The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings
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ABSTRACT: Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term (‘static’) employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term (‘dynamic’) relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency. Supplementary Information
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.
SUBMITTER: Kerschbamer R
PROVIDER: S-EPMC10129933 | biostudies-literature | 2022 Oct
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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