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ACO Clinicians Have Higher Medicare Part B Medical Services Payments Than MIPS Clinicians Under the Quality Payment Program.

ABSTRACT: The Quality Payment Program (QPP) is a Medicare value-based payment program with 2 tracks: -Advanced Alternative Payment Models (A-APMs), including two-sided risk Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), and Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). In 2020, A-APM eligible ACO clinicians received an additional 5% positive, and MIPS clinicians received up to 5% negative or 2% positive performance-based adjustments to their Medicare Part B medical services payments. It is unclear whether the different payment adjustments have differential impacts on total medical services payments for ACO and MIPS participants. We compare Medicare Part B medical services payments received by primary care clinicians participating in ACO and MIPS programs using Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Public Use Files from 2014 to 2018 using difference-in-differences regressions. We have 254 395 observations from 50 879 unique clinicians (ACO = 37.86%; MIPS = 62.14%). Regression results suggest that ACO clinicians have significantly higher Medicare Part B medical services payments ($1003.88; 95% CI: [579.08, 1428.69]) when compared to MIPS clinicians. Our findings suggest that ACO clinicians had a greater increase in medical services payments when compared to MIPS clinicians following QPP participation. Increased payments for Medicare Part B medical services among ACO clinicians may be driven partly by higher payment adjustment rates for ACO clinicians for Part B medical services. However, increased Part B medical services payments could also reflect clinicians switching to increased outpatient services to prevent potentially costly inpatient services. Policymakers should examine both aspects when evaluating QPP effectiveness.

SUBMITTER: Shrestha M

PROVIDER: S-EPMC10958801 | biostudies-literature | 2024 Jan-Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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ACO Clinicians Have Higher Medicare Part B Medical Services Payments Than MIPS Clinicians Under the Quality Payment Program.

Shrestha Mina M Sharma Hari H Mueller Keith J KJ

Inquiry : a journal of medical care organization, provision and financing 20240101

The Quality Payment Program (QPP) is a Medicare value-based payment program with 2 tracks: -Advanced Alternative Payment Models (A-APMs), including two-sided risk Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), and Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). In 2020, A-APM eligible ACO clinicians received an additional 5% positive, and MIPS clinicians received up to 5% negative or 2% positive performance-based adjustments to their Medicare Part B medical services payments. It is unclear whether the diff ...[more]

PMID: 38515280

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Project description:BackgroundAlthough the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) created new incentives for organizations to improve healthcare value, Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) have achieved only modest reductions in the use of low-value care.ObjectiveTo assess ACO engagement of clinicians and whether engagement was associated with clinicians' reported difficulty implementing recommendations against low-value care.DesignCross-sectional survey of ACO clinicians in 2018.Participants1289 clinicians in the Physician Organization of Michigan ACO, including generalist physicians (18%), internal medicine specialists (16%), surgeons (10%), other physician specialists (27%), and advanced practice providers (29%). Response rate was 34%.Main measuresPrimary exposures included clinicians' participation in ACO decision-making, awareness of ACO incentives, perceived influence on practice, and perceived quality improvement. Our primary outcome was clinicians' reported difficulty implementing recommendations against low-value care.ResultsFew clinicians participated in the decision to join the ACO (3%). Few clinicians were aware of ACO incentives, including knowing the ACO was accountable for both spending and quality (23%), successfully lowered spending (9%), or faced upside risk only (3%). Few agreed (moderately or strongly) the ACO changed compensation (20%), practice (19%), or feedback (15%) or that it improved care coordination (17%) or inappropriate care (13%). Clinicians reported they had difficulty following recommendations against low-value care 18% of the time; clinicians reported patients had difficulty accepting recommendations 36% of the time. Increased ACO awareness (1 standard deviation [SD]) was associated with decreased difficulty (- 2.3 percentage points) implementing recommendations (95% confidence interval [CI] - 3.8, - 0.7), as was perceived quality improvement (1 SD increase, - 2.1 percentage points, 95% CI, - 3.4, - 0.8). Participation in ACO decision-making and perceived influence on practice were not associated with recommendation implementation.ConclusionsClinicians participating in a large Medicare ACO were broadly unaware of and unengaged with ACO objectives and activities. Whether low clinician engagement limits ACO efforts to reduce low-value care warrants further longitudinal study.

Project description:ObjectiveTo evaluate the effects of the size of financial bonuses on quality of care and the number of plan offerings in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration.Data sourcesPublicly available data from CMS from 2009 to 2014 on Medicare Advantage plan quality ratings, the counties in the service area of each plan, and the benchmarks used to construct plan payments.Study designThe Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration began in 2012. Under the Demonstration, all Medicare Advantage plans were eligible to receive bonus payments based on plan-level quality scores (star ratings). In some counties, plans were eligible to receive bonus payments that were twice as large as in other counties. We used this variation in incentives to evaluate the effects of bonus size on star ratings and the number of plan offerings in the Demonstration using a differences-in-differences identification strategy. We used matching to create a comparison group of counties that did not receive double bonuses but had similar levels of the preintervention outcomes.Principal findingsResults from the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the receipt of double bonuses was not associated with an increase in star ratings. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with a statistically insignificant increase of +0.034 (approximately 1 percent) in the average star rating (p > .10, 95 percent CI: -0.015, 0.083). In contrast, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an increase in the number of plans offered. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an overall increase of +0.814 plans (approximately 5.8 percent) (p < .05, 95 percent CI: 0.078, 1.549). We estimate that the double bonuses increased payments by $3.43 billion over the first 3 years of the Demonstration.ConclusionsAt great expense to Medicare, double bonuses in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration were not associated with improved quality but were associated with more plan offerings.

Project description:ImportanceRising pharmaceutical costs in the United States are an increasing source of financial burden for payers and patients. Although topical steroids are among the most commonly prescribed medications in dermatology, there are limited data on steroid-related spending and utilization.ObjectiveTo characterize Medicare and patient out-of-pocket costs for topical steroids, and to model potential savings that could result from substitution of the cheapest topical steroid from the corresponding potency class.Design, setting, and participantsThis study was a retrospective cost analysis of the Medicare Part D Prescriber Public Use File, which details annual drug utilization and spending on both generic and branded drugs from 2011 to 2015 by Medicare Part D participants who filled prescriptions for topical steroids.Main outcomes and measuresTotal and potential Medicare and out-of-pocket patient spending. Costs were adjusted for inflation and reported in 2015 dollars.ResultsMedicare Part D expenditures on topical steroids between 2011 and 2015 were $2.3 billion. Patients' out-of-pocket spending for topical steroids over the same period was $333.7 million. The total annual spending increased from $237.6 million to $775.9 million, an increase of 226.5%. Patients' annual out-of-pocket spending increased from $41.4 million to $101.8 million, an increase of 145.9%. The total number of prescriptions were 7.7 million in 2011 and 10.6 million in 2015, an increase of 37.0%. Generic medication costs accounted for 97.8% of the total spending during this time period. The potential health care savings and out-of-pocket patient savings from substitution of the cheapest topical steroid within the corresponding potency class were $944.8 million and $66.6 million, respectively.Conclusions and relevanceMost topical steroids prescribed were generic drugs. There has been a sharp increase in Medicare and out-of-pocket spending on topical steroids that is driven by higher costs for generics. Use of clinical decision support tools to enable substitution of the most affordable generic topical steroid from the corresponding potency class may reduce drug expenditures.

Project description:ImportanceAge-related macular degeneration (ARMD) therapies aflibercept and ranibizumab are among the highest-cost Medicare Part B drugs, even though off-label use of lower-cost bevacizumab is clinically noninferior. Payments from manufacturers of these ARMD therapies to ophthalmologists are hypothesized to be factors in ophthalmologists' therapeutic choice, controlling for ophthalmologist and patient characteristics.ObjectiveTo assess the association between manufacturer payments to ophthalmologists and choice of ARMD treatment as well as to identify ophthalmologist-level characteristics associated with prescribing lower-cost ARMD therapies.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective cross-sectional study of longitudinal (2013-2019) Medicare Part B data was conducted from December 2021 to December 2022. Ophthalmologists prescribing aflibercept (manufactured by Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc), rabinizumab, or bevacizumab (both manufactured by Genentech Inc) for ARMD treatment of Medicare Part B beneficiaries were included. Data on manufacturer payments to ophthalmologists were obtained from the Open Payments database.Main outcomes and measuresThe primary outcome was the percentage of bevacizumab prescribed by ophthalmologists among all ARMD therapies. Regression analysis assessed variation in bevacizumab prescribing by acceptance of manufacturer payments as well as by ophthalmologist and patient characteristics. Ophthalmologist characteristics were duration of practice and Medicare Administrative Contractor region, and patient characteristics were aggregated at the ophthalmologist level and included mean beneficiary age, percentage of dual-eligible beneficiaries, mean beneficiary risk score, and percentage of White beneficiaries. Savings were estimated by projecting the change in bevacizumab use had ophthalmologists not accepted manufacturer payments, controlling for all ophthalmologist and patient characteristics and comparing with observed use and costs.ResultsA total of 21 584 ophthalmologists (18 489 males [85.7%]) were included. Ophthalmologists who accepted manufacturer payments were significantly less likely to prescribe bevacizumab (28.0% [95% CI, 24.6%-42.5%] of patients) compared with those who did not accept manufacturer payments (45.8% [95% CI, 44.5%-47.1%]). Ophthalmologists who saw dual-eligible beneficiaries had greater bevacizumab prescribing (50.0% [95% CI, 40.6%-68.3%] in the highest quartile vs 36.1% [95% CI, 33.5%-38.8%] in the lowest quartile; β coefficient, 0.139; P < .001), while those who saw patients with higher mean beneficiary risk scores had lower bevacizumab use (38.0% [95% CI, 23.7%-44.1%] in the highest quartile vs 48.2% [95% CI, 45.5%-50.8%] in the lowest quartile; β coefficient, -0.102, P < .001). Had ophthalmologists who accepted manufacturer payments prescribed ARMD drugs as those who did not accept payments, Medicare spending on these treatments would have been $642 779 703.08 lower from 2013 to 2019, a 2.0% savings.Conclusions and relevanceResults of this cross-sectional study suggest that drug manufacturer payments to ophthalmologists were associated with selection of higher-cost therapies for ARMD, which is a factor in increased Medicare and patient spending. Development of manufacturer payment models that encourage ophthalmologists to choose lower-cost therapies are needed.

Dataset Information

ACO Clinicians Have Higher Medicare Part B Medical Services Payments Than MIPS Clinicians Under the Quality Payment Program.

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ACO Clinicians Have Higher Medicare Part B Medical Services Payments Than MIPS Clinicians Under the Quality Payment Program.

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