Tragedy of the commons in Melipona bees.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Wenseleers T
PROVIDER: S-EPMC1810046 | biostudies-literature | 2004 Aug
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Tragedy of the commons in Melipona bees.
Wenseleers Tom T Ratnieks Francis L W FL
Proceedings. Biological sciences 20040801
In human society selfish use of common resources can lead to disaster, a situation known as the 'tragedy of the commons' (TOC). Although a TOC is usually prevented by coercion, theory predicts that close kinship ties can also favour reduced exploitation. We test this prediction using data on a TOC occurring in Melipona bee societies. ...[more]
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