Metacognition in the rat.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Foote AL
PROVIDER: S-EPMC1861845 | biostudies-literature | 2007 Mar
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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The ability to reflect on one's own mental processes, termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human existence [1, 2]. Consequently, a fundamental question in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states [3]. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhuman primates [4-8] but not less "cognitively sophisticated" species [3, 9, 10] are capable of metacognition. Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are capable of metacognition-- ...[more]
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Project description:IntroductionPrevious studies on metacognitive ability were explored using self-report questionnaires that are difficult to adequately measure and evaluate when the capacity for self-reference is undeveloped. This study aimed to validate the Congruency-based Metacognition Scale (CMS) to measure metacognition and the feeling of confidence abilities and to investigate the development of metacognition during adolescence.MethodsThe CMS was administered to 633 child-parent pairs in Japan (child, mean age = 16.0 years, 46.0% female; parent, mean age = 48.3 years, 94.9% mother). The CMS metacognition score was assessed based on congruency scores between the self-report of the child from a third-person perspective (3PP) and the parent's report from the first-person perspective (1PP). The CMS self-judgment accuracy score was assessed by the congruency scores between the children's self-report from the 1PP and 3PP. For both measures, the more distant the 3PP on the self-report was from the 1PP on the parent's report and child self-report means low ability. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to examine construct validity and then a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used. Criterion validity was examined by calculating Pearson's correlation coefficients with scores on the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) and Autism Quotient (AQ). We used intraclass correlation and Cronbach's alpha to examine the test-retest and internal consistency reliability.ResultsBased on the results of the EFA and CFA, we adopted one factor structure with five items. The CMS metacognition and CMS self-judgment accuracy showed evidence criterion validity, exhibiting significant correlations with the BCIS self-reflectiveness (r = 0.16) and self-certainty scores (r = 0.17), respectively. Regarding to the AQ, only the CMS metacognition score had significant correlations with the social skills (r = 0.22) and total scale score (r = 0.20). The test-retest reliability showed adequate (intraclass correlation coefficient 0.70-0.81 and the Cronbach's alpha coefficient 0.63-0.59). Adolescents were found to have significantly lower metacognitive ability compared to young adults.ConclusionCMS could be a valid and reliable measure to examine metacognitive abilities for adolescents.
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Project description:The ability to recognize one's own successful cognitive processing, in e.g., perceptual or memory tasks, is often referred to as metacognition. How should we quantitatively measure such ability? Here we focus on a class of measures that assess the correspondence between trial-by-trial accuracy and one's own confidence. In general, for healthy subjects endowed with metacognitive sensitivity, when one is confident, one is more likely to be correct. Thus, the degree of association between accuracy and confidence can be taken as a quantitative measure of metacognition. However, many studies use a statistical correlation coefficient (e.g., Pearson's r) or its variant to assess this degree of association, and such measures are susceptible to undesirable influences from factors such as response biases. Here we review other measures based on signal detection theory and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis that are "bias free," and relate these quantities to the calibration and discrimination measures developed in the probability estimation literature. We go on to distinguish between the related concepts of metacognitive bias (a difference in subjective confidence despite basic task performance remaining constant), metacognitive sensitivity (how good one is at distinguishing between one's own correct and incorrect judgments) and metacognitive efficiency (a subject's level of metacognitive sensitivity given a certain level of task performance). Finally, we discuss how these three concepts pose interesting questions for the study of metacognition and conscious awareness.
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Project description:Metacognition is the ability to think about thinking. Although monitoring and controlling one's knowledge is a key feature of human cognition, its evolutionary origins are debated. In the current study, we examined whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; N = 120) could make metacognitive inferences in a one-shot decision. Each monkey experienced one of four conditions, observing a human appearing to hide a food reward in an apparatus consisting of either one or two tubes. The monkeys tended to search the correct location when they observed this baiting event, but engaged in information seeking-by peering into a center location where they could check both potential hiding spots-if their view had been occluded and information seeking was possible. The monkeys only occasionally approached the center when information seeking was not possible. These results show that monkeys spontaneously use information about their own knowledge states to solve naturalistic foraging problems, and thus provide the first evidence that nonhumans exhibit information-seeking responses in situations with which they have no prior experience.
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Project description:Humans have the ability to reflect upon their perception, thoughts, and actions, known as metacognition (MC). The brain basis of MC is incompletely understood, and it is debated whether MC on different processes is subserved by common or divergent networks. We combined behavioral phenotyping with multi-modal neuroimaging to investigate whether structural substrates of individual differences in MC on higher-order cognition (MC-C) are dissociable from those underlying MC on perceptual accuracy (MC-P). Motivated by conceptual work suggesting a link between MC and cognitive perspective taking, we furthermore tested for overlaps between MC substrates and mentalizing networks. In a large sample of healthy adults, individual differences in MC-C and MC-P did not correlate. MRI-based cortical thickness mapping revealed a structural basis of this independence, by showing that individual differences in MC-P related to right prefrontal cortical thickness, while MC-C scores correlated with measures in lateral prefrontal, temporo-parietal, and posterior midline regions. Surface-based superficial white matter diffusivity analysis revealed substrates resembling those seen for cortical thickness, confirming the divergence of both MC faculties using an independent imaging marker. Despite their specificity, substrates of MC-C and MC-P fell clearly within networks known to participate in mentalizing, confirmed by task-based fMRI in the same subjects, previous meta-analytical findings, and ad-hoc Neurosynth-based meta-analyses. Our integrative multi-method approach indicates domain-specific substrates of MC; despite their divergence, these nevertheless likely rely on component processes mediated by circuits also involved in mentalizing. Hum Brain Mapp 37:3388-3399, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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Project description:When deciding whether or not to bring an umbrella to work, your confidence will be influenced by the sky outside the window (direct evidence) as well as by, for example, whether or not people walking in the street have their own umbrella (indirect or contingent evidence). These 2 distinct aspects of decision confidence have not yet been assessed independently within the same framework. Here we study the relative contributions of stimulus-specific and social-contingent information on confidence formation. Dyads of participants made visual perceptual decisions, first individually and then together by sharing their wagers in their decisions. We independently manipulated the sensory evidence and the social consensus available to participants and found that both type of evidence contributed to wagers. Consistent with previous work, the amount people were prepared to wager covaried with the strength of sensory evidence. However, social agreements and disagreement affected wagers in opposite directions and asymmetrically. These different contributions of sensory and social evidence to wager were linearly additive. Moreover, average metacognitive sensitivity-namely the association between wagers and accuracy-between interacting dyad members positively correlated with dyadic performance and dyadic benefit above average individual performance. Our results provide a general framework that accounts for how both social context and direct sensory evidence contribute to decision confidence. (PsycINFO Database Record
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Project description:Bayesian models of the mind suggest that we estimate the reliability or "precision" of incoming sensory signals to guide perceptual inference and to construct feelings of confidence or uncertainty about what we are perceiving. However, accurately estimating precision is likely to be challenging for bounded systems like the brain. One way observers could overcome this challenge is to form expectations about the precision of their perceptions and use these to guide metacognition and awareness. Here we test this possibility. Participants made perceptual decisions about visual motion stimuli, while providing confidence ratings (Experiments 1 and 2) or ratings of subjective visibility (Experiment 3). In each experiment, participants acquired probabilistic expectations about the likely strength of upcoming signals. We found these expectations about precision altered metacognition and awareness-with participants feeling more confident and stimuli appearing more vivid when stronger sensory signals were expected, without concomitant changes in objective perceptual performance. Computational modeling revealed that this effect could be well explained by a predictive learning model that infers the precision (strength) of current signals as a weighted combination of incoming evidence and top-down expectation. These results support an influential but untested tenet of Bayesian models of cognition, suggesting that agents do not only "read out" the reliability of information arriving at their senses, but also take into account prior knowledge about how reliable or "precise" different sources of information are likely to be. This reveals that expectations about precision influence how the sensory world appears and how much we trust our senses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
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Project description:Metacognition, our ability to reflect on our own beliefs, manifests itself in the confidence we have in these beliefs, and helps us guide our behavior in complex and uncertain environments. Here, we provide empirical tests of the importance of metacognition during the pandemic. Bayesian and frequentist analyses demonstrate that citizens with higher metacognitive sensitivity-where confidence differentiates correct from incorrect COVID-19 beliefs-reported higher willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19, and higher compliance with recommended public health measures. Notably, this benefit of accurate introspection held controlling for the accuracy of COVID-19 beliefs. By demonstrating how vaccination willingness and compliance may relate to insight into the varying accuracy of beliefs, rather than only the accuracy of the beliefs themselves, this research highlights the critical role of metacognitive ability in times of crisis. However, we do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that citizens with higher metacognitive sensitivity were more likely to comply with recommended public health measures when controlling for the absolute level of the confidence citizens had in their COVID-19 beliefs.
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