Dataset Information

Quality of clinical primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Payments for recorded evidence of quality of clinical care in UK general practices were introduced in 2004.

Aim

To examine the relationship between changes in recorded quality of care for four common chronic conditions from, 2003 to 2005, and the payment of incentives.

Design of study

Retrospective observational study comparing incentivised and non-incentivised indicators of quality of care.

Setting

Eighteen general practices in England.

Method

Medical records were examined for 1156 patients. The percentage of eligible quality indicators achieved for each patient was assessed in 2003 and 2005. Twenty-one quality indicators referred to asthma and hypertension: six subject to and 15 not subject to incentive payments. Another 15 indicators referred to depression and osteoarthritis which were not subject to incentive payments.

Results

A significant increase occurred for the six indicators linked to incentive payments: from 75% achieved in 2003 to 91% in 2005 (change = 16%, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 10 to 22%, P <0.01). A significant increase also occurred for 15 other indicators linked to 'incentivised conditions'; 53 to 64% (change = 11%, 95% CI = 6 to 15%, P <0.01). The 'non-incentivised conditions' started at a lower achievement level, and did not increase significantly: 35 to 36% (change = 2%, 95% CI = -1 to 4%, P = 0.19).

Conclusion

The introduction of financial incentives was associated with substantial apparent quality improvement for incentivised conditions. For non-incentivised conditions, quality did not appear to improve. Patients with non-incentivised conditions may be at risk of poorer quality care.

SUBMITTER: Steel N

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2078183 | biostudies-literature | 2007 Jun

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Publications

Quality of clinical primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study.

Steel Nicholas N Maisey Susan S Clark Allan A Fleetcroft Robert R Howe Amanda A

The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners 20070601 539

<h4>Background</h4>Payments for recorded evidence of quality of clinical care in UK general practices were introduced in 2004.<h4>Aim</h4>To examine the relationship between changes in recorded quality of care for four common chronic conditions from, 2003 to 2005, and the payment of incentives.<h4>Design of study</h4>Retrospective observational study comparing incentivised and non-incentivised indicators of quality of care.<h4>Setting</h4>Eighteen general practices in England.<h4>Method</h4>Medi ...[more]

PMID: 17550669

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Project description:The Medicare and Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a hospital-based pay-for-performance program, changed its incentive design from one rewarding only high performance (Phase 1) to another rewarding high performance, moderate performance, and improvement (Phase 2). We tested whether this design change reduced the gap in incentive payments among hospitals treating patients across the gradient of socioeconomic disadvantage.To estimate incentive payments in both phases, we used data from the Premier Inc. website and from Medicare Provider Analysis and Review files. We used data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Impact File to identify hospital characteristics.Hospitals were divided into quartiles based on their Disproportionate Share Index (DSH), from lowest disadvantage (Quartile 1) to highest disadvantage (Quartile 4). In both phases of the HQID, we tested for differences across the DSH quartiles for three outcomes: (1) receipt of any incentive payments; (2) total incentive payments; and (3) incentive payments per discharge. For each of the study outcomes, we performed a hospital-level difference-in-differences analysis to test whether the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles decreased from Phase 1 to Phase 2.In Phase 1, there were significant gaps across the DSH quartiles for the receipt of any payment and for payment per discharge. In Phase 2, the gap was not significant for the receipt of any payment, but it remained significant for payment per discharge. For the receipt of any incentive payment, difference-in-difference estimates showed significant reductions in the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, 17.5 percentage points [p < .05]; Quartile 3, 18.1 percentage points [p < .01]; Quartile 4, 28.3 percentage points [p < .01]). For payments per discharge, the gap was also significantly reduced between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, $14.92 per discharge [p < .10]; Quartile 3, $17.34 per discharge [p < .05]; Quartile 4, $21.31 per discharge [p < .01]). There were no significant reductions in the gap for total payments.The design change in the HQID reduced the disparity in the receipt of any incentive payment and for incentive payments per discharge between hospitals caring for the most and least socioeconomically disadvantaged patient populations.

Project description:BackgroundThe General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives.MethodsWe performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment.ResultsEvidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years.ConclusionsIn this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator.

Project description:ObjectiveTo evaluate the effects of the size of financial bonuses on quality of care and the number of plan offerings in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration.Data sourcesPublicly available data from CMS from 2009 to 2014 on Medicare Advantage plan quality ratings, the counties in the service area of each plan, and the benchmarks used to construct plan payments.Study designThe Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration began in 2012. Under the Demonstration, all Medicare Advantage plans were eligible to receive bonus payments based on plan-level quality scores (star ratings). In some counties, plans were eligible to receive bonus payments that were twice as large as in other counties. We used this variation in incentives to evaluate the effects of bonus size on star ratings and the number of plan offerings in the Demonstration using a differences-in-differences identification strategy. We used matching to create a comparison group of counties that did not receive double bonuses but had similar levels of the preintervention outcomes.Principal findingsResults from the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the receipt of double bonuses was not associated with an increase in star ratings. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with a statistically insignificant increase of +0.034 (approximately 1 percent) in the average star rating (p > .10, 95 percent CI: -0.015, 0.083). In contrast, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an increase in the number of plans offered. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an overall increase of +0.814 plans (approximately 5.8 percent) (p < .05, 95 percent CI: 0.078, 1.549). We estimate that the double bonuses increased payments by $3.43 billion over the first 3 years of the Demonstration.ConclusionsAt great expense to Medicare, double bonuses in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration were not associated with improved quality but were associated with more plan offerings.

Project description:ObjectiveTo measure changes in quality of care for three major chronic diseases (coronary heart disease, asthma, and type 2 diabetes) between 1998 and 2003.DesignLongitudinal cohort study.Setting42 general practices in six geographical areas of England (Avon, Bury/Rochdale, Enfield, Oldham, Somerset, South Essex).ParticipantsMedical record data for 2300 patients with diabetes, asthma, or coronary heart disease in 1998, and 1495 patients in 2003.Main outcome measureQuality of care assessed against predefined evidence based review criteria.ResultsBetween 1998 and 2003, quality of care improved markedly in terms of maximum possible scores on the review criteria, from 60.5% to 78.1% for coronary heart disease (change = 17.6, 95% confidence interval 13.9 to 21.4; P < 0.001), 60.1% to 70.3% for asthma (10.2, 4.6 to 15.8; P = 0.001), and 70.4% to 77.7% for diabetes (7.3, 3.5 to 11.1; P = 0.001). Important changes occurred to several indicators potentially related to improved health outcomes. These included improved control of serum cholesterol (to < or = 5 mmol/l) from 17.6% to 61.4% in coronary heart disease and from 21.5% to 52% in diabetes and control of blood pressure to < or = 150/90 in coronary heart disease from 47.3% to 72.2% and to < or = 145/85 in diabetes from 21.8% to 35.8%. A small, non-significant improvement in glycaemic control occurred among diabetic patients (37.9% to 39.7% with HbA1c < 7.4%). Significant improvements also occurred in the recording of exercise capacity and diet and weight advice for patients with coronary heart disease; of smoking advice, peak flow, and symptoms for patients with asthma; and of creatinine, weight, and HbA(1c) for patients with diabetes. Over the five years, more improvement in coronary heart disease care occurred in large practices and practices in affluent areas.ConclusionsSubstantial improvements were seen in quality of care for the three conditions studied between 1998 and 2003, a time of systematic quality improvement initiatives in the NHS. The changes were most marked for coronary heart disease. English general practices could be expected to achieve high clinical quality scores in the initial year of a new contact, which provides financial incentives for high quality care from 2004.

Project description:BackgroundRurality strongly correlates with higher pay-for-performance access bonuses, despite higher emergency department use and fewer primary care services than in urban settings. We sought to evaluate the relation between patient-reported access to primary care and access bonus payments in urban settings.MethodsWe conducted a cross-sectional, secondary data analysis using Ontario survey and health administrative data from 2013 to 2017. We used administrative data to calculate annual access bonuses for eligible urban family physicians. We linked this payment data to adult (≥ 16 yr) patient data from the Health Care Experiences Survey to examine the relation between access bonus achievement (in quintiles of the proportion of bonus achieved, from lowest [Q1, reference category] to highest [Q5]) and 4 patient-reported access outcomes. The average survey response rate to the patient survey during the study period was 51%. We stratified urban geography into large, medium and small settings. In a multilevel regression model, we adjusted for patient-, physician- and practice-level covariates. We tested linear trends, adjusted for clustering, for each outcome.ResultsWe linked 18 893 respondents to 3940 physicians in 414 bonus-eligible practices. Physicians in small urban settings earned the highest proportion of their maximum potential access bonuses. Access bonus achievement was positively associated with telephone access (Q2 odds ratio [OR] 1.18, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.98-1.42; Q3 OR 1.34, 95% CI 1.10-1.63; Q4 OR 1.46, 95% CI 1.19-1.79; Q5 OR 1.87, 95% CI 1.50-2.33), after hours access (Q2 OR 1.26, 95% CI 1.09-1.47; Q3 OR 1.46, 95% CI 1.23-1.74; Q4 OR 1.77, 95% CI 1.46-2.15; Q5 OR 1.88, 95% CI 1.52-2.32), wait time for care (Q2 OR 1.01, 95% CI 0.85-1.20; Q3 OR 1.17, 95% CI 0.97-1.41; Q4 OR 1.27, 95% CI 1.05-1.55; Q5 OR 1.63, 95% CI 1.32-2.00) and timeliness (Q2 OR 1.29, 95% CI 0.98-1.69; Q3 OR 1.29, 95% CI 0.94-1.77; Q4 OR 1.58, 95% CI 1.16-2.13; Q5 OR 1.98, 95% CI 1.38-2.82). When stratified by geography, we observed several of these associations in large urban settings, but not in small urban settings. Trend tests were statistically significant for all 4 outcomes.InterpretationAlthough the access bonus correlated with access in larger urban settings, it did not in smaller settings, aligning with previous research questioning its utility in smaller geographies. The access bonus may benefit from a redesign that considers geography and patient experience.

Dataset Information

Quality of clinical primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study.

Background

Aim

Design of study

Setting

Method

Results

Conclusion

Publications

Quality of clinical primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observational study.

Similar Datasets

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