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Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude.

ABSTRACT: If someone is nice to you, you feel good and may be inclined to be nice to somebody else. This every day experience is borne out by experimental games: the recipients of an act of kindness are more likely to help in turn, even if the person who benefits from their generosity is somebody else. This behaviour, which has been called 'upstream reciprocity', appears to be a misdirected act of gratitude: you help somebody because somebody else has helped you. Does this make any sense from an evolutionary or a game theoretic perspective? In this paper, we show that upstream reciprocity alone does not lead to the evolution of cooperation, but it can evolve and increase the level of cooperation if it is linked to either direct or spatial reciprocity. We calculate the random walks of altruistic acts that are induced by upstream reciprocity. Our analysis shows that gratitude and other positive emotions, which increase the willingness to help others, can evolve in the competitive world of natural selection.

SUBMITTER: Nowak MA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2197219 | biostudies-literature | 2007 Mar

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude.

Nowak Martin A MA Roch Sébastien S

Proceedings. Biological sciences 20070301 1610

If someone is nice to you, you feel good and may be inclined to be nice to somebody else. This every day experience is borne out by experimental games: the recipients of an act of kindness are more likely to help in turn, even if the person who benefits from their generosity is somebody else. This behaviour, which has been called 'upstream reciprocity', appears to be a misdirected act of gratitude: you help somebody because somebody else has helped you. Does this make any sense from an evolution ...[more]

PMID: 17254983

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