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Game theory of mind.

ABSTRACT: This paper introduces a model of 'theory of mind', namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a 'game theory of mind'. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a 'stag-hunt'. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution.

SUBMITTER: Yoshida W

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2596313 | biostudies-literature | 2008 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Game theory of mind.

Yoshida Wako W Dolan Ray J RJ Friston Karl J KJ

PLoS computational biology 20081226 12

This paper introduces a model of 'theory of mind', namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a 'game theory of mind'. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value functio ...[more]

PMID: 19112488

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Project description:Background: Several meta-analyses highlight pronounced problems in general Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other persons' mental states, in patients with psychosis in comparison to non-clinical controls. In addition, first studies suggest associations between Hyper-ToM, an exaggerated inference of mental states to others, and delusions. Research on different ToM subtypes (Cognitive ToM, Affective ToM, and Hyper-ToM) and symptom clusters of psychosis (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) have gathered conflicting findings. Thus, the present study examined group differences between patients with psychosis and non-clinical controls concerning Cognitive ToM/Affective ToM and Hyper-ToM. Further, the association between ToM subtypes and symptom clusters (positive, negative, and disorganized symptoms) were examined. Methods: Patients with psychotic disorders (n = 64, 1/3 with present delusions indicated by a minimum score of four in the PANSS P1 item) and non-clinical controls (n = 21) were examined with assessments of Cognitive ToM and Affective ToM abilities and Hyper-ToM errors using the Frith-Happé animations. Psychopathology was assessed using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Results: Patients with psychosis presented more pronounced problems in Cognitive and Affective ToM in comparison to non-clinical controls, whereas there were no group differences with regard to Hyper-ToM errors. Furthermore, deficits in Cognitive ToM were associated with general delusions, whereas problems in Affective ToM were associated with negative and disorganized symptoms. In addition, there was no association between Hyper-ToM errors and any symptoms when controlling for years of education. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that deficits in ToM subtypes might not be directly related to delusions and positive symptoms and are in line with more recently developed cognitive models of delusions. In addition, our results support the well-established finding of associations between ToM alterations and negative or disorganized symptoms. Our results shed light on the role of different dimensions of ToM in specific symptoms of psychosis.

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Game theory of mind.

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Game theory of mind.

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