Medical malpractice reform and employer-sponsored health insurance premiums.

ABSTRACT:

Objective

Tort reform may affect health insurance premiums both by reducing medical malpractice premiums and by reducing the extent of defensive medicine. The objective of this study is to estimate the effects of noneconomic damage caps on the premiums for employer-sponsored health insurance.

Data sources/study setting

Employer premium data and plan/establishment characteristics were obtained from the 1999 through 2004 Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Insurance Surveys. Damage caps were obtained and dated based on state annotated codes, statutes, and judicial decisions.

Study design

Fixed effects regression models were run to estimate the effects of the size of inflation-adjusted damage caps on the weighted average single premiums.

Data collection/extraction methods

State tort reform laws were identified using Westlaw, LEXIS, and statutory compilations. Legislative repeal and amendment of statutes and court decisions resulting in the overturning or repealing state statutes were also identified using LEXIS.

Principal findings

Using a variety of empirical specifications, there was no statistically significant evidence that noneconomic damage caps exerted any meaningful influence on the cost of employer-sponsored health insurance.

Conclusions

The findings suggest that tort reforms have not translated into insurance savings.

SUBMITTER: Morrisey MA 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2614003 | biostudies-literature | 2008 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature