Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: De Martino B
PROVIDER: S-EPMC2631940 | biostudies-literature | 2006 Aug
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain.
De Martino Benedetto B Kumaran Dharshan D Seymour Ben B Dolan Raymond J RJ
Science (New York, N.Y.) 20060801 5787
Human choices are remarkably susceptible to the manner in which options are presented. This so-called "framing effect" represents a striking violation of standard economic accounts of human rationality, although its underlying neurobiology is not understood. We found that the framing effect was specifically associated with amygdala activity, suggesting a key role for an emotional system in mediating decision biases. Moreover, across individuals, orbital and medial prefrontal cortex activity pred ...[more]
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