Delayed perceptual awareness in rapid perceptual decisions.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Gregori-Grgic R
PROVIDER: S-EPMC3040746 | biostudies-literature | 2011 Feb
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Delayed perceptual awareness in rapid perceptual decisions.
Gregori-Grgič Regina R Balderi Monica M de'Sperati Claudio C
PloS one 20110217 2
The flourishing of studies on the neural correlates of decision-making calls for an appraisal of the relation between perceptual decisions and conscious perception. By exploiting the long integration time of noisy motion stimuli, and by forcing human observers to make difficult speeded decisions--sometimes a blind guess--about stimulus direction, we traced the temporal buildup of motion discrimination capability and perceptual awareness, as assessed trial by trial through direct rating. We found ...[more]
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