Family doctor responses to changes in incentives for influenza immunization under the U.K. Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme.
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SUBMITTER: Kontopantelis E
PROVIDER: S-EPMC3423175 | biostudies-literature | 2012 Jun
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Family doctor responses to changes in incentives for influenza immunization under the U.K. Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance scheme.
Kontopantelis Evangelos E Doran Tim T Gravelle Hugh H Goudie Rosalind R Siciliani Luigi L Sutton Matt M
Health services research 20111215 3 Pt 1
<h4>Objective</h4>To analyze the effect of setting higher targets, in a primary care pay-for-performance scheme, on rates of influenza immunization and exception reporting.<h4>Study setting</h4>The U.K. Quality and Outcomes Framework links financial rewards for family practices to four separate influenza immunization rates for patients with coronary heart disease (CHD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes, and stroke. There is no additional payment for immunization rates above an upp ...[more]
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Project description:BackgroundAlthough pay-for-performance (P4P) has become a central strategy for improving quality in US healthcare, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. A key question is whether quality improvement that occurs as a result of P4P programs is sustainable, particularly if incentives are removed.ObjectiveTo investigate sustainability of performance levels following removal of performance-based incentives.Design, setting, and participantsObservational cohort study that capitalized on a P4P program within the Veterans Health Administration (VA) that included adoption and subsequent removal of performance-based incentives for selected inpatient quality measures. The study sample comprised 128 acute care VA hospitals where performance was assessed between 2004 and 2010.InterventionVA system managers set annual performance goals in consultation with clinical leaders, and report performance scores to medical centers on a quarterly basis. These scores inform performance-based incentives for facilities and their managers. Bonuses are distributed based on the attainment of these performance goals.MeasurementsSeven quality of care measures for acute coronary syndrome, heart failure, and pneumonia linked to performance-based incentives.ResultsSignificant improvements in performance were observed for six of seven quality of care measures following adoption of performance-based incentives and were maintained up to the removal of the incentive; subsequently, the observed performance levels were sustained.LimitationsThis is a quasi-experimental study without a comparison group; causal conclusions are limited.ConclusionThe maintenance of performance levels after removal of a performance-based incentive has implications for the implementation of Medicare's value-based purchasing initiative and other P4P programs. Additional research is needed to better understand human and system-level factors that mediate sustainability of performance-based incentives.
| S-EPMC3889947 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This study aims to explore the impact of healthcare digitalization on smart hospital project financing (PF) fostered by pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives. Digital platforms are a technology-enabled business model that facilitates exchanges between interacting agents. They represent a bridging link among disconnected nodes, improving the scalable value of networks. Application to healthcare public-private partnerships (PPPs) is significant due to the consistency of digital platforms with health issues and the complexity of the stakeholder's interaction. In infrastructural PPPs, public and private players cooperate, usually following PF patterns. This relationship is complemented by digitized supply chains and is increasingly patient-centric. This paper reviews the literature, analyzes some supply chain bottlenecks, addresses solutions concerning the networking effects of platforms to improve PPP interactions, and investigates the cost-benefit analysis of digital health with an empirical case. Whereas diagnostic or infrastructural technology is an expensive investment with long-term payback, leapfrogging digital applications reduce contingent costs. "Digital" savings can be shared by key stakeholders with P4P schemes, incentivizing value co-creation patterns. Efficient sharing may apply network theory to a comprehensive PPP ecosystem where stakeholding nodes are digitally connected. This innovative approach improves stakeholder relationships, which are re-engineered around digital platforms that enhance patient-centered satisfaction and sustainability. Digital technologies are useful even for infectious disease surveillance, like that of the coronavirus pandemic, for supporting massive healthcare intervention, decongesting hospitals, and providing timely big data.
| S-EPMC7177756 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundThe Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is an incentive scheme for general practice, which was introduced across the UK in 2004. The Quality and Outcomes Framework is one of the biggest pay for performance (P4P) scheme in the world, worth £691 million in 2016/17. We now know that P4P is good at driving some kinds of improvement but not others. In some areas, it also generated moral controversy, which in turn created conflicts of interest for providers. We aimed to undertake a meta-synthesis of 18 qualitative studies of the QOF to identify themes on the impact of the QOF on individual practitioners and other staff.MethodsWe searched 5 electronic databases, Medline, Embase, Healthstar, CINAHL and Web of Science, for qualitative studies of the QOF from the providers' perspective in primary care, published in UK between 2004 and 2018. Data was analysed using the Schwartz Value Theory as a theoretical framework to analyse the published papers through the conceptual lens of Professionalism. A line of argument synthesis was undertaken to express the synthesis.ResultsWe included 18 qualitative studies that where on the providers' perspective. Four themes were identified; 1) Loss of autonomy, control and ownership; 2) Incentivised conformity; 3) Continuity of care, holism and the caring role of practitioners' in primary care; and 4) Structural and organisational changes. Our synthesis found, the Values that were enhanced by the QOF were power, achievement, conformity, security, and tradition. The findings indicated that P4P schemes should aim to support Values such as benevolence, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and universalism, which professionals ranked highly and have shown to have positive implications for Professionalism and efficiency of health systems.ConclusionsUnderstanding how practitioners experience the complexities of P4P is crucial to designing and delivering schemes to enhance and not compromise the values of professionals. Future P4P schemes should aim to permit professionals with competing high priority values to be part of P4P or other quality improvement initiatives and for them to take on an 'influencer role' rather than being 'responsive agents'. Through understanding the underlying Values and not just explicit concerns of professionals, may ensure higher levels of acceptance and enduring success for P4P schemes.
| S-EPMC7359468 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundPolicies to use financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviour are controversial. Much of this controversy is played out in the mass media, both reflecting and shaping public opinion.ObjectiveTo describe U.K. mass media coverage of incentive schemes, comparing schemes targeted at different client groups and assessing the relative prominence of the views of different interest groups.DesignThematic content analysis.SubjectsNational and local news coverage in newspapers, news media targeted at health-care providers and popular websites between January 2005 and February 2010.SettingU.K. mass media.ResultsThe study included 210 articles. Fifteen separate arguments favourable towards schemes, and 19 unfavourable, were identified. Overall, coverage was more favourable than unfavourable, although most articles reported a mix of views. Arguments about the prevalence and seriousness of the health problems targeted by incentive schemes were uncontested. Moral and ethical objections to such schemes were common, focused in particular on recipients such as drug users or the overweight who were already stereotyped as morally deficient, and these arguments were largely uncontested. Arguments about the effectiveness of schemes and their potential for benefit or harm were areas of greater contestation. Government, public health and other health-care provider interests dominated favourable coverage; opposition came from rival politicians, taxpayers' representatives, certain charities and from some journalists themselves.ConclusionsThose promoting incentive schemes for people who might be regarded as 'undeserving' should plan a media strategy that anticipates their public reception.
| S-EPMC4180042 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo determine whether hospitals increase efforts on easy tasks relative to difficult tasks to improve scores under pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives.Data sourceThe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Compare data from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005 and 2003 American Hospital Association Annual Survey data.Study designWe classified measures of process compliance targeted by the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration as easy or difficult to improve based on whether they introduce additional per-patient costs. We compared process compliance on easy and difficult tasks at hospitals eligible for P4P bonus payments relative to hospitals engaged in public reporting using random effects regression models.Principal findingsP4P hospitals did not preferentially increase efforts for easy tasks in patients with heart failure or pneumonia, but they did exhibit modestly greater effort on easy tasks for heart attack admissions. There is no systematic evidence that effort was allocated toward easier processes of care and away from more difficult tasks.ConclusionsDespite perverse P4P incentives to change allocation of efforts across tasks to maximize performance scores at lowest cost, we find little evidence that hospitals respond to P4P incentives as hypothesized. Alternative incentive structures may motivate greater response by targeted hospitals.
| S-EPMC3034262 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundHealthcare payers in the United States are increasingly tying provider payments to quality and value using pay-for-performance policies. Cost-effectiveness analysis quantifies value in healthcare but is not currently used to design or prioritize pay-for-performance strategies or metrics. Acute ischemic stroke care provides a useful application to demonstrate how simulation modeling can be used to determine cost-effective levels of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies and associated challenges with this approach.Methods and resultsOur framework requires a simulation model that can estimate quality-adjusted life years and costs resulting from improvements in a quality metric. A monetary level of incentives can then be back-calculated using the lifetime discounted quality-adjusted life year (which includes effectiveness of quality improvement) and cost (which includes incentive payments and cost offsets from quality improvements) outputs from the model. We applied this framework to an acute ischemic stroke microsimulation model to calculate the difference in population-level net monetary benefit (willingness-to-pay of $50 000 to $150 000/quality-adjusted life year) accrued under current Medicare policy (stroke payment not adjusted for performance) compared with various hypothetical pay-for-performance policies. Performance measurement was based on time-to-thrombolytic treatment with tPA (tissue-type plasminogen activator). Compared with current payment, equivalent population-level net monetary benefit was achieved in pay-for-performance policies with 10-minute door-to-needle time reductions (5057 more acute ischemic stroke cases/y in the 0-3-hour window) incentivized by increasing tPA payment by as much as 18% to 44% depending on willingness-to-pay for health.ConclusionsCost-effectiveness modeling can be used to determine the upper bound of financial incentives used in pay-for-performance policies, although currently, this approach is limited due to data requirements and modeling assumptions. For tPA payments in acute ischemic stroke, our model-based results suggest financial incentives leading to a 10-minute decrease in door-to-needle time should be implemented but not exceed 18% to 44% of current tPA payment. In general, the optimal level of financial incentives will depend on willingness-to-pay for health and other modeling assumptions around parameter uncertainty and the relationship between quality improvements and long-run quality-adjusted life expectancy and costs.
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Project description:BackgroundNot enough is known about the association between practice size and clinical outcomes in primary care. We examined this association between 1997 and 2005, in addition to the impact of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, a pay-for-performance incentive scheme introduced in the United Kingdom in 2004, on diabetes management.MethodsWe conducted a retrospective open-cohort study using data from the General Practice Research Database. We enrolled 422 general practices providing care for 154,945 patients with diabetes. Our primary outcome measures were the achievement of national treatment targets for blood pressure, glycated hemoglobin (HbA(1c)) levels and total cholesterol.ResultsWe saw improvements in the recording of process of care measures, prescribing and achieving intermediate outcomes in all practice sizes during the study period. We saw improvement in reaching national targets after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. These improvements significantly exceeded the underlying trends in all practice sizes for achieving targets for cholesterol level and blood pressure, but not for HbA(1c) level. In 1997 and 2005, there were no significant differences between the smallest and largest practices in achieving targets for blood pressure (1997 odds ratio [OR] 0.98, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.82 to 1.16; 2005 OR 0.92, 95% CI 0.80 to 1.06 in 2005), cholesterol level (1997 OR 0.94, 95% CI 0.76 to 1.16; 2005 OR 1.1, 95% CI 0.97 to 1.40) and glycated hemoglobin level (1997 OR 0.79, 95% CI 0.55 to 1.14; 2005 OR 1.05, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.19).InterpretationWe found no evidence that size of practice is associated with the quality of diabetes management in primary care. Pay-for-performance programs appear to benefit both large and small practices to a similar extent.
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Project description:IntroductionThe Quality and Outcomes Framework, or QOF, rewards primary care doctors (GPs) in the UK for providing certain types of care. Since 2006, GPs have been paid to identify patients with dementia and to conduct an annual review of their mental and physical health. During the review, the GP also assesses the carer's support needs, including impact of caring, and ensures that services are co-ordinated across care settings. In principle, this type of care should reduce the risk of admission to long-term residential care directly from an acute hospital ward, a phenomenon considered to be indicative of poor quality care. However, this potential effect has not previously been tested.MethodsUsing English data from 2006/07 to 2010/11, we ran multilevel logit models to assess the impact of the QOF review on the risk of care home placement following emergency admission to acute hospital. Emergency admissions were defined for (a) people with a primary diagnosis of dementia and (b) people with dementia admitted for treatment of an ambulatory care sensitive condition. We adjusted for a wide range of potential confounding factors.ResultsOver the study period, 19% of individuals admitted to hospital with a primary diagnosis of dementia (N = 31,120) were discharged to a care home; of those admitted for an ambulatory care sensitive condition (N = 139,267), the corresponding figure was 14%. Risk factors for subsequent care home placement included older age, female gender, vascular dementia, incontinence, fall, hip fracture, and number of comorbidities. Better performance on the QOF review was associated with a lower risk of care home placement but only when the admission was for an ambulatory care sensitive condition.ConclusionsThe QOF dementia review may help to reduce the risk of long-term care home placement following acute hospital admission.
| S-EPMC4882036 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGROUND:Screening for sexually transmitted infection (STI) especially HIV as early detection and treatment have been financially supported under the Thai Universal Coverage (UC) scheme since 2009 (THB140 for HIV). However, the implementation has not been evidence-based, strategic risk-based, nor economically evaluated whereas husbands who accompanied the pregnant women are likely to have a lower risk than those who did not come along. This study is aimed to determine the husband's willingness-to-pay (WTP) for his HIV and syphilis screening tests and potential factors affecting STI screenings at the antenatal care (ANC) clinic of a tertiary hospital in Thailand. METHODS:A pilot open-ended interview was conducted among 50 participants to estimate the mean and standard deviation of WTP prices for HIV and syphilis screening tests. A questionnaire was developed to obtain demographics, STI knowledge and screening history, as well as two contingent valuation methods (bidding and payment scale), using the mean WTP prices identified from the pilot study as a starting WTP with ¼SD step-up/down. The survey of 200 randomly selected husbands of pregnant women was conducted at King Chulalongkorn Memorial Hospital from April to June 2018. Descriptive statistics and logistic regression were used for data analysis. RESULTS:During the study period, 597 pregnant women received their first ANC. Of 368 accompanying husbands, 200 were enrolled in the study. Their median age was 31 (IQR 27-36) years old and 67% had a first child. Eighty-eight percent of the participants were willing to test for the STIs. Based on the bidding method, WTP prices for HIV and syphilis screening tests were US$14.5 (IQR 12.4-14.5) and US$9.7 (IQR 10-12), respectively. The payment scale method suggested approximately three-quarters of the WTP prices from the bidding method. CONCLUSIONS:The husbands who accompanied their pregnant wives to the ANC clinic showed positive behaviors according to the propitious selection theory. They tend to cooperate well with STI testing and are willing to pay at least two times the price of the STI screening tests. The financial support to promote STI screenings should be reconsidered to cover other groups with higher sexual behavior risks and less WTP.
| S-EPMC7149847 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Most evaluations of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives have focused on large-group practices. Thus, the effect of P4P in small practices, where many US residents receive care, is largely unknown. Furthermore, whether electronic health records (EHRs) with chronic disease management capabilities support small-practice response to P4P has not been studied.To assess the effect of P4P incentives on quality in EHR-enabled small practices in the context of an established quality improvement initiative.A cluster-randomized trial of small (<10 clinicians) primary care clinics in New York City from April 2009 through March 2010. A city program provided all participating clinics with the same EHR software with decision support and patient registry functionalities and quality improvement specialists offering technical assistance.Incentivized clinics were paid for each patient whose care met the performance criteria, but they received higher payments for patients with comorbidities, who had Medicaid insurance, or who were uninsured (maximum payments: $200/patient; $100,000/clinic). Quality reports were given quarterly to both the intervention and control groups.Comparison of differences in performance improvement, from the beginning to the end of the study, between control and intervention clinics for aspirin or antithrombotic prescription, blood pressure control, cholesterol control, and smoking cessation interventions. Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to account for clustering of patients within clinics, with a treatment by time interaction term assessing the statistical significance of the effect of the intervention.Participating clinics (n?=?42 for each group) had similar baseline characteristics, with a mean of 4592 (median, 2500) patients at the intervention group clinics and 3042 (median, 2000) at the control group clinics. Intervention clinics had greater adjusted absolute improvement in rates of appropriate antithrombotic prescription (12.0% vs 6.1%, difference: 6.0% [95% CI, 2.2% to 9.7%], P?=?.001 for interaction term), blood pressure control (no comorbidities: 9.7% vs 4.3%, difference: 5.5% [95% CI, 1.6% to 9.3%], P?=?.01 for interaction term; with diabetes mellitus: 9.0% vs 1.2%, difference: 7.8% [95% CI, 3.2% to 12.4%], P?=?.007 for interaction term; with diabetes mellitus or ischemic vascular disease: 9.5% vs 1.7%, difference: 7.8% [95% CI, 3.0% to 12.6%], P?=?.01 for interaction term), and in smoking cessation interventions (12.4% vs 7.7%, difference: 4.7% [95% CI, -0.3% to 9.6%], P?=?.02 for interaction term). Intervention clinics performed better on all measures for Medicaid and uninsured patients except cholesterol control, but no differences were statistically significant.Among small EHR-enabled clinics, a P4P incentive program compared with usual care resulted in modest improvements in cardiovascular care processes and outcomes. Because most proposed P4P programs are intended to remain in place more than a year, further research is needed to determine whether this effect increases or decreases over time.clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00884013.
| S-EPMC4013308 | biostudies-literature