Criminal defectors lead to the emergence of cooperation in an experimental, adversarial game.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: D'Orsogna MR
PROVIDER: S-EPMC3634082 | biostudies-literature | 2013
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Criminal defectors lead to the emergence of cooperation in an experimental, adversarial game.
D'Orsogna Maria R MR Kendall Ryan R McBride Michael M Short Martin B MB
PloS one 20130423 4
While the evolution of cooperation has been widely studied, little attention has been devoted to adversarial settings wherein one actor can directly harm another. Recent theoretical work addresses this issue, introducing an adversarial game in which the emergence of cooperation is heavily reliant on the presence of "Informants," actors who defect at first-order by harming others, but who cooperate at second-order by punishing other defectors. We experimentally study this adversarial environment ...[more]
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