Browse
Submit Data
Databases
API
Help

Dataset Information

19 Views

0 Connections

0 Citations

0 Reanalyses

0 Downloads

Omics score: 0

Exit, punishment and rewards in commons dilemmas: an experimental study.

ABSTRACT: Commons dilemmas are interaction situations where a common good is provided or exploited by a group of individuals so that optimal collective outcomes clash with private interests. Although in these situations, social norms and institutions exist that might help individuals to cooperate, little is known about the interaction effects between positive and negative incentives and exit options by individuals. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of exit, rewards and punishment, as well as the interplay between exit and rewards and punishment. We found that punishment had a stronger effect than rewards on cooperation if considered by itself, whereas rewards had a stronger effect when combined with voluntary participation. This can be explained in terms of the 'framing effect', i.e., as the combination of exit and rewards might induce people to attach higher expected payoffs to cooperative strategies and expect better behaviour from others.

SUBMITTER: Bravo G

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3731340 | biostudies-literature | 2013

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Json Xml

Publications

Exit, punishment and rewards in commons dilemmas: an experimental study.

Bravo Giangiacomo G Squazzoni Flaminio F

PloS one 20130801 8

Commons dilemmas are interaction situations where a common good is provided or exploited by a group of individuals so that optimal collective outcomes clash with private interests. Although in these situations, social norms and institutions exist that might help individuals to cooperate, little is known about the interaction effects between positive and negative incentives and exit options by individuals. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of exit, rewards ...[more]

PMID: 23936356

Similar Datasets

Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas.

Project description:The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and an otherwise identical social dilemma in which the minimum contribution determines the group outcome. Experiments were run in a culture with traditionally high antisocial punishment (Southern Europe). We replicate the detrimental effect of antisocial sanctions on cooperation in the linear case. However, we find that punishment is still widely effective when actions are complementary: the provision of the public good significantly and substantially increases with sanctions, participants punish significantly less and sanctions radically transform conditional cooperation patterns to generate significant welfare gains.

| S-EPMC4413789 | biostudies-other

Escaping the tragedy of the commons through targeted punishment.

Project description:Failures of cooperation cause many of society's gravest problems. It is well known that cooperation among many players faced with a social dilemma can be maintained thanks to the possibility of punishment, but achieving the initial state of widespread cooperation is often much more difficult. We show here that there exist strategies of 'targeted punishment' whereby a small number of punishers can shift a population of defectors into a state of global cooperation. We conclude by outlining how the international community could use a strategy of this kind to combat climate change.

| S-EPMC4555856 | biostudies-literature

Effect of infrastructure design on commons dilemmas in social-ecological system dynamics.

Project description:The use of shared infrastructure to direct natural processes for the benefit of humans has been a central feature of human social organization for millennia. Today, more than ever, people interact with one another and the environment through shared human-made infrastructure (the Internet, transportation, the energy grid, etc.). However, there has been relatively little work on how the design characteristics of shared infrastructure affect the dynamics of social-ecological systems (SESs) and the capacity of groups to solve social dilemmas associated with its provision. Developing such understanding is especially important in the context of global change where design criteria must consider how specific aspects of infrastructure affect the capacity of SESs to maintain vital functions in the face of shocks. Using small-scale irrigated agriculture (the most ancient and ubiquitous example of public infrastructure systems) as a model system, we show that two design features related to scale and the structure of benefit flows can induce fundamental changes in qualitative behavior, i.e., regime shifts. By relating the required maintenance threshold (a design feature related to infrastructure scale) to the incentives facing users under different regimes, our work also provides some general guidance on determinants of robustness of SESs under globalization-related stresses.

| S-EPMC4629374 | biostudies-other

Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game.

Project description:Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.

| S-EPMC6070290 | biostudies-literature

Voluntary rewards mediate the evolution of pool punishment for maintaining public goods in large populations.

Project description:Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and institutions.

| S-EPMC5390906 | biostudies-literature

Impacts of experimental advisory exit speed sign on traffic speeds for freeway exit ramp.

Project description:Many crashes occur around freeway exit ramp areas in China due to excessive speeds and large speed variances. Traditionally, a single posted ramp speed limit sign is installed around the physical gore area to manage the speed. To address this issue, the study presented in this paper proposes the use of an advisory exit speed sign (AESS), which is an additional exit speed limit sign positioned along the deceleration lane to accommodate the speed changes ahead of the physical gore. The study selected three sites with similar exit ramp configurations and two scenarios (with AESS/without AESS) to quantify the influences of the AESS on the speed of exiting vehicles. The speed profiles of 480 vehicles were obtained based on 12 hours of data collection. A t-test was applied to verify the reduction in mean speed between the two scenarios. The results show that the AESS in this study was effective in reducing the mean speed and 85th percentile speed, especially in the taper and deceleration lane. It was clearly seen that drivers began to decelerate in advance when the AESS was installed, which led to a smooth deceleration process, especially on the segment between the theoretical gore and the physical gore. The AESS was also helpful in reducing speeding to some extent. Although the effects of the AESS on speed reduction at curved ramps were not ideal, the speed fluctuation range tended to be more contracted when the AESS was installed. This paper provides useful information for researchers, managers, and engineers when considering the implementation of AESS.

| S-EPMC6867653 | biostudies-literature

The climate commons dilemma: how can humanity solve the commons dilemma for the global climate commons?

Project description:In the era when human activities can fundamentally alter the planetary climate system, a stable climate is a global commons. However, the need to develop the economy to sustain the growing human population poses the Climate Commons Dilemma. Although citizens may need to support policies that forgo their country's economic growth, they may instead be motivated to grow their economy while freeriding on others' efforts to mitigate the ongoing climate change. To examine how to resolve the climate commons dilemma, we constructed a Climate Commons Game (CCG), an experimental analogue of the climate commons dilemma that embeds a simple model of the effects of economic activities on global temperature rise and its eventual adverse effects on the economy. The game includes multiple economic units, and each participant is tasked to manage one economic unit while keeping global temperature rise to a sustainable level. In two experiments, we show that people can manage the climate system and their economies better when they regarded the goal of environmentally sustainable economic growth as a singular global goal that all economic units collectively pursue rather than a goal to be achieved by each unit individually. In addition, beliefs that everyone shares the knowledge about the climate system help the group coordinate their economic activities better to mitigate global warming in the CCG. However, we also found that the resolution of the climate commons dilemma came at the cost of exacerbating inequality among the economic units in the current constrains of the CCG.Supplementary informationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10584-021-02989-2.

| S-EPMC7818715 | biostudies-literature

The ethics of human volunteer studies involving experimental exposure to pesticides: unanswered dilemmas.

Project description:The controversy about the use of data from human volunteer studies involving experimental exposure to pesticides as part of regulatory risk assessment has been widely discussed, but the complex and interrelated scientific and ethical issues remain largely unresolved. This discussion paper, generated by authors who comprised a workgroup of the ICOH Scientific Committee on Rural Health, reviews the use of human experimental studies in regulatory risk assessment for pesticides with a view to advancing the debate as to when, if ever, such studies might be ethically justifiable. The discussion is based on three elements: (a) a review of discussion papers on the topic of human testing of pesticides and the positions adopted by regulatory agencies in developed countries; (b) an analysis of published and unpublished studies involving human testing with pesticides, both in the peer-reviewed literature and in the JMPR database; and (c) application of an ethical analysis to the problem. The paper identifies areas of agreement which include general principles that may provide a starting point on which to base criteria for judgements as to the ethical acceptability of such studies. However, the paper also highlights ongoing unresolved differences of opinion inherent in ethical analysis of contentious issues, which we propose should form a starting point for further debate and the development of guidelines to achieve better resolution of this matter.

| S-EPMC2931486 | biostudies-literature

Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior.

Project description:Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here report on experiments on iterated, multi-player Prisoner's dilemma, on groups of 2 to 5 people. We confirm the dependence on the previous step and that memory effects for earlier periods are not significant. We show that the behavior of subjects in pairwise dilemmas is qualitatively different from the cases with more players; After an initial decay, cooperation increases significantly reaching values above 80%. The strategy of the players is rather universal as far as their willingness to reciprocate cooperation is concerned, whereas there is much diversity in their initial propensity to cooperate. Our results indicate that, for cooperation to emerge and thrive, three is a crowd.

| S-EPMC3435562 | biostudies-literature

Experimental Gingivitis Study

Project description:Time course study that monitored clinical observation data, cytokines from gingival crevicular fluid, and microbial composition from sub-gingival dental plaque.

| PRJEB37444 | ENA

OmicsDI is part of the ELIXIR infrastructure

OmicsDI is an Elixir interoperability service. Learn more ›

Tweets

OmicsDI Databases

PRIDE
PeptideAtlas
MassIVE
JPOST Repository
Physiome Model Repository

EGA
EVA
ENA
LINCS
PAXDB
Cell Collective

MetaboLights
Metabolomics Workbench
MetabolomeExpress
GNPS
BioModels
FAIRDOMHub

ArrayExpress
dbGaP
ExpressionAtlas
GEO
NODE

Information

Databases
Help
API
Contact us
Code on GitHub
Terms of use
Submit Data