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The effect of financial incentives on chlamydia testing rates: evidence from a randomized experiment.

ABSTRACT: Financial incentives have been used in a variety of settings to motivate behaviors that might not otherwise be undertaken. They have been highlighted as particularly useful in settings that require a single behavior, such as appointment attendance or vaccination. They also have differential effects based on socioeconomic status in some applications (e.g. smoking). To further investigate these claims, we tested the effect of providing different types of non-cash financial incentives on the return rates of chlamydia specimen samples amongst 16-24 year-olds in England. In 2011 and 2012, we ran a two-stage randomized experiment involving 2988 young people (1489 in Round 1 and 1499 in Round 2) who requested a chlamydia screening kit from Freetest.me, an online and text screening service run by Preventx Limited. Participants were randomized to control, or one of five types of financial incentives in Round 1 or one of four financial incentives in Round 2. We tested the effect of five types of incentives on specimen sample return; reward vouchers of differing values, charity donation, participation in a lottery, choices between a lottery and a voucher and including vouchers of differing values in the test kit prior to specimen return. Financial incentives of any type, did not make a significant difference in the likelihood of specimen return. The more deprived individuals were, as calculated using Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), the less likely they were to return a sample. The extent to which incentive structures influenced sample return was not moderated by IMD score. Non-cash financial incentives for chlamydia testing do not seem to affect the specimen return rate in a chlamydia screening program where test kits are requested online, mailed to requestors and returned by mail. They also do not appear more or less effective in influencing test return depending on deprivation level.

SUBMITTER: Dolan P

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3969100 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Mar

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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The effect of financial incentives on chlamydia testing rates: evidence from a randomized experiment.

Dolan Paul P Rudisill Caroline C

Social science & medicine (1982) 20131119

Financial incentives have been used in a variety of settings to motivate behaviors that might not otherwise be undertaken. They have been highlighted as particularly useful in settings that require a single behavior, such as appointment attendance or vaccination. They also have differential effects based on socioeconomic status in some applications (e.g. smoking). To further investigate these claims, we tested the effect of providing different types of non-cash financial incentives on the return ...[more]

PMID: 24373390

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Project description:IntroductionExperts continue to debate how to increase COVID-19 vaccination rates. Some experts advocate for financial incentives. Others argue that financial incentives, especially large ones, will have counterproductive psychological effects, reducing the percent of people who want to vaccinate. Among a racially and ethnically diverse U.S. sample of lower income adults, for whom vaccine uptake has lagged compared with higher income adults, we empirically examine such claims about relatively large and small guaranteed cash payments.MethodsIn 2021, we conducted a randomized, controlled experiment among U.S. residents with incomes below $80,000 who reported being unvaccinated against COVID-19. Study participants were randomized to one of four study arms. In two arms, respondents first learned about a policy proposal to pay $1,000 or $200 to those who received COVID-19 vaccination and were then asked if, given that policy, they would want to vaccinate. In the two other arms, respondents received either an educational message about this vaccine or received no vaccine information and were then asked if they wanted to vaccinate for COVID-19. The primary analyses estimated and compared the overall percentage in each study arm that reported wanting to vaccinate for COVID-19. In other analyses, we estimated and compared these percentages for subgroups of interest, including gender, race/ethnicity, and education.Main resultsAmong 2,290 unvaccinated adults, 79.7% (95%CI, 76.4-83.0%) of those who learned about the proposed $1,000 payment wanted to get vaccinated, compared with 58.9% (95%CI, 54.8-63.0%) in the control condition without vaccine information, a difference of 20 percentage points. Among those who learned of the proposed $200 payment, 74.8% (95% CI, 71.3-78.4%) wanted to vaccinate. Among those who learned only about the safety and efficacy of COVID-19 vaccines, 68.9% (95% CI, 65.1-72.7%) wanted to vaccinate. Findings were consistent across various subgroups.DiscussionDespite several study limitations, the results do not support concerns that the financial incentive policies aimed to increase COVID-19 vaccination would have counterproductive effects. Instead, those who learned about a policy with a large or small financial incentive were more likely than those in the control condition to report that they would want to vaccinate. The positive effects extended to subgroups that have been less likely to vaccinate, including younger adults, those with less education, and racial and ethnic minorities. Financial incentives of $1,000 performed similarly to those offering only $200.

Project description:Importance:Although breastfeeding has a positive effect on an infant's health and development, the prevalence is low in many communities. The effect of financial incentives to improve breastfeeding prevalence is unknown. Objective:To assess the effect of an area-level financial incentive for breastfeeding on breastfeeding prevalence at 6 to 8 weeks post partum. Design, Setting, and Participants:The Nourishing Start for Health (NOSH) trial, a cluster randomized trial with 6 to 8 weeks follow-up, was conducted between April 1, 2015, and March 31, 2016, in 92 electoral ward areas in England with baseline breastfeeding prevalence at 6 to 8 weeks post partum less than 40%. A total of 10?010 mother-infant dyads resident in the 92 study electoral ward areas where the infant's estimated or actual birth date fell between February 18, 2015, and February 17, 2016, were included. Areas were randomized to the incentive plus usual care (n?=?46) (5398 mother-infant dyads) or to usual care alone (n?=?46) (4612 mother-infant dyads). Interventions:Usual care was delivered by clinicians (mainly midwives, health visitors) in a variety of maternity, neonatal, and infant feeding services, all of which were implementing the UNICEF UK Baby Friendly Initiative standards. Shopping vouchers worth £40 (US$50) were offered to mothers 5 times based on infant age (2 days, 10 days, 6-8 weeks, 3 months, 6 months), conditional on the infant receiving any breast milk. Main Outcomes and Measures:The primary outcome was electoral ward area-level 6- to 8-week breastfeeding period prevalence, as assessed by clinicians at the routine 6- to 8-week postnatal check visit. Secondary outcomes were area-level period prevalence for breastfeeding initiation and for exclusive breastfeeding at 6 to 8 weeks. Results:In the intervention (5398 mother-infant dyads) and control (4612 mother-infant dyads) group, the median (interquartile range) percentage of women aged 16 to 44 years was 36.2% (3.0%) and 37.4% (3.6%) years, respectively. After adjusting for baseline breastfeeding prevalence and local government area and weighting to reflect unequal cluster-level breastfeeding prevalence variances, a difference in mean 6- to 8-week breastfeeding prevalence of 5.7 percentage points (37.9% vs 31.7%; 95% CI for adjusted difference, 2.7% to 8.6%; P?<?.001) in favor of the intervention vs usual care was observed. No significant differences were observed for the mean prevalence of breastfeeding initiation (61.9% vs 57.5%; adjusted mean difference, 2.9 percentage points; 95%, CI, -0.4 to 6.2; P?=?.08) or the mean prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding at 6 to 8 weeks (27.0% vs 24.1%; adjusted mean difference, 2.3 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.2 to 4.8; P?=?.07). Conclusions and Relevance:Financial incentives may improve breastfeeding rates in areas with low baseline prevalence. Offering a financial incentive to women in areas of England with breastfeeding rates below 40% compared with usual care resulted in a modest but statistically significant increase in breastfeeding prevalence at 6 to 8 weeks. This was measured using routinely collected data. Trial Registration:International Standard Randomized Controlled Trial Registry: ISRCTN44898617.

Project description:ImportanceFinancial incentives can improve medication adherence and cardiovascular disease risk, but the optimal design to promote sustained adherence after incentives are discontinued is unknown.ObjectiveTo determine whether 6-month interventions involving different financial incentives to encourage statin adherence reduce low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) levels from baseline to 12 months.Design, setting, and participantsThis 4-group, randomized clinical trial was conducted from August 2013 to July 2018 among several large US insurer or employer populations and the University of Pennsylvania Health System. The study population included adults with elevated risk of cardiovascular disease, suboptimal LDL-C control, and evidence of imperfect adherence to statin medication. Data analysis was performed from July 2017 to June 2019.InterventionsThe interventions lasted 6 months during which all participants received daily medication reminders and an electronic pill bottle. Statin adherence was measured by opening the bottle. For participants randomized to the 3 intervention groups, adherence was rewarded with financial incentives. The sweepstakes group involved incentives for daily adherence. In the deadline sweepstakes group, incentives were reduced if participants were adherent only after a reminder. The sweepstakes plus deposit contract group split incentives between daily adherence and a monthly deposit reduced for each day of nonadherence.Main outcomes and measuresThe primary outcome was change in LDL-C level from baseline to 12 months.ResultsAmong 805 participants randomized (199 in the simple daily sweepstakes group, 204 in the deadline sweepstakes group, 201 in the sweepstakes plus deposit contract group, and 201 in the control group), the mean (SD) age was 58.5 (10.3) years; 519 participants (64.5%) were women, 514 (63.9%) had diabetes, and 273 (33.9%) had cardiovascular disease. The mean (SD) baseline LDL-C level was 143.2 (42.5) mg/dL. Measured adherence at 6 months (defined as the proportion of 180 days with electronic pill bottle opening) in the control group (0.69; 95% CI, 0.66-0.72) was lower than that in the simple sweepstakes group (0.84; 95% CI, 0.81-0.87), the deadline sweepstakes group (0.86; 95% CI, 0.83-0.89), and the sweepstakes plus deposit contract group (0.87; 95% CI, 0.84-0.90) (P < .001 for each incentive group vs control). LDL-C levels were measured for 636 participants at 12 months. Mean LDL-C level reductions from baseline to 12 months were 33.6 mg/dL (95% CI, 28.4-38.8 mg/dL) in the control group, 32.4 mg/dL (95% CI, 27.3-37.6 mg/dL) in the sweepstakes group, 33.2 mg/dL (95% CI, 28.1-38.3 mg/dL) in the deadline sweepstakes group, and 36.5 mg/dL (95% CI, 31.3-41.7 mg/dL) in the sweepstakes plus deposit contract group (adjusted P > .99 for each incentive group vs control).Conclusions and relevanceCompared with the control group, different financial incentives improved measured statin adherence but not LDL-C levels. This result points to the importance of directly measuring health outcomes, rather than simply adherence, in trials aimed at improving health behaviors.Trial registrationClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT01798784.

Project description:BackgroundFor addressing antibiotic overuse, Japan designed a health care policy in which eligible medical facilities could claim a financial reward when antibiotics were not prescribed for early-stage respiratory and gastrointestinal infections. The policy was introduced in a pilot manner in paediatric clinics in April 2018.MethodsWe conducted a quasi-experimental, propensity score-matched, difference-in-differences (DID) design to determine whether the nationwide financial incentives for appropriate non-prescribing of antibiotics as antimicrobial stewardship [800 JPY (≈7.3 US D) per case] were associated with changes in prescription patterns, including antibiotics, and health care use in routine paediatric health care settings at a national level. Data consisted of 9 253 261 cases of infectious diseases in 553 138 patients treated at 10 180 eligible or ineligible facilities.ResultsA total of 2959 eligible facilities claimed 316 770 cases for financial incentives and earned 253 million JPY (≈2.29 million USD). Compared with ineligible facilities, the introduction of financial incentives in the eligible facilities was associated with an excess reduction in antibiotic prescriptions [DID estimate, -228.6 days of therapy (DOTs) per 1000 cases (95% CI, -272.4 to -184.9), which corresponded to a relative reduction of 17.8% (95% CI, 14.8 to 20.7)]. The introduction was also associated with excess reductions in drugs for respiratory symptoms [DID estimates, -256.9 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -379.3 to -134.5)] and antihistamines [DID estimate, -198.5 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -282.1 to -114.9)]. There was no excess in out-of-hour visits [DID estimate, -4.43 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -12.8 to 3.97)] or hospitalizations [DID estimate, -0.08 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -0.48 to 0.31)].ConclusionsOur findings suggest that financial incentives to medical facilities for not prescribing antibiotics were associated with reductions in prescriptions for antibiotics without adverse health care consequences. Japan's new health policy provided us with policy options for immediately reducing inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions by relatively small financial incentives.

Project description:Financial incentives to physicians or patients are increasingly used, but their effectiveness is not well established.To determine whether physician financial incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician and patient incentives are more effective than control in reducing levels of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) among patients with high cardiovascular risk.Four-group, multicenter, cluster randomized clinical trial with a 12-month intervention conducted from 2011 to 2014 in 3 primary care practices in the northeastern United States. Three hundred forty eligible primary care physicians (PCPs) were enrolled from a pool of 421. Of 25,627 potentially eligible patients of those PCPs, 1503 enrolled. Patients aged 18 to 80 years were eligible if they had a 10-year Framingham Risk Score (FRS) of 20% or greater, had coronary artery disease equivalents with LDL-C levels of 120 mg/dL or greater, or had an FRS of 10% to 20% with LDL-C levels of 140 mg/dL or greater. Investigators were blinded to study group, but participants were not.Primary care physicians were randomly assigned to control, physician incentives, patient incentives, or shared physician-patient incentives. Physicians in the physician incentives group were eligible to receive up to $1024 per enrolled patient meeting LDL-C goals. Patients in the patient incentives group were eligible for the same amount, distributed through daily lotteries tied to medication adherence. Physicians and patients in the shared incentives group shared these incentives. Physicians and patients in the control group received no incentives tied to outcomes, but all patient participants received up to $355 each for trial participation.Change in LDL-C level at 12 months.Patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved a mean reduction in LDL-C of 33.6 mg/dL (95% CI, 30.1-37.1; baseline, 160.1 mg/dL; 12 months, 126.4 mg/dL); those in physician incentives achieved a mean reduction of 27.9 mg/dL (95% CI, 24.9-31.0; baseline, 159.9 mg/dL; 12 months, 132.0 mg/dL); those in patient incentives achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.6-28.5; baseline, 160.6 mg/dL; 12 months, 135.5 mg/dL); and those in the control group achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL (95% CI, 21.7-28.5; baseline, 161.5 mg/dL; 12 months, 136.4 mg/dL; P <?.001 for comparison of all 4 groups). Only patients in the shared physician-patient incentives group achieved reductions in LDL-C levels statistically different from those in the control group (8.5 mg/dL; 95% CI, 3.8-13.3; P =?.002).In primary care practices, shared financial incentives for physicians and patients, but not incentives to physicians or patients alone, resulted in a statistically significant difference in reduction of LDL-C levels at 12 months. This reduction was modest, however, and further information is needed to understand whether this approach represents good value.clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01346189.

Dataset Information

The effect of financial incentives on chlamydia testing rates: evidence from a randomized experiment.

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The effect of financial incentives on chlamydia testing rates: evidence from a randomized experiment.

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