The price of racial bias: intergroup negotiations in the ultimatum game.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Kubota JT
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4028070 | biostudies-literature | 2013 Dec
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
The price of racial bias: intergroup negotiations in the ultimatum game.
Kubota Jennifer T JT Li Jian J Bar-David Eyal E Banaji Mahzarin R MR Phelps Elizabeth A EA
Psychological science 20131011 12
Existing stereotypes about Black Americans may influence perceptions of intent during financial negotiations. In this study, we explored whether the influence of race on economic decisions extends to choices that are costly to the decision maker. We investigated whether racial group membership contributes to differential likelihood of rejection of objectively equal unfair monetary offers. In the Ultimatum Game, players accept or reject proposed splits of money. Players keep accepted splits, but ...[more]
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