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Diffusive public goods and coexistence of cooperators and cheaters on a 1D lattice.

ABSTRACT: Many populations of cells cooperate through the production of extracellular materials. These materials (enzymes, siderophores) spread by diffusion and can be applied by both the cooperator and cheater (non-producer) cells. In this paper the problem of coexistence of cooperator and cheater cells is studied on a 1D lattice where cooperator cells produce a diffusive material which is beneficial to the individuals according to the local concentration of this public good. The reproduction success of a cell increases linearly with the benefit in the first model version and increases non-linearly (saturates) in the second version. Two types of update rules are considered; either the cooperative cell stops producing material before death (death-production-birth, DpB) or it produces the common material before it is selected to die (production-death-birth, pDB). The empty space is occupied by its neighbors according to their replication rates. By using analytical and numerical methods I have shown that coexistence of the cooperator and cheater cells is possible although atypical in the linear version of this 1D model if either DpB or pDB update rule is assumed. While coexistence is impossible in the non-linear model with pDB update rule, it is one of the typical behaviors in case of the non-linear model with DpB update rule.

SUBMITTER: Scheuring I

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4098918 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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