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Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

ABSTRACT: Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

SUBMITTER: Bone J

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4126631 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Jul

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

Bone Jonathan J Silva Antonio S AS Raihani Nichola J NJ

Biology letters 20140701 7

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a ...[more]

PMID: 25079496

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Project description:BackgroundA clinical hallmark of alcohol use disorder is persistent drinking despite potential adverse consequences. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) are positioned to exert top-down control over subcortical regions, such as the nucleus accumbens shell (NAcS) and basolateral amygdala, which encode positive and negative valence of ethanol (EtOH)-related stimuli. Prior rodent studies have implicated these regions in regulation of punished EtOH self-administration (EtOH-SA).MethodsWe conducted in vivo electrophysiological recordings in mouse vmPFC and dmPFC to obtain neuronal correlates of footshock-punished EtOH-SA. Ex vivo recordings were performed in NAcS D1 receptor-expressing medium spiny neurons receiving vmPFC input to examine punishment-related plasticity in this pathway. Optogenetic photosilencing was employed to assess the functional contribution of the vmPFC, dmPFC, vmPFC projections to NAcS, or vmPFC projections to basolateral amygdala, to punished EtOH-SA.ResultsPunishment reduced EtOH lever pressing and elicited aborted presses (lever approach followed by rapid retraction). Neurons in the vmPFC and dmPFC exhibited phasic firing to EtOH lever presses and aborts, but only in the vmPFC was there a population-level shift in coding from lever presses to aborts with punishment. Closed-loop vmPFC, but not dmPFC, photosilencing on a postpunishment probe test negated the reduction in EtOH lever presses but not in aborts. Punishment was associated with altered plasticity at vmPFC inputs to D1 receptor-expressing medium spiny neurons in the NAcS. Photosilencing vmPFC projections to the NAcS, but not to the basolateral amygdala, partially reversed suppression of EtOH lever presses on probe testing.ConclusionsThese findings demonstrate a key role for the vmPFC in regulating EtOH-SA after punishment, with implications for understanding the neural basis of compulsive drinking in alcohol use disorder.

Project description:Determining the neural factors contributing to compulsive behaviors such as alcohol-use disorders (AUDs) has become a significant focus of current preclinical research. Comparison of phenotypic differences across genetically distinct mouse strains provides one approach to identify molecular and genetic factors contributing to compulsive-like behaviors. Here we examine a rodent assay for punished ethanol self-administration in four widely used inbred strains known to differ on ethanol-related behaviors: C57BL/6J (B6), DBA/2J (D2), 129S1/SvImJ (S1), and BALB/cJ (BALB). Mice were trained in an operant task (FR1) to reliably lever-press for 10% ethanol using a sucrose-fading procedure. Once trained, mice received a punishment session in which lever pressing resulted in alternating ethanol reward and footshock, followed by tests to probe the effects of punishment on ethanol self-administration. Results indicated significant strain differences in training performance and punished attenuation of ethanol self-administration. S1 and BALB showed robust attenuation of ethanol self-administration after punishment, whereas behavior in B6 was attenuated only when the punishment and probe tests were conducted in the same contexts. By contrast, D2 were insensitive to punishment regardless of context, despite receiving more shocks during punishment and exhibiting normal footshock reactivity. Additionally, B6, but not D2, reduced operant self-administration when ethanol was devalued with a bitter tastant. B6 and D2 showed devaluation of sucrose self-administration, and punished suppression of sucrose seeking was context dependent in both the strains. While previous studies have demonstrated avoidance of ethanol in D2, particularly when ethanol is orally available from a bottle, current findings suggest this strain may exhibit heightened compulsive-like self-administration of ethanol, although there are credible alternative explanations for the phenotype of this strain. In sum, these findings offer a foundation for future studies examining the neural and genetic factors underlying AUDs.

Project description:Cooperation based on the production of costly common goods is observed throughout nature. This is puzzling, as cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation by defectors which enjoy a fitness advantage by consuming the common good without contributing fairly. Depletion of the common good can lead to population collapse and the destruction of cooperation. However, population collapse implies small population size, which, in a structured population, is known to favor cooperation. This happens because small population size increases variability in cooperator frequency across different locations. Since individuals in cooperator-dominated locations (which are most likely cooperators) will grow more than those in defector-dominated locations (which are most likely defectors), cooperators can outgrow defectors globally despite defectors outgrowing cooperators in each location. This raises the possibility that defectors can lead to conditions that sometimes rescue cooperation from defector-induced destruction. We demonstrate multiple mechanisms through which this can occur, using an individual-based approach to model stochastic birth, death, migration, and mutation events. First, during defector-induced population collapse, defectors occasionally go extinct before cooperators by chance, which allows cooperators to grow. Second, empty locations, either preexisting or created by defector-induced population extinction, can favor cooperation because they allow cooperator but not defector migrants to grow. These factors lead to the counterintuitive result that the initial presence of defectors sometimes allows better survival of cooperation compared to when defectors are initially absent. Finally, we find that resource limitation, inducible by defectors, can select for mutations adaptive to resource limitation. When these mutations are initially present at low levels or continuously generated at a moderate rate, they can favor cooperation by further reducing local population size. We predict that in a structured population, small population sizes precipitated by defectors provide a "built-in" mechanism for the persistence of cooperation.

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Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

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Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties.

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