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Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

ABSTRACT: It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals). These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a "strong" player is greater than the "weak" players in the model of Diekmann (1993). This contradicts Selten's (1980) model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.

SUBMITTER: He JZ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4128801 | biostudies-literature | 2014

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

He Jun-Zhou JZ Wang Rui-Wu RW Li Yao-Tang YT

PloS one 20140811 8

It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., ...[more]

PMID: 25111781

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Project description:Spike-timing-dependent plasticity (STDP) modifies the weight (or strength) of synaptic connections between neurons and is considered to be crucial for generating network structure. It has been observed in physiology that, in addition to spike timing, the weight update also depends on the current value of the weight. The functional implications of this feature are still largely unclear. Additive STDP gives rise to strong competition among synapses, but due to the absence of weight dependence, it requires hard boundaries to secure the stability of weight dynamics. Multiplicative STDP with linear weight dependence for depression ensures stability, but it lacks sufficiently strong competition required to obtain a clear synaptic specialization. A solution to this stability-versus-function dilemma can be found with an intermediate parametrization between additive and multiplicative STDP. Here we propose a novel solution to the dilemma, named log-STDP, whose key feature is a sublinear weight dependence for depression. Due to its specific weight dependence, this new model can produce significantly broad weight distributions with no hard upper bound, similar to those recently observed in experiments. Log-STDP induces graded competition between synapses, such that synapses receiving stronger input correlations are pushed further in the tail of (very) large weights. Strong weights are functionally important to enhance the neuronal response to synchronous spike volleys. Depending on the input configuration, multiple groups of correlated synaptic inputs exhibit either winner-share-all or winner-take-all behavior. When the configuration of input correlations changes, individual synapses quickly and robustly readapt to represent the new configuration. We also demonstrate the advantages of log-STDP for generating a stable structure of strong weights in a recurrently connected network. These properties of log-STDP are compared with those of previous models. Through long-tail weight distributions, log-STDP achieves both stable dynamics for and robust competition of synapses, which are crucial for spike-based information processing.

Dataset Information

Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

Publications

Evolutionary stability in the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma.

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