Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Branas-Garza P
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4129421 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Aug
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:The strong reciprocity model of the evolution of human cooperation has gained some acceptance, partly on the basis of support from experimental findings. The observation that unfair offers in the ultimatum game are frequently rejected constitutes an important piece of the experimental evidence for strong reciprocity. In the present study, we have challenged the idea that the rejection response in the ultimatum game provides evidence of the assumption held by strong reciprocity theorists that negative reciprocity observed in the ultimatum game is inseparably related to positive reciprocity as the two sides of a preference for fairness. The prediction of an inseparable relationship between positive and negative reciprocity was rejected on the basis of the results of a series of experiments that we conducted using the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the trust game, and the prisoner's dilemma game. We did not find any correlation between the participants' tendencies to reject unfair offers in the ultimatum game and their tendencies to exhibit various prosocial behaviors in the other games, including their inclinations to positively reciprocate in the trust game. The participants' responses to postexperimental questions add support to the view that the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game is a tacit strategy for avoiding the imposition of an inferior status.
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Project description:Participants in the Ultimatum Game will often reject unfair resource allocations at personal cost, reflecting a trade-off between financial gain and maintenance of social standing. Although this rejection behavior is linked to executive control, the exact role of cognitive regulation in relation to status cues is unclear. We propose that the salience of status cues affects how cognitive regulation resolves the conflict between financial gain and social status considerations. Situations that tax executive control by limiting available cognitive resources should increase acceptance rates for unfair offers, particularly when the conflict between economic self-interest and social reputation is high. Here, participants rated their own subjective social status, and then either mentally counted (Load) or ignored (No Load) simultaneously-presented tones while playing two rounds of the Ultimatum Game with an online (sham) "Proposer" of either high or low social status. A logistic regression revealed an interaction of Proposer status with cognitive load. Compared to the No Load group, the Load group showed higher acceptance rates for unfair offers from the high-status Proposer. In contrast, cognitive load did not influence acceptance rates for unfair offers from the low-status Proposer. Additionally, Proposer status interacted with the relative social distance between participant and Proposer. Participants close in social distance to the high-status Proposer were more likely to accept the unfair offer than those farther in social distance, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for offers from the low-status Proposer. Although rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game has previously been conceptualized as an intuitive response, these results instead suggest it reflects a deliberative strategy, dependent on cognitive resources, to prioritize social standing over short-term financial gain. This study reveals the dynamic interplay of cognitive resources and status concerns within this paradigm, providing new insights into when and why people reject inequitable divisions of resources.
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Project description:In the Ultimatum Game (UG), incurring a cost to punish inequity is commonly termed altruistic punishment. This behaviour is thought to benefit others if the defector becomes more equitable in future interactions. However, clear connections between punishment in the UG and altruistic behaviours outside the laboratory are lacking. We tested the altruistic punishment hypothesis in a sample of extraordinarily altruistic adults, predicting that if punishing inequity is predictive of altruism more broadly, extraordinary altruists should punish more frequently. Results showed that punishment was not more prevalent in extraordinary altruists than controls. However, a self-reported altruism measure previously linked to peer evaluations but not behaviour, and on which extraordinary altruists and controls did not differ, did predict punishment. These findings support suggestions that altruistic punishment in the UG is better termed costly punishment and may be motivated by social, but not necessarily prosocial, concerns. Results also support prior suggestions that self-reported altruism may not reliably predict altruistic behaviour.
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Project description:The purpose of this study was to examine whether the tendency to fear negative evaluation moderates the effect of fear emotion on the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game (UG). A photograph of a fearful face or landscape was displayed subliminally (i.e., for 10 ms) before the proposer's offer in the UG was presented to participants. We used the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNES) to measure participants' anxiety regarding negative evaluations from others. Results showed a significant interaction between FNES and condition (fearful face vs. landscape) in relation to the rejection of an unfair offer. Furthermore, the mean rejection rate of an unfair offer was significantly higher in the fearful face condition relative to that in the landscape condition among participants whose FNES scores were higher than the median; however, this difference was not observed in participants whose FNES scores were lower than the median. These results suggest that fear of negative evaluation moderates the effect of subliminal fear priming on the rejection of unfair offers in the UG, and that negative emotion induced by unconscious stimuli enhances rejection of these unfair offers.
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Project description:In the ultimatum game, two players divide a sum of money. The proposer suggests how to split and the responder can accept or reject. If the suggestion is rejected, both players get nothing. The rational solution is that the responder accepts even the smallest offer but humans prefer fair share. In this paper, we study the ultimatum game by a learning-mutation process based on quantal response equilibrium, where players are assumed boundedly rational and make mistakes when estimating the payoffs of strategies. Social learning is never stabilized at the fair outcome or the rational outcome, but leads to oscillations from offering 40 percent to 50 percent. To be precise, there is a clear tendency to increase the mean offer if it is lower than 40 percent, but will decrease when it reaches the fair offer. If mutations occur rarely, fair behavior is favored in the limit of local mutation. If mutation rate is sufficiently high, fairness can evolve for both local mutation and global mutation.
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Project description:In recent years, mechanisms favoring fair split in the ultimatum game have attracted growing interests because of its practical implications for international bargains. In this game, two players are randomly assigned two different roles respectively to split an offer: the proposer suggests how to split and the responder decides whether or not to accept it. Only when both agree is the offer successfully split; otherwise both get nothing. It is of importance and interest to break the symmetry in role assignment especially when the game is repeatedly played in a heterogeneous population. Here we consider an adaptive role assignment: whenever the split fails, the two players switch their roles probabilistically. The results show that this simple feedback mechanism proves much more effective at promoting fairness than other alternatives (where, for example, the role assignment is based on the number of neighbors).
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Project description:Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.
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Project description:When humans fail to make optimal decisions in strategic games and economic gambles, researchers typically try to explain why that behaviour is biased. To this end, they search for mechanisms that cause human behaviour to deviate from what seems to be the rational optimum. But perhaps human behaviour is not biased; perhaps research assumptions about the optimality of strategies are incomplete. In the one-shot anonymous symmetric ultimatum game (UG), humans fail to play optimally as defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, the distinction between kin and non-kin-with kin detection being a key evolutionary adaption-is often neglected when deriving the "optimal" strategy. We computationally evolved strategies in the UG that were equipped with an evolvable probability to discern kin from non-kin. When an opponent was not kin, agents evolved strategies that were similar to those used by humans. We therefore conclude that the strategy humans play is not irrational. The deviation between behaviour and the Nash equilibrium may rather be attributable to key evolutionary adaptations, such as kin detection. Our findings further suggest that social preference models are likely to capture mechanisms that permit people to play optimally in an evolutionary context. Once this context is taken into account, human behaviour no longer appears irrational.
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Project description:Unfair advantages can be created either intentionally (e.g., cheating) or unintentionally (e.g., unintended benefit). Little is known regarding how children evaluate different types of advantages in situations where group identity and group membership are made salient. To investigate how children's group identity influences their evaluations and attribution of intentions in intergroup contexts, children were presented with three hypothetical advantages (unintentionally unfair, intentionally unfair, and fair) in a competitive context created by either an in-group member or an out-group member. Children (N = 120) were 4-6 years of age (n = 59; Mage = 5.29 years) and 7-10 years of age (n = 61; Mage = 8.34 years), including 64 girls and 56 boys. Participants were 67% European American, 18% African American, 11% Asian American, and 4% Hispanic. All participants were assigned to one of two teams in a contest in order to create an in-group/out-group manipulation prior to their evaluation of the actions. Out-group members viewed unintentional unfair and fair advantages as less acceptable than in-group members, but in-group and out-group members were equally negative in their assessment of an intentional transgression. When reasoning about unintentional and intentional unfair advantages, older children referenced the intentions of the advantage creator to justify their decisions more than younger children, whereas younger children reasoned about the impact of the behavior on their team more than older children. These novel findings shed light on developmental and social factors influencing children's understanding of fairness and intentionality in everyday contexts.
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