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Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial.

ABSTRACT: Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high-quality care, but results have been contradictory.To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care.Cluster randomized trial of 12 Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics with 5 performance periods and a 12-month washout that enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 nonphysician personnel (eg, nurses, pharmacists).Physician-level (individual) incentives, practice-level incentives, both, or none. Intervention participants received up to 5 payments every 4 months; all participants could access feedback reports.Among a random sample, number of patients achieving guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or receiving an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure, number of patients prescribed guideline-recommended medications, and number who developed hypotension.Mean (SD) total payments over the study were $4270 ($459), $2672 ($153), and $1648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure were 75% to 84% and 8.84% (95% CI, 4.20% to 11.80%) for the individual group, 80% to 85% and 3.70% (95% CI, 0.24% to 7.68%) for the practice-level group, 79% to 88% and 5.54% (95% CI, 1.92% to 9.52%) for the combined group, and 86% to 86% and 0.47% (95% CI, -3.12% to 4.04%) for the control group. The adjusted absolute estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36% (95% CI, 2.40% to 13.00%; P=.005). The other incentive groups did not show a significant change compared with controls for this outcome. For medications, the unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change were 61% to 73% and 9.07% (95% CI, 4.52% to 13.44%), 56% to 65% and 4.98% (95% CI, 0.64% to 10.08%), 65% to 80% and 7.26% (95% CI, 2.92% to 12.48%), and 63% to 72% and 4.35% (95% CI, -0.28% to 9.28%), respectively. These changes in the use of guideline-recommended medications were not significant in any of the incentive groups compared with controls, nor was the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout.Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared with controls. Further research is needed on the factors that contributed to these findings.clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00302718.

SUBMITTER: Petersen LA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4165573 | biostudies-literature | 2013 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial.

Petersen Laura A LA Simpson Kate K Pietz Kenneth K Urech Tracy H TH Hysong Sylvia J SJ Profit Jochen J Conrad Douglas A DA Dudley R Adams RA Woodard LeChauncy D LD

JAMA 20130901 10

<h4>Importance</h4>Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high-quality care, but results have been contradictory.<h4>Objective</h4>To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care.<h4>Design, setting, and participants</h4>Cluster randomized trial of 12 Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics with 5 performance periods and a 12-month washout that enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 nonphysician personnel (eg, nurses, ...[more]

PMID: 24026599

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Project description:ObjectivesTo evaluate whether greater experience and success with performance incentives among physician practices are related to increased participation in Medicare's voluntary value-based payment reforms.Data sources/study settingPublicly available data from Medicare's Physician Compare (n = 1,278; January 2012 to November 2013) and nationally representative physician practice data from the National Survey of Physician Organizations 3 (NSPO3; n = 907,538; 2013).Study designWe used regression analysis to examine practice-level relationships between prior exposure to performance incentives and participation in key Medicare value-based payment reforms: accountable care organization (ACO) programs, the Physician Quality Reporting System ("Physician Compare"), and the Meaningful Use of Health Information Technology program ("Meaningful Use"). Prior experience and success with financial incentives were measured as (1) the percentage of practices' revenue from financial incentives for quality or efficiency; and (2) practices' exposure to public reporting of quality measures.Data collection/extraction methodsWe linked physician participation data from Medicare's Physician Compare to the NSPO3 survey.Principal findingsThere was wide variation in practices' exposure to performance incentives, with 64 percent exposed to financial incentives, 45 percent exposed to public reporting, and 2.2 percent of practice revenue coming from financial incentives. For each percentage-point increase in financial incentives, there was a 0.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in ACOs (standard error [SE], 0.1, p < .001) and a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the probability of participating in Meaningful Use (SE, 0.1, p < .001), controlling for practice characteristics. Financial incentives were not associated with participation in Physician Compare. Among ACO participants, a 1 percentage-point increase in incentives was associated with a 0.7 percentage-point increase in the probability of being "very well" prepared to utilize cost and quality data (SE, 0.1, p < .001).ConclusionsPhysicians organizations' prior experience and success with performance incentives were related to participation in Medicare ACO arrangements and participation in the meaningful use criteria but not to participation in Physician Compare. We conclude that Medicare must complement financial incentives with additional efforts to address the needs of practices with less experience with such incentives to promote value-based payment on a broader scale.

Project description:More than half of adults in the United States do not attain the minimum recommended level of physical activity to achieve health benefits. The optimal design of financial incentives to promote physical activity is unknown.To compare the effectiveness of individual versus team-based financial incentives to increase physical activity.Randomized, controlled trial comparing three interventions to control.Three hundred and four adult employees from an organization in Philadelphia formed 76 four-member teams.All participants received daily feedback on performance towards achieving a daily 7000 step goal during the intervention (weeks 1- 13) and follow-up (weeks 14- 26) periods. The control arm received no other intervention. In the three financial incentive arms, drawings were held in which one team was selected as the winner every other day during the 13-week intervention. A participant on a winning team was eligible as follows: $50 if he or she met the goal (individual incentive), $50 only if all four team members met the goal (team incentive), or $20 if he or she met the goal individually and $10 more for each of three teammates that also met the goal (combined incentive).Mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 step goal during the intervention.Compared to the control group during the intervention period, the mean proportion achieving the 7000 step goal was significantly greater for the combined incentive (0.35 vs. 0.18, difference: 0.17, 95 % confidence interval [CI]: 0.07-0.28, p <0.001) but not for the individual incentive (0.25 vs 0.18, difference: 0.08, 95 % CI: -0.02-0.18, p?=?0.13) or the team incentive (0.17 vs 0.18, difference: -0.003, 95 % CI: -0.11-0.10, p?=?0.96). The combined incentive arm participants also achieved the goal at significantly greater rates than the team incentive (0.35 vs. 0.17, difference: 0.18, 95 % CI: 0.08-0.28, p?<?0.001), but not the individual incentive (0.35 vs. 0.25, difference: 0.10, 95 % CI: -0.001-0.19, p?=?0.05). Only the combined incentive had greater mean daily steps than control (difference: 1446, 95 % CI: 448-2444, p ? 0.005). There were no significant differences between arms during the follow-up period (weeks 14- 26).Financial incentives rewarded for a combination of individual and team performance were most effective for increasing physical activity.Clinicaltrials.gov identifier: NCT02001194.

Project description:ImportanceFinancial incentives may improve health behaviors. It is unknown whether incentives are more effective if they target a key process (eg, medication adherence), an outcome (eg, low-density lipoprotein cholesterol [LDL-C] levels), or both.ObjectiveTo determine whether financial incentives awarded daily for process (adherence to statins), awarded quarterly for outcomes (personalized LDL-C level targets), or awarded for process plus outcomes induce reductions in LDL-C levels compared with control.Design, setting, and participantsA randomized clinical trial was conducted from February 12, 2015, to October 3, 2018; data analysis was performed from October 4, 2018, to May 27, 2021, at the University of Pennsylvania Health System, Philadelphia. Participants included 764 adults with an active statin prescription, elevated risk of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, suboptimal LDL-C level, and evidence of imperfect adherence to statin medication.InterventionsInterventions lasted 12 months. All participants received a smart pill bottle to measure adherence and underwent LDL-C measurement every 3 months. In the process group, daily financial incentives were awarded for statin adherence. In the outcomes group, participants received incentives for achieving or sustaining at least a quarterly 10-mg/dL LDL-C level reduction. The process plus outcomes group participants were eligible for incentives split between statin adherence and quarterly LDL-C level targets.Main outcomes and measuresChange in LDL-C level from baseline to 12 months, determined using intention-to-treat analysis.ResultsOf the 764 participants, 390 were women (51.2%); mean (SD) age was 62.4 (10.0) years, 310 (40.6%) had diabetes, 298 (39.0%) had hypertension, and mean (SD) baseline LDL-C level was 138.8 (37.6) mg/dL. Mean LDL-C level reductions from baseline to 12 months were -36.9 mg/dL (95% CI, -42.0 to -31.9 mg/dL) among control participants, -40.0 mg/dL (95% CI, -44.7 to -35.4 mg/dL) among process participants, -41.6 mg/dL (95% CI, -46.3 to -37.0 mg/dL) among outcomes participants, and -42.8 mg/dL (95% CI, -47.4 to -38.1 mg/dL) among process plus outcomes participants. In exploratory analysis among participants with diabetes and hypertension, no spillover effects of incentives were detected compared with the control group on hemoglobin A1c level and blood pressure over 12 months.Conclusions and relevanceIn this randomized clinical trial, process-, outcomes-, or process plus outcomes-based financial incentives did not improve LDL-C levels vs control.Trial registrationClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02246959.

Project description:Importance:Although breastfeeding has a positive effect on an infant's health and development, the prevalence is low in many communities. The effect of financial incentives to improve breastfeeding prevalence is unknown. Objective:To assess the effect of an area-level financial incentive for breastfeeding on breastfeeding prevalence at 6 to 8 weeks post partum. Design, Setting, and Participants:The Nourishing Start for Health (NOSH) trial, a cluster randomized trial with 6 to 8 weeks follow-up, was conducted between April 1, 2015, and March 31, 2016, in 92 electoral ward areas in England with baseline breastfeeding prevalence at 6 to 8 weeks post partum less than 40%. A total of 10?010 mother-infant dyads resident in the 92 study electoral ward areas where the infant's estimated or actual birth date fell between February 18, 2015, and February 17, 2016, were included. Areas were randomized to the incentive plus usual care (n?=?46) (5398 mother-infant dyads) or to usual care alone (n?=?46) (4612 mother-infant dyads). Interventions:Usual care was delivered by clinicians (mainly midwives, health visitors) in a variety of maternity, neonatal, and infant feeding services, all of which were implementing the UNICEF UK Baby Friendly Initiative standards. Shopping vouchers worth £40 (US$50) were offered to mothers 5 times based on infant age (2 days, 10 days, 6-8 weeks, 3 months, 6 months), conditional on the infant receiving any breast milk. Main Outcomes and Measures:The primary outcome was electoral ward area-level 6- to 8-week breastfeeding period prevalence, as assessed by clinicians at the routine 6- to 8-week postnatal check visit. Secondary outcomes were area-level period prevalence for breastfeeding initiation and for exclusive breastfeeding at 6 to 8 weeks. Results:In the intervention (5398 mother-infant dyads) and control (4612 mother-infant dyads) group, the median (interquartile range) percentage of women aged 16 to 44 years was 36.2% (3.0%) and 37.4% (3.6%) years, respectively. After adjusting for baseline breastfeeding prevalence and local government area and weighting to reflect unequal cluster-level breastfeeding prevalence variances, a difference in mean 6- to 8-week breastfeeding prevalence of 5.7 percentage points (37.9% vs 31.7%; 95% CI for adjusted difference, 2.7% to 8.6%; P?<?.001) in favor of the intervention vs usual care was observed. No significant differences were observed for the mean prevalence of breastfeeding initiation (61.9% vs 57.5%; adjusted mean difference, 2.9 percentage points; 95%, CI, -0.4 to 6.2; P?=?.08) or the mean prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding at 6 to 8 weeks (27.0% vs 24.1%; adjusted mean difference, 2.3 percentage points; 95% CI, -0.2 to 4.8; P?=?.07). Conclusions and Relevance:Financial incentives may improve breastfeeding rates in areas with low baseline prevalence. Offering a financial incentive to women in areas of England with breastfeeding rates below 40% compared with usual care resulted in a modest but statistically significant increase in breastfeeding prevalence at 6 to 8 weeks. This was measured using routinely collected data. Trial Registration:International Standard Randomized Controlled Trial Registry: ISRCTN44898617.

Project description:OBJECTIVE: Evaluate the effectiveness of collaborative management of hypertension by primary care-pharmacist teams in community-based clinics. STUDY DESIGN: A 12-month prospective, single-blind, randomized, controlled trial in the Providence Primary Care Research Network of patients with hypertension and uncontrolled blood pressure. METHODS: As compared to usual primary care, intervention consisted of pharmacy practitioners participating in the active management of hypertension in the primary care office according to established collaborative treatment protocols. At baseline, there was no significant difference in blood pressure between groups. Primary outcome measures were the differences in mean systolic and diastolic blood pressures between arms at study end. Secondary measures included blood pressure goal attainment (<140/90 mmHg), hypertension-related knowledge, medication adherence, home blood pressure monitoring, resource utilization, quality of life, and satisfaction. RESULTS: A total of 463 subjects were enrolled (n = 233 control, n = 230 intervention). Subjects receiving the intervention achieved significantly lower systolic (p = 0.007) and diastolic (p = 0.002) blood pressures compared to control (137/75 mmHg vs. 143/78 mmHg). In addition, 62% of intervention subjects achieved target blood pressure compared to 44% of control subjects (p = 0.003). The intervention group received more total office visits (7.2 vs. 4.9, p < 0.0001), however had fewer physician visits (3.2 vs. 4.7, p < 0.0001) compared to control. Intervention subjects were prescribed more antihypertensive medications (2.7 vs. 2.4, p = 0.02), but did not take more antihypertensive pills per day (2.4 vs. 2.5, p = 0.87). There were minimal differences between groups in hypertension-related knowledge, medication adherence, quality of life, or satisfaction. CONCLUSIONS: Patients randomized to collaborative primary care-pharmacist hypertension management achieved significantly better blood pressure control compared to usual care with no difference in quality of life or satisfaction.

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Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial.

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Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial.

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