Dataset Information

Incentives for new antibiotics: the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) model.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat resulting from the convergence of biological, economic and political pressures. Investment in research and development of new antimicrobials has suffered secondary to these pressures, leading to an emerging crisis in antibiotic resistance.

Methods

Current policies to stimulate antibiotic development have proven inadequate to overcome market failures. Therefore innovative ideas utilizing market forces are necessary to stimulate new investment efforts. Employing the benefits of both the previously described Advanced Market Commitment and a refined Call Options for Vaccines model, we describe herein a novel incentive mechanism, the Options Market for Antibiotics.

Results

This model applies the benefits of a financial call option to the investment in and purchase of new antibiotics. The goal of this new model is to provide an effective mechanism for early investment and risk sharing while maintaining a credible purchase commitment and incentives for companies to ultimately bring new antibiotics to market.

Conclusions

We believe that the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) may help to overcome some of the traditional market failures associated with the development of new antibiotics. Additional work must be done to develop a more robust mathematical model to pave the way for practical implementation.

SUBMITTER: Brogan DM

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4226193 | biostudies-literature | 2013 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Publications

Incentives for new antibiotics: the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) model.

Brogan David M DM Mossialos Elias E

Globalization and health 20131107

<h4>Background</h4>Antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat resulting from the convergence of biological, economic and political pressures. Investment in research and development of new antimicrobials has suffered secondary to these pressures, leading to an emerging crisis in antibiotic resistance.<h4>Methods</h4>Current policies to stimulate antibiotic development have proven inadequate to overcome market failures. Therefore innovative ideas utilizing market forces are necessary to stimulat ...[more]

PMID: 24199835

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Project description:BackgroundPosthumous organ procurement is hindered by the consenting process. Several consenting systems have been proposed. There is limited information on public relative attitudes towards various consenting systems, especially in Middle Eastern/Islamic countries.MethodsWe surveyed 698 Saudi Adults attending outpatient clinics at a tertiary care hospital. Preference and perception of norm regarding consenting options for posthumous organ donation were explored. Participants ranked (1, most agreeable) the following, randomly-presented, options from 1 to 11: no-organ-donation, presumed consent, informed consent by donor-only, informed consent by donor-or-surrogate, and mandatory choice; the last three options ± medical or financial incentive.ResultsMean(SD) age was 32(9) year, 27% were males, 50% were patients' companions, 60% had???college education, and 20% and 32%, respectively, knew an organ donor or recipient. Mandated choice was among the top three choices for preference of 54% of respondents, with an overall median[25%,75%] ranking score of 3[2,6], and was preferred over donor-or-surrogate informed consent (4[2,7], p?<?0.001), donor-only informed consent (5[3,7], p?<?0.001), and presumed consent (7[3,10], p?<?0.001). The addition of a financial or medical incentive, respectively, reduced ranking of mandated choice to 7[4,9], p?<?0.001, and 5[3,8], p?<?0.001; for donor-or-surrogate informed consent to 7[5,9], p?<?0.001, and 5[3,7], p?=?0.004; and for donor-only informed consent to 8[6,10], p?<?0.001, and 5[3,7], p?=?0.56. Distribution of ranking score of perception of norm and preference were similar except for no-organ donation (11[7,11] vs. 11[6,11], respectively, p?=?0.002). Compared to females, males more perceived donor-or-surrogate informed consent as the norm (3[1,6] vs. 5[3,7], p?<?0.001), more preferred mandated choice with financial incentive option (6[3,8] vs. 8[4,9], p?<?0.001), and less preferred mandated choice with medical incentive option (7[4,9] vs. 5[2,7], p?<?0.001). There was no association between consenting options ranking scores and age, health status, education level, or knowing an organ donor or recipient.ConclusionsWe conclude that: 1) most respondents were in favor of posthumous organ donation, 2) mandated choice system was the most preferred and presumed consent system was the least preferred, 3) there was no difference between preference and perception of norm in consenting systems ranking, and 4) financial (especially in females) and medical (especially in males) incentives reduced preference.

Project description:BackgroundFor addressing antibiotic overuse, Japan designed a health care policy in which eligible medical facilities could claim a financial reward when antibiotics were not prescribed for early-stage respiratory and gastrointestinal infections. The policy was introduced in a pilot manner in paediatric clinics in April 2018.MethodsWe conducted a quasi-experimental, propensity score-matched, difference-in-differences (DID) design to determine whether the nationwide financial incentives for appropriate non-prescribing of antibiotics as antimicrobial stewardship [800 JPY (≈7.3 US D) per case] were associated with changes in prescription patterns, including antibiotics, and health care use in routine paediatric health care settings at a national level. Data consisted of 9 253 261 cases of infectious diseases in 553 138 patients treated at 10 180 eligible or ineligible facilities.ResultsA total of 2959 eligible facilities claimed 316 770 cases for financial incentives and earned 253 million JPY (≈2.29 million USD). Compared with ineligible facilities, the introduction of financial incentives in the eligible facilities was associated with an excess reduction in antibiotic prescriptions [DID estimate, -228.6 days of therapy (DOTs) per 1000 cases (95% CI, -272.4 to -184.9), which corresponded to a relative reduction of 17.8% (95% CI, 14.8 to 20.7)]. The introduction was also associated with excess reductions in drugs for respiratory symptoms [DID estimates, -256.9 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -379.3 to -134.5)] and antihistamines [DID estimate, -198.5 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -282.1 to -114.9)]. There was no excess in out-of-hour visits [DID estimate, -4.43 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -12.8 to 3.97)] or hospitalizations [DID estimate, -0.08 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -0.48 to 0.31)].ConclusionsOur findings suggest that financial incentives to medical facilities for not prescribing antibiotics were associated with reductions in prescriptions for antibiotics without adverse health care consequences. Japan's new health policy provided us with policy options for immediately reducing inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions by relatively small financial incentives.

Dataset Information

Incentives for new antibiotics: the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) model.

Background

Methods

Results

Conclusions

Publications

Incentives for new antibiotics: the Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) model.

Similar Datasets

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