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Disproportionate-share hospital payment reductions may threaten the financial stability of safety-net hospitals.

ABSTRACT: Safety-net hospitals rely on disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) payments to help cover uncompensated care costs and underpayments by Medicaid (known as Medicaid shortfalls). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) anticipates that insurance expansion will increase safety-net hospitals' revenues and will reduce DSH payments accordingly. We examined the impact of the ACA's Medicaid DSH reductions on California public hospitals' financial stability by estimating how total DSH costs (uncompensated care costs and Medicaid shortfalls) will change as a result of insurance expansion and the offsetting DSH reductions. Decreases in uncompensated care costs resulting from the ACA insurance expansion may not match the act's DSH reductions because of the high number of people who will remain uninsured, low Medicaid reimbursement rates, and medical cost inflation. Taking these three factors into account, we estimate that California public hospitals' total DSH costs will increase from $2.044 billion in 2010 to $2.363-$2.503 billion in 2019, with unmet DSH costs of $1.381-$1.537 billion.

SUBMITTER: Neuhausen K

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4242845 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Jun

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Disproportionate-share hospital payment reductions may threaten the financial stability of safety-net hospitals.

Neuhausen Katherine K Davis Anna C AC Needleman Jack J Brook Robert H RH Zingmond David D Roby Dylan H DH

Health affairs (Project Hope) 20140601 6

Safety-net hospitals rely on disproportionate-share hospital (DSH) payments to help cover uncompensated care costs and underpayments by Medicaid (known as Medicaid shortfalls). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) anticipates that insurance expansion will increase safety-net hospitals' revenues and will reduce DSH payments accordingly. We examined the impact of the ACA's Medicaid DSH reductions on California public hospitals' financial stability by estimating how total DSH costs (uncompensated care cos ...[more]

PMID: 24889948

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Project description:ObjectiveTo assess whether a hospital's percentage of Black patients associates with variations in FY2017 overall/domain-specific Hospital Acquired-Condition Reduction Program (HACRP) scores and penalty receipt. Differences in socioeconomic status and receipt of disproportionate share hospital payments (a marker of safety-net status) were also assessed.Summary of background dataIn FY2015, Medicare began reducing payments to hospitals with high adverse event rates. Concern has been expressed that HACRP penalties could adversely affect minority-serving hospitals, leading to reductions in resources and exasperation of disparities among hospitals with the greatest need.Methods100% Medicare FFS claims from 2013 to 2014 identified older adult inpatients, aged ≥65 years, presenting for 8 common surgical conditions. Multilevel mixed-effects regression determined differences in FY2017 HACRP scores/penalties among hospitals managing the highest decile of minority patients.ResultsA total of 695,775 patients from 2923 hospitals were included. As a hospital's percentage of Black patients increased, climbing from 0.6% to 32.5% (lowest vs highest decile), average HACRP scores also increased, rising from 5.33 to 6.36 (higher values indicate worse scores). Increases in HACRP penalties did not follow the same stepwise increase, instead exhibiting a marked jump within the highest decile of racial minority-serving extent (45.7% vs 36.7%; OR [95% CI]: 1.45[1.42-1.47]). Similar patterns were observed for high disproportionate share hospital (OR [95% CI]: 1.44 [1.42-1.47]; absolute difference: +7.4 percentage-points) and low socioeconomic status-serving (1.38[1.35-1.40]; +7.3% percentage-points) hospitals. Restricted analyses accounting for the influence of teaching status and severity of patient case-mix both accentuated disparities in HACRP penalties when limiting hospitals to those at the highest known penalty-risk (more residents-to-beds, more severe), absolute differences +13.9, +20.5 percentage-points. Restriction to high operative volume, in contrast, reduced the penalty difference, +6.6 percentage-points.ConclusionsMinority-serving hospitals are being disproportionately penalized by the HACRP. As the program continues to develop, efforts are needed to identify and protect patients in vulnerable institutions to ensure that disparities do not increase.

Project description:ImportanceVarious policy proposals would reduce federal payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. However, it is unclear whether payment reductions would compromise beneficiary access to the MA program.ObjectiveTo quantify the association between MA payment reductions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and MA enrollment growth.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective cohort study examined the MA market before and after the ACA, which mandated cuts to MA benchmark payment rates. Using 2008 to 2019 county-level enrollment and payment data, a difference-in-differences analysis was conducted comparing MA enrollment changes between counties with larger vs smaller benchmark reductions, before vs after the ACA.Main outcomes and measuresThe primary outcome was the MA enrollment rate, defined as the proportion of a county's Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA. A secondary analysis examined MA plan payments per member per month.ResultsAmong 3138 counties with 37 639 county-year observations, ACA-induced benchmark cuts were sizeable and varied, ranging from 0% to 42.9% (mean [SD], 5.9% [6.6%]). Counties with benchmark cuts above the 75th percentile had population-weighted average benchmark cuts of 14.9% compared with 4.4% in other counties. In the 8 years following the ACA, there was no differential change in MA enrollment between counties with larger vs smaller benchmark cuts (difference-in-differences estimate, 0.02 [95% CI, -1.18 to 1.21] percentage points; P = .98). Plan payments differentially fell in counties with larger benchmark cuts by $78.35 (95% CI, $62.21-$94.48) per member per month (P < .001).Conclusion and relevanceThis cohort study found no evidence that the MA benchmark and ensuing payment cuts imposed by the ACA were associated with reduced MA enrollment, compromising access to MA. This evidence can inform ongoing policy debates regarding the growth of MA, concerns about excess payments to MA plans, and proposed Medicare reforms, including further reductions in MA payments.

Dataset Information

Disproportionate-share hospital payment reductions may threaten the financial stability of safety-net hospitals.

Publications

Disproportionate-share hospital payment reductions may threaten the financial stability of safety-net hospitals.

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