The source of consciousness.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Paller KA
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4337993 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Aug
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
The source of consciousness.
Paller Ken A KA Suzuki Satoru S
Trends in cognitive sciences 20140709 8
Why does a relentless stream of experiences normally fill your mind? No answer is entirely satisfactory. We are not sure how the normal operation of the human brain might exude subjective experiences. Consciousness can thus seem miraculous, and research on consciousness a waste of time and money, ultimately doomed to fail. Yet, there are good reasons for optimism that should be shared with the public to justify research in this area. ...[more]
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