Unknown

Dataset Information

0

Algorithmic mechanisms for reliable crowdsourcing computation under collusion.


ABSTRACT: We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers' decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense. We identify analytically the parameter conditions for a unique Nash Equilibrium where the master obtains the correct result. We also evaluate experimentally mixed equilibria aiming to attain better reliability-profit trade-offs. For a wide range of parameter values that may be used in practice, our simulations show that, in fact, both master and workers are better off using a pure equilibrium where no worker cheats, even under collusion, and even for colluding behaviors that involve deviating from the game.

SUBMITTER: Fernandez Anta A 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4391324 | biostudies-literature | 2015

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

altmetric image

Publications

Algorithmic mechanisms for reliable crowdsourcing computation under collusion.

Fernández Anta Antonio A   Georgiou Chryssis C   Mosteiro Miguel A MA   Pareja Daniel D  

PloS one 20150320 3


We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers' decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense. We identify analytically the parameter conditions for a unique Nash Equilibrium where the master obtains the correct result. We also evaluate experi  ...[more]

Similar Datasets

| S-EPMC5624899 | biostudies-other
| S-EPMC6447384 | biostudies-literature
| S-EPMC8594842 | biostudies-literature
| S-EPMC7518335 | biostudies-literature
| S-EPMC7048320 | biostudies-literature
2022-09-19 | GSE211653 | GEO
| S-EPMC4339801 | biostudies-other
| S-EPMC8359010 | biostudies-literature
| S-EPMC3387023 | biostudies-literature
| S-EPMC5579072 | biostudies-literature