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Social Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma Games.

ABSTRACT: It has been a long-lasting pursuit to promote cooperation, and this study aims to promote cooperation via the combination of social stratification and the spatial prisoners' dilemma game. It is previously assumed that agents share the identical payoff matrix, but the stratification or diversity exists and exerts influences in real societies. Thus, two additional classes, elites and scoundrels, derive from and coexist with the existing class, commons. Three classes have different payoff matrices. We construct a model where agents play the prisoners' dilemma game with neighbors. It indicates that stratification and temptation jointly influence cooperation. Temptation permanently reduces cooperation; elites play a positive role in promoting cooperation while scoundrels undermine it. As the temptation getting larger and larger, elites play a more and more positive and critical role while scoundrels' negative effect becomes weaker and weaker, and it is more obvious when temptation goes beyond its threshold.

SUBMITTER: Lu P

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4501745 | biostudies-literature | 2015

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Social Stratification and Cooperative Behavior in Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma Games.

Lu Peng P Zheng Xiaoping X

PloS one 20150714 7

It has been a long-lasting pursuit to promote cooperation, and this study aims to promote cooperation via the combination of social stratification and the spatial prisoners' dilemma game. It is previously assumed that agents share the identical payoff matrix, but the stratification or diversity exists and exerts influences in real societies. Thus, two additional classes, elites and scoundrels, derive from and coexist with the existing class, commons. Three classes have different payoff matrices. ...[more]

PMID: 26173029

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