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Information asymmetry and deception.

ABSTRACT: Situations such as an entrepreneur overstating a project's value, or a superior choosing to under or overstate the gains from a project to a subordinate are common and may result in acts of deception. In this paper we modify the standard investment game in the economics literature to study the nature of deception. In this game a trustor (investor) can send a given amount of money to a trustee (or investee). The amount received is multiplied by a certain amount, k, and the investee then decides on how to divide the total amount received. In our modified game the information on the multiplier, k, is known only to the investee and she can send a non-binding message to the investor regarding its value. We find that 66% of the investees send false messages with both under and over, statement being observed. Investors are naive and almost half of them believe the message received. We find greater lying when the distribution of the multiplier is unknown by the investors than when they know the distribution. Further, messages make beliefs about the multiplier more pessimistic when the investors know the distribution of the multiplier, while the opposite is true when they do not know the distribution.

SUBMITTER: Clots-Figueras I

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4508524 | biostudies-literature | 2015

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Information asymmetry and deception.

Clots-Figueras Irma I Hernán-González Roberto R Kujal Praveen P

Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience 20150721

Situations such as an entrepreneur overstating a project's value, or a superior choosing to under or overstate the gains from a project to a subordinate are common and may result in acts of deception. In this paper we modify the standard investment game in the economics literature to study the nature of deception. In this game a trustor (investor) can send a given amount of money to a trustee (or investee). The amount received is multiplied by a certain amount, k, and the investee then decides o ...[more]

PMID: 26257615

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Project description:BackgroundInformation asymmetries and the agency relationship are two defining features of the healthcare system. These market failures are often used as a rationale for government intervention. Many countries have government financing and provision of healthcare in order to correct for this, while health technology agencies also exist to improve efficiency. However, informational asymmetries and the resulting principal-agent problem still persist, and one example is the lack of cost awareness amongst clinicians. This study explores the cost awareness of clinicians across different settings.MethodsWe targeted four clinical cohorts: medical students, Senior House Officers/Interns, Mid-grade Senior Registrar/Residents, and Consultant/Attending Physicians, in six hospitals in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Spain. The survey asked respondents to report the cost (as they recalled) of different types of scans, visits, medications and tests. Our analysis focused on the differential between the perceived/recalled cost and the actual cost. We explored variation across speciality, country and other potential confounders. Cost-awareness levels were estimated based on the cost estimates within 25% of the actual cost.ResultsWe received 705 complete responses from six sites across five countries. Our analysis found that respondents often overestimated the cost of common tests while underestimating high-cost tests. The mean cost-awareness levels varied between 4 and 23% for different items. Respondents acknowledged that they did not feel they had received adequate training in cost awareness.DiscussionThe current financial climate means that cost awareness and the appropriate use of scarce healthcare resources is more paramount than perhaps ever before. Much of the focus of health economics research is on high-cost innovative technologies, yet there is considerable waste in the system with respect to overtreatment and overdiagnosis. Common reasons put forward for this include defensive medicine, poor education, clinical uncertainty and the institution of protocols.ConclusionGiven the role of clinicians in the healthcare system, as agents both for patients and for providers, more needs to be done to remove informational asymmetries and improve clinician cost awareness.

Dataset Information

Information asymmetry and deception.

Publications

Information asymmetry and deception.

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