Dataset Information

Rational Constraints and the Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game.

ABSTRACT: Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked contrast between the theoretical model of a self-interested economic agent and that of an actual human concerned with social norms such as fairness. How did such norms evolve, when punishing unfair behavior can be costly to the punishing agent? The work described here simulated a series of Ultimatum Games, in which populations of agents earned resources based on their preferences for proposing and accepting (or rejecting) offers of various sizes. Two different systems governing the acceptance or rejection of offers were implemented. Under one system, the probability that an agent accepted an offer of a given size was independent of the probabilities of accepting the other possible offers. Under the other system, a simple, ordinal constraint was placed on the acceptance probabilities such that a given offer was at least as likely to be accepted as a smaller offer. For simulations under either system, agents' preferences and their corresponding behavior evolved over multiple generations. Populations without the ordinal constraint came to emulate maximizing economic agents, while populations with the constraint came to resemble the behavior of human players.

SUBMITTER: Tomlin D

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4520471 | biostudies-literature | 2015

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Rational Constraints and the Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game.

Tomlin Damon D

PloS one 20150730 7

Behavior in the Ultimatum Game has been well-studied experimentally, and provides a marked contrast between the theoretical model of a self-interested economic agent and that of an actual human concerned with social norms such as fairness. How did such norms evolve, when punishing unfair behavior can be costly to the punishing agent? The work described here simulated a series of Ultimatum Games, in which populations of agents earned resources based on their preferences for proposing and acceptin ...[more]

PMID: 26226512

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Project description:The current study delineated how male proposers' facial attractiveness affect female responders' fairness considerations and their subsequent decision outcome during the Ultimatum Game (UG). Event Related Potentials (ERPs) were recorded from 17 female subjects, who played the role as responders and had to decide whether to accept offers from either attractive or unattractive male proposers. Behavioral data (Acceptance Ratio and Response time) revealed that, more offers were accepted from attractive-face conditions; subjects typically responded quicker to unfair offers from unattractive proposers as compared with slower to unfair offers from attractive proposers. The ERP data demonstrated similar N2 amplitudes elicited by both attractive and unattractive faces, and a larger early frontal LPP elicited by the attractive faces compared with unattractive ones, but no significant differences of both late posterior LPP and typical parietal LPP amplitudes were observed between these two face conditions, which was different from our previous study with similar paradigm but male participants. The results suggest that, in comparison to males, females might not experience the potential attention bias towards unattractive opposite-sex faces and are less likely to possess an enhanced processing and evaluation of those faces. This phenomenon might be explained by endogenous gender differences in mate preference. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) and P300 responses during an offer presentation were further measured in both attractive-face and unattractive-face conditions and the results demonstrated that the amplitudes elicited by fair and unfair offers were not statistically different in the former condition, but were different in the latter condition. More specifically, unfair offers generated larger FRN and smaller P300 than fair ones in the unattractive-face condition. Findings suggest that, although females tend to possess less salient evaluation of male's facial attractiveness, the attractiveness of male proposers would still attenuate female responders' fairness consideration during the UG.

Dataset Information

Rational Constraints and the Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game.

Publications

Rational Constraints and the Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game.

Similar Datasets

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