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Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial.

ABSTRACT: Inappropriate treatment of non-malaria fevers with artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) is a growing concern, particularly in light of emerging artemisinin resistance, but it is a behavior that has proven difficult to change. Pay for performance (P4P) programs have generated interest as a mechanism to improve health service delivery and accountability in resource-constrained health systems. However, there has been little experimental evidence to establish the effectiveness of P4P in developing countries. We tested a P4P strategy that emphasized parasitological diagnosis and appropriate treatment of suspected malaria, in particular reduction of unnecessary consumption of ACTs.A random sample of 18 health centers was selected and received a refresher workshop on malaria case management. Pre-intervention baseline data was collected from August to September 2012. Facilities were subsequently randomized to either the comparison (n?=?9) or intervention arm (n?=?9). Between October 2012 and November 2013, facilities in the intervention arm received quarterly incentive payments based on seven performance indicators. Incentives were for use by facilities rather than as payments to individual providers. All non-pregnant patients older than 1 year of age who presented to a participating facility and received either a malaria test or artemether-lumefantrine (AL) were eligible to be included in the analysis. Our primary outcome was prescription of AL to patients with a negative malaria diagnostic test (n?=?11,953). Our secondary outcomes were prescription of AL to patients with laboratory-confirmed malaria (n?=?2,993) and prescription of AL to patients without a malaria diagnostic test (analyzed at the cluster level, n?=?178 facility-months).In the final quarter of the intervention period, the proportion of malaria-negative patients in the intervention arm who received AL was lower than in the comparison arm (7.3% versus 10.9%). The improvement from baseline to quarter 4 in the intervention arm was nearly three times that of the comparison arm (ratio of adjusted odds ratios for baseline to quarter 4?=?0.36, 95% CI: 0.24-0.57). The rate of prescription of AL to patients without a test was five times lower in the intervention arm (adjusted incidence rate ratio?=?0.18, 95% CI: 0.07-0.48). Prescription of AL to patients with confirmed infection was not significantly different between the groups over the study period.Facility-based incentives coupled with training may be more effective than training alone and could complement other quality improvement approaches.This study was registered with ClinicalTrials.gov (NCT01809873) on 11 March 2013.

SUBMITTER: Menya D

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4608124 | biostudies-literature | 2015 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial.

Menya Diana D Platt Alyssa A Manji Imran I Sang Edna E Wafula Rebeccah R Ren Jing J Cheruiyot Olympia O Armstrong Janice J Neelon Brian B O'Meara Wendy Prudhomme WP

BMC medicine 20151016

<h4>Background</h4>Inappropriate treatment of non-malaria fevers with artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) is a growing concern, particularly in light of emerging artemisinin resistance, but it is a behavior that has proven difficult to change. Pay for performance (P4P) programs have generated interest as a mechanism to improve health service delivery and accountability in resource-constrained health systems. However, there has been little experimental evidence to establish the effecti ...[more]

PMID: 26472130

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Project description:In high-resource settings, 'pay-for-performance' (P4P) programs have generated interest as a potential mechanism to improve health service delivery and accountability. However, there has been little or no experimental evidence to guide the development or assess the effectiveness of P4P incentive programs in developing countries. In the developing world, P4P programs are likely to rely, at least initially, on external funding from donors. Under these circumstances, the sustainability of such programs is in doubt and needs assessment.We describe a cluster-randomized controlled trial underway in 18 health centers in western Kenya that is testing an innovative incentive strategy to improve management of an epidemiologically and economically important problem--diagnosis and treatment of malaria. The incentive scheme in this trial promotes adherence to Ministry of Health guidelines for laboratory confirmation of malaria before treatment, a priority area for the Ministry of Health. There are three important innovations that are unique to this study among those from other resource-constrained settings: the behavior being incentivized is quality of care rather than volume of service delivery; the incentives are applied at the facility-level rather than the individual level, thus benefiting facility infrastructure and performance overall; and the incentives are designed to be budget-neutral if effective.Linking appropriate case management for malaria to financial incentives has the potential to improve patient care and reduce wastage of expensive antimalarials. In our study facilities, on average only 25% of reported malaria cases were confirmed by laboratory diagnosis prior to the intervention, and the total treatment courses of antimalarials dispensed did not correspond to the number of cases reported. This study will demonstrate whether facility rather than individual incentives are compelling enough to improve case management, and whether these incentives lead to offsetting cost-savings as a result of reduced drug consumption.ClinicalTrials.gov Registration Number NCT01809873.

Project description:BackgroundAlthough pay-for-performance (P4P) has become a central strategy for improving quality in US healthcare, questions persist about the effectiveness of these programs. A key question is whether quality improvement that occurs as a result of P4P programs is sustainable, particularly if incentives are removed.ObjectiveTo investigate sustainability of performance levels following removal of performance-based incentives.Design, setting, and participantsObservational cohort study that capitalized on a P4P program within the Veterans Health Administration (VA) that included adoption and subsequent removal of performance-based incentives for selected inpatient quality measures. The study sample comprised 128 acute care VA hospitals where performance was assessed between 2004 and 2010.InterventionVA system managers set annual performance goals in consultation with clinical leaders, and report performance scores to medical centers on a quarterly basis. These scores inform performance-based incentives for facilities and their managers. Bonuses are distributed based on the attainment of these performance goals.MeasurementsSeven quality of care measures for acute coronary syndrome, heart failure, and pneumonia linked to performance-based incentives.ResultsSignificant improvements in performance were observed for six of seven quality of care measures following adoption of performance-based incentives and were maintained up to the removal of the incentive; subsequently, the observed performance levels were sustained.LimitationsThis is a quasi-experimental study without a comparison group; causal conclusions are limited.ConclusionThe maintenance of performance levels after removal of a performance-based incentive has implications for the implementation of Medicare's value-based purchasing initiative and other P4P programs. Additional research is needed to better understand human and system-level factors that mediate sustainability of performance-based incentives.

Project description:BackgroundAs mobile phone access continues to expand globally, opportunities exist to leverage these technologies to support demand for immunisation services and improve vaccine coverage. We aimed to assess whether short message service (SMS) reminders and monetary incentives can improve immunisation uptake in Kenya.MethodsIn this cluster-randomised controlled trial, villages were randomly and evenly allocated to four groups: control, SMS only, SMS plus a 75 Kenya Shilling (KES) incentive, and SMS plus 200 KES (85 KES = USD$1). Caregivers were eligible if they had a child younger than 5 weeks who had not yet received a first dose of pentavalent vaccine. Participants in the intervention groups received SMS reminders before scheduled pentavalent and measles immunisation visits. Participants in incentive groups, additionally, received money if their child was timely immunised (immunisation within 2 weeks of the due date). Caregivers and interviewers were not masked. The proportion of fully immunised children (receiving BCG, three doses of polio vaccine, three doses of pentavalent vaccine, and measles vaccine) by 12 months of age constituted the primary outcome and was analysed with log-binomial regression and General Estimating Equations to account for correlation within clusters. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT01878435.FindingsBetween Oct 14, 2013, and Oct 17, 2014, we enrolled 2018 caregivers and their infants from 152 villages into the following four groups: control (n=489), SMS only (n=476), SMS plus 75 KES (n=562), and SMS plus 200 KES (n=491). Overall, 1375 (86%) of 1600 children who were successfully followed up achieved the primary outcome, full immunisation by 12 months of age (296 [82%] of 360 control participants, 332 [86%] of 388 SMS only participants, 383 [86%] of 446 SMS plus 75 KES participants, and 364 [90%] of 406 SMS plus 200 KES participants). Children in the SMS plus 200 KES group were significantly more likely to achieve full immunisation at 12 months of age (relative risk 1·09, 95% CI 1·02-1·16, p=0·014) than children in the control group.InterpretationIn a setting with high baseline immunisation coverage levels, SMS reminders coupled with incentives significantly improved immunisation coverage and timeliness. Given that global immunisation coverage levels have stagnated around 85%, the use of incentives might be one option to reach the remaining 15%.FundingBill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Project description:ObjectiveTo test whether pay for performance (P4P) is an effective method to improve adolescent substance use disorder treatment implementation and efficacy.DesignCluster randomized trial.SettingCommunity-based treatment organizations.ParticipantsTwenty-nine community-based treatment organizations, 105 therapists, and 986 adolescent patients (953 with complete data).InterventionCommunity-based treatment organizations were assigned to 1 of the following conditions: the implementation-as-usual (IAU) control condition or the P4P experimental condition. In addition to delivering the same evidence-based treatment (ie, using the Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach [A-CRA]), each organization received standardized levels of funding, training, and coaching from the treatment developers. Therapists in the P4P condition received US $50 for each month that they demonstrated competence in treatment delivery (ie, A-CRA competence) and US $200 for each patient who received a specified number of treatment procedures and sessions (ie, target A-CRA) that has been found to be associated with significantly improved patient outcomes.Main outcome measuresOutcomes included ACRA competence (ie, a therapist-level implementation measure), target A-CRA (ie, a patient-level implementation measure), and remission status (ie, a patient-level treatment effectiveness measure).ResultsRelative to therapists in the IAU control condition, therapists in the P4P condition were significantly more likely to demonstrate A-CRA competence (24.0% vs 8.9%; event rate ratio, 2.24; 95% CI, 1.12- 4.48; P=.02). Relative to patients in the IAU control condition, patients in the P4P condition were significantly more likely to receive target A-CRA (17.3% vs 2.5%; odds ratio, 5.19; 95% CI, 1.53-17.62; P=.01). However, no significant differences were found between conditions with regard to patients' end-of-treatment remission status.ConclusionPay for performance can be an effective method of improving treatment implementation.Trial registrationclinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01016704

Project description:ObjectivesTo test the impact of provider performance pay for anaemia reduction in rural China.DesignA cluster randomised trial of information, subsidies, and incentives for school principals to reduce anaemia among their students. Enumerators and study participants were not informed of study arm assignment.Setting72 randomly selected rural primary schools across northwest China.Participants3553 fourth and fifth grade students aged 9-11 years. All fourth and fifth grade students in sample schools participated in the study.InterventionsSample schools were randomly assigned to a control group, with no intervention, or one of three treatment arms: (a) an information arm, in which principals received information about anaemia; (b) a subsidy arm, in which principals received information and unconditional subsidies; and (c) an incentive arm, in which principals received information, subsidies, and financial incentives for reducing anaemia among students. Twenty seven schools were assigned to the control arm (1816 students at baseline, 1623 at end point), 15 were assigned to the information arm (659 students at baseline, 596 at end point), 15 to the subsidy arm (726 students at baseline, 667 at end point), and 15 to the incentive arm (743 students at baseline, 667 at end point).Main outcome measuresStudent haemoglobin concentrations.ResultsMean student haemoglobin concentration rose by 1.5 g/L (95% CI -1.1 to 4.1) in information schools, 0.8 g/L (-1.8 to 3.3) in subsidy schools, and 2.4 g/L (0 to 4.9) in incentive schools compared with the control group. This increase in haemoglobin corresponded to a reduction in prevalence of anaemia (Hb <115 g/L) of 24% in incentive schools. Interactions with pre-existing incentives for principals to achieve good academic performance led to substantially larger gains in the information and incentive arms: when combined with incentives for good academic performance, associated effects on student haemoglobin concentration were 9.8 g/L (4.1 to 15.5) larger in information schools and 8.6 g/L (2.1 to 15.1) larger in incentive schools.ConclusionsFinancial incentives for health improvement were modestly effective. Understanding interactions with other motives and pre-existing incentives is critical.Trial registration numberISRCTN76158086.

Dataset Information

Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial.

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Using pay for performance incentives (P4P) to improve management of suspected malaria fevers in rural Kenya: a cluster randomized controlled trial.

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