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Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma.

ABSTRACT: Classic socio-ecological theory holds that the occurrence of aggressive range defence is primarily driven by ecological incentives, most notably by the economic defendability of an area or the resources it contains. While this ecological cost-benefit framework has great explanatory power in solitary or pair-living species, comparative work on group-living primates has always found economic defendability to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition to account for the distribution of effective range defence across the taxon. This mismatch between theory and observation has recently been ascribed to a collective action problem among group members in, what is more informatively viewed as, a public goods dilemma: mounting effective defence of a communal range against intrusions by outgroup conspecifics. We here further develop this framework, and report on analyses at three levels of biological organization: across species, across populations within a single lineage and across groups and individuals within a single population. We find that communal range defence in primates very rarely involves collective action sensu stricto and that it is best interpreted as the outcome of opportunistic and strategic individual-level decisions. Whether the public good of a defended communal range is produced by solitary, joint or collective action is thus the outcome of the interplay between the unique characteristics of each individual, local and current socio-ecological conditions, and fundamental life-history traits of the species.

SUBMITTER: Willems EP

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4633841 | biostudies-literature | 2015 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma.

Willems Erik P EP Arseneau T Jean M TJ Schleuning Xenia X van Schaik Carel P CP

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences 20151201 1683

Classic socio-ecological theory holds that the occurrence of aggressive range defence is primarily driven by ecological incentives, most notably by the economic defendability of an area or the resources it contains. While this ecological cost-benefit framework has great explanatory power in solitary or pair-living species, comparative work on group-living primates has always found economic defendability to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition to account for the distribution of effective ...[more]

PMID: 26503678

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Project description:Empirical findings on public goods dilemmas indicate an unresolved dilemma: that increasing size-the number of people in the dilemma-sometimes increases, decreases, or does not influence cooperation. We clarify this dilemma by first classifying public goods dilemma properties that specify individual outcomes as individual properties (e.g., Marginal Per Capita Return) and group outcomes as group properties (e.g., public good multiplier), mathematically showing how only one set of properties can remain constant as the dilemma size increases. Underpinning decision-making regarding individual and group properties, we propose that individuals are motivated by both individual and group preferences based on a theory of collective rationality. We use Van Lange's integrated model of social value orientations to operationalize these preferences as an amalgamation of outcomes for self, outcomes for others, and equality of outcomes. Based on this model, we then predict how the public good's benefit and size, combined with controlling individual versus group properties, produce different levels of cooperation in public goods dilemmas. A two (low vs. high benefit) by three (2-person baseline vs. 5-person holding constant individual properties vs. 5-person holding constant group properties) factorial experiment (group n = 99; participant n = 390) confirms our hypotheses. The results indicate that when holding constant group properties, size decreases cooperation. Yet when holding constant individual properties, size increases cooperation when benefit is low and does not affect cooperation when benefit is high. Using agent-based simulations of individual and group preferences vis-à-vis the integrative model, we fit a weighted simulation model to the empirical data. This fitted model is sufficient to reproduce the empirical results, but only when both individual (self-interest) and group (other-interest and equality) preference are included. Our research contributes to understanding how people's motivations and behaviors within public goods dilemmas interact with the properties of the dilemma to lead to collective outcomes.

Dataset Information

Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma.

Publications

Communal range defence in primates as a public goods dilemma.

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