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Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of Financial Compensation for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations.

ABSTRACT: Despite the popularity of financial compensation as a means for addressing trust violations, the question whether (more) money can indeed buy trust back remains largely unexplored. In the present research, we focus on the role of violation type and compensation size. The results of a scenario study and a laboratory experiment show that financial compensation can effectively promote the restoration of trust for transgressions that indicate a lack of competence. Conversely, for transgressions which signal a lack of integrity, financial compensation is not an effective tool to repair trust. Moreover, our findings indicate that for both violation types, overcompensation has no positive effects on top of the impact of equal compensation. These findings therefore show that when it comes to trust, money cannot buy everything.

SUBMITTER: Haesevoets T

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4694657 | biostudies-literature | 2015

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of Financial Compensation for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations.

Haesevoets Tessa T Reinders Folmer Chris C Van Hiel Alain A

PloS one 20151229 12

Despite the popularity of financial compensation as a means for addressing trust violations, the question whether (more) money can indeed buy trust back remains largely unexplored. In the present research, we focus on the role of violation type and compensation size. The results of a scenario study and a laboratory experiment show that financial compensation can effectively promote the restoration of trust for transgressions that indicate a lack of competence. Conversely, for transgressions whic ...[more]

PMID: 26714025

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Project description:BackgroundFinancial incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) are thought to motivate them to lead their company toward achieving important business objectives. Based on the Rousseau et al. (2019) protocol, this systematic review assesses the predictive effects of CEO incentives on certain business outcomes.ObjectivesThis review addresses whether CEO financial incentives predict: (1) firm financial performance and (2) financial restatement due to misreporting.Search methodsWe searched nine research databases for published peer-reviewed literature (to July 23-26, 2021 and an attenuated search from those dates to July 27-31, 2023) and thirteen professional association websites for non-published gray literature (to August 2021). We also hand-searched selected relevant journals.Selection criteriaWe reviewed peer-reviewed and unpublished studies available in English since 1980. Eligible studies regarding our first question assessed CEO financial incentives (1) 1 year or more before the measurement of outcomes, (2) controlled for pre-incentive firm performance or market conditions, and (3) analyzed CEO financial incentives as predictors of firm outcomes. Eligible studies regarding our second question assessed whether financial restatement had occurred and analyzed effects of CEO incentives on this outcome.Data collection and analysisWe extracted standardized regression coefficients for each effect or converted unstandardized regressions to standardized. Analyses were conducted using STATA. All studies were assessed to have moderate risk of bias.Main resultsFor our first question, 20 studies (15,398 firms) met our criteria for meta-analysis of effects. Bonuses, the most commonly studied incentive, had a small positive effect on next year's accounting performance metric Return on Assets (ROA, 0.046 [k = 7, 95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.014, 0.078]). The bonus effect in the market-related metric of Stock Returns (-0.026 [k = 5, 95% CI = -0.119, 0.067]) fell within a CI including 0, as did its effect on another market-related metric, Market-to-Book value (Tobin's Q, 0.028 [k = 3, 95% CI = -0.024, 0.08]). We conclude that Bonuses show no predictive effect on the following year's market-related metrics but do affect ROA. Stock Options had no effect on next year's ROA (0.027 [k = 5, 0.95% CI = 0.000, 0.052]), nor on Market-to-Book Value (Tobin's Q, 0.097 [k = 5, 95% CI = -0.027, 0.220]) or Stock Return (0.042 [k = 6, -0.033, 0.117]), indicating no predictive effect for Stock Options on either accounting or market-related performance. We sought but found too few studies to report on effects of incentives on other financial outcomes or for lags greater than 1 year. For our second question, three studies (n = 2044 firms) met our criteria. The overall effect size for CEO Incentives on Restatement (-0.09 [k = 3, 95% CI = -0.363, 0.184) fell within a CI including zero. We conclude that current evidence does not support a direct relationship between CEO financial incentives and Restatement.Authors' conclusionsThis review affirms a small effect of CEO Bonuses, but no effect of Stock Options, on the accounting performance metric ROA. In contrast, neither Bonuses nor Stock Options predict a firm's market-related metrics. CEO incentives also are unrelated to Financial Restatement. Despite widespread use of CEO financial incentives, lack of evidence supporting their use, beyond the bonus-ROA effect we identify, suggests caution regarding current CEO financial incentive practice and greater consideration of alternative arrangements to enhance firm performance.

Project description:Early intervention following occupational injury can improve health outcomes and reduce the duration and cost of workers' compensation claims. Financial early reporting incentives (ERIs) for employers may shorten the time between injury and access to compensation benefits and services. We examined ERI effect on time spent in the claim lodgement process in two Australian states: South Australia (SA), which introduced them in January 2009, and Tasmania (TAS), which introduced them in July 2010.Using administrative records of 1.47 million claims lodged between July 2006 and June 2012, we conducted an interrupted time series study of ERI impact on monthly median days in the claim lodgement process. Time periods included claim reporting, insurer decision, and total time. The 18-month gap in implementation between the states allowed for a multiple baseline design. In SA, we analysed periods within claim reporting: worker and employer reporting times (similar data were not available in TAS). To account for external threats to validity, we examined impact in reference to a comparator of other Australian workers' compensation jurisdictions.Total time in the process did not immediately change, though trend significantly decreased in both jurisdictions (SA: -0.36 days per month, 95% CI -0.63 to -0.09; TAS: 0.35, -0.50 to -0.20). Claim reporting time also decreased in both (SA: -1.6 days, -2.4 to -0.8; TAS: -5.4, -7.4 to -3.3). In TAS, there was a significant increase in insurer decision time (4.6, 3.9 to 5.4) and a similar but non-significant pattern in SA. In SA, worker reporting time significantly decreased (-4.7, -5.8 to -3.5), but employer reporting time did not (-0.3, -0.8 to 0.2).The results suggest that ERIs reduced claim lodgement time and, in the long-term, reduced total time in the claim lodgement process. However, only worker reporting time significantly decreased in SA, indicating that ERIs may not have shortened the process through the intended target of employer reporting time. Lack of similar data in Tasmania limited our ability to determine whether this was a result of ERIs or another component of the legislative changes. Further, increases in insurer decision time highlight possible unintended negative effects.

Dataset Information

Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of Financial Compensation for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations.

Publications

Is Trust for Sale? The Effectiveness of Financial Compensation for Repairing Competence- versus Integrity-Based Trust Violations.

Similar Datasets

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