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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?

ABSTRACT: Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.

SUBMITTER: Aron-Dine A

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4710379 | biostudies-literature | 2015 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?

Aron-Dine Aviva A Einav Liran L Finkelstein Amy A Cullen Mark M

The review of economics and statistics 20151001 4

Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial ...[more]

PMID: 26769985

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Project description:ObjectiveThe huge loss of health insurance funds has been a topic of concern around the world. This study aims to explore the network of moral hazard activities and the attribution mechanisms that lead to the loss of medical insurance funds.MethodsData were derived from 314 typical cases of medical insurance moral hazards reported on Chinese government official websites. Social network analysis (SNA) was utilized to visualize the network structure of the moral hazard activities, and crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (cs/QCA) was conducted to identify conditional configurations leading to funding loss in cases.ResultsIn the moral hazard activity network of medical insurance funds, more than 50% of immoral behaviors mainly occur in medical service institutions. Designated private hospitals (degree centrality = 33, closeness centrality = 0.851) and primary medical institutions (degree centrality = 30, closeness centrality = 0.857) are the main offenders that lead to the core problem of medical insurance fraud (degree centrality = 50, eigenvector centrality = 1). Designated public hospitals (degree centrality = 27, closeness centrality = 0.865) are main contributor to another important problem that illegal medical charges (degree centrality = 26, closeness centrality = 0.593). Non-medical insurance items swap medical insurance items (degree centrality = 28), forged medical records (degree centrality = 25), false hospitalization (degree centrality = 24), and overtreatment (degree centrality = 23) are important immoral nodes. According to the results of cs/QCA, low-economic pressure, low informatization, insufficient policy intervention, and organization such as public medical institutions, were the high-risk conditional configuration of opportunism; and high-economic pressure, insufficient policy intervention, and organizations, such as public medical institutions and high violation rates, were the high-risk conditional configuration of risky adventurism (solution coverage = 31.03%, solution consistency = 90%).ConclusionThere are various types of moral hazard activities in medical insurance, which constitute a complex network of behaviors. Most moral hazard activities happen in medical institutions. Opportunism lack of regulatory technology and risky adventurism with economic pressure are two types causing high loss of funds, and the cases of high loss mainly occur before the government implemented intervention. The government should strengthen the regulatory intervention and improve the level of informatization for monitoring the moral hazard of medical insurance funds, especially in areas with low economic development and high incident rates, and focus on monitoring the behaviors of major medical services providers.

Project description:This study's objective is to provide an alternative explanation for the low enrolment in health insurance in Ghana by analysing differences in perceptions between the insured and uninsured of the non-technical quality of healthcare. It further explores the association between insurance status and perception of healthcare quality to ascertain whether insurance status matters in the perception of healthcare quality. Data from a survey of 1,903 households living in the catchment area of 64 health centres were used for the analysis. Two sample independent t-tests were employed to compare the average perceptions of the insured and uninsured on seven indicators of non-technical quality of healthcare. A generalised ordered logit regression, controlling for socio-economic characteristics and clustering at the health facility level, tested the association between insurance status and perceived quality of healthcare. The perceptions of the insured were found to be significantly more negative than the uninsured and those of the previously insured were significantly more negative than the never insured. Being insured was associated with a significantly lower perception of healthcare quality. Thus, once people are insured, they tend to perceive the quality of healthcare they receive as poor compared to those without insurance. This study demonstrated that health insurance status matters in the perceptions of healthcare quality. The findings also imply that perceptions of healthcare quality may be shaped by individual experiences at the health facilities, where the insured and uninsured may be treated differently. Health insurance then becomes less attractive due to the poor perception of the healthcare quality provided to individuals with insurance, resulting in low demand for health insurance in Ghana. Policy makers in Ghana should consider redesigning, reorganizing, and reengineering the National Healthcare Insurance Scheme to ensure the provision of better quality healthcare for both the insured and uninsured.

Dataset Information

MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?

Publications

MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE: DO DYNAMIC INCENTIVES MATTER?

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