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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.

ABSTRACT: We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals' budget set created by the famous "donut hole," where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response along the entire non-linear budget set. We use the model for counterfactual analysis of the increase in spending from "filling" the donut hole, as will be required by 2020 under the Affordable Care Act. In our baseline model, which considers spending decisions within a single year, we estimate that "filling" the donut hole will increase annual drug spending by about $150, or about 8 percent. About one-quarter of this spending increase reflects "anticipatory" behavior, coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also present descriptive evidence of cross-year substitution of spending by individuals who reach the kink, which motivates a simple extension to our baseline model that allows - in a highly stylized way - for individuals to engage in such cross year substitution. Our estimates from this extension suggest that a large share of the $150 drug spending increase could be attributed to cross-year substitution, and the net increase could be as little as $45 per year.

SUBMITTER: Einav L

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4710380 | biostudies-literature | 2015 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.

Einav Liran L Finkelstein Amy A Schrimpf Paul P

The quarterly journal of economics 20150208 2

We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. We exploit the kink in individuals' budget set created by the famous "donut hole," where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin, to provide descriptive evidence of the drug purchase response to a price increase. We then specify and estimate a simple dynamic model of drug use that allows us to quantify the spending response al ...[more]

PMID: 26769984

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Project description:BackgroundIncome-related inequality measures such as the concentration index are often used to describe the unequal distribution of health, health care access, or expenditure in a single measure. This study demonstrates the use of such measures to evaluate the distributional impact of changes in health insurance coverage. We use the example of Medicare Part D in the United States, which increased access to prescription medications for Medicare beneficiaries from 2006.MethodsUsing pooled cross-sectional samples from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for 1997-2011, we estimated income-related inequality in drug expenditures over time using the concentration and generalised concentration indices. A difference-in-differences analysis investigated the change in inequality in drug expenditures, as measured using the concentration index and generalised concentration index, between the elderly (over 65 years) and near-elderly (54-63 years) pre- and post-implementation of Medicare Part D.ResultsMedicare Part D increased public drug expenditure while out-of-pocket and private spending fell. Public drug expenditures favoured the poor during all study periods, but the degree of pro-poorness declined in the years immediately following the implementation of Part D, with the poor gaining less than the rich in both relative and absolute terms. Part D also appeared to result in a fall in the pro-richness of private insurance drug expenditure in absolute terms but have minimal distributional impact on out-of-pocket expenditure. These effects appeared to be short lived, with a return to the prevailing trends in both concentration and generalised concentration indices several years following the start of Part D.ConclusionsThe implementation of Medicare Part D significantly reduced the degree of pro-poorness in public drug expenditure. The poor gained less of the increased public drug expenditure than the rich in both relative and absolute terms. This study demonstrates how income-related inequality measures can be used to estimate the impact of health system changes on inequalities in health expenditure and provides a guide for future evaluations.

Project description:BackgroundSources of regional variation in spending for prescription drugs under Medicare Part D are poorly understood, and such variation may reflect differences in health status, use of effective treatments, or selection of branded drugs over lower-cost generics.MethodsWe analyzed 2008 Medicare data for 4.7 million beneficiaries for prescription-drug use and expenditures overall and in three drug categories: angiotensin-converting-enzyme (ACE) inhibitors and angiotensin-receptor blockers (ARBs), 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl coenzyme A (HMG-CoA) reductase inhibitors (statins), and selective serotonin-reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs). Differences in per capita expenditures across hospital-referral regions (HRRs) were decomposed into annual prescription volume and cost per prescription. The ratio of prescriptions filled as branded drugs to all prescriptions filled was calculated. We adjusted all measures for demographic, socioeconomic, and health-status differences.ResultsMean adjusted per capita pharmaceutical spending ranged from $2,413 in the lowest to $3,008 in the highest quintile of HRRs. Most (75.9%) of that difference was attributable to the cost per prescription ($53 vs. $63). Regional differences in cost per prescription explained 87.5% of expenditure variation for ACE inhibitors and ARBs and 56.3% for statins but only 36.1% for SSRIs and SNRIs. The ratio of branded-drug to total prescriptions, which correlated highly with cost per prescription, ranged across HRRs from 0.24 to 0.45 overall and from 0.24 to 0.55 for ACE inhibitors and ARBs, 0.29 to 0.60 for statins, and 0.15 to 0.51 for SSRIs and SNRIs.ConclusionsRegional variation in Medicare Part D spending results largely from differences in the cost of drugs selected rather than prescription volume. A reduction in branded-drug use in some regions through modification of Part D plan benefits might lower costs without reducing quality of care. (Funded by the National Institute on Aging and others.).

Project description:Approximately one-fifth of Medicare Advantage (MA) contracts terminated their participation in the MA program between 2011 and 2020. Little is known about subsequent insurance choices following a termination. To examine the insurance destinations of MA enrollees and the characteristics of enrollees who switch into traditional Medicare (TM) after a contract termination. This cross-sectional study examined MA program data of MA beneficiaries in the Medicare Master Beneficiary File from 2016 to 2018. Statistical analysis was performed from June 2023 to April 2024. Beneficiary characteristics, including age, sex, race and ethnicity, dual eligibility; hospital, nursing home, and home health utilization; and contract characteristics, including plan type, vertical integration, premium, and MA star rating. The main outcome was switching to TM in the year immediately after termination. We also evaluated the characteristics of contracts among those who remained in MA. A total of 117 681 beneficiaries were included in this analysis (64 654 [54.9%] female; 409 [0.4%] American Indian or Alaska Native; 2817 [2.4%] Asian; 76 725 [16.8%] Black; 11 131 [9.5%] Hispanic; 81 226 [69.0%] White; and 2373 [2.0%] other race or ethnicity; 27 078 [23.0%] dual-eligible; mean [SD] age, 71.2 [10.4] years). Following a contract termination, 20.1% (95% CI, 19.9%-20.4%) of enrollees switched to TM, including 32.7% (95% CI, 32.4%-33.1%) of dual-eligible beneficiaries and 16.4% (95% CI, 16.2%-16.5%) of non-dual-eligible beneficiaries. In nonterminated contracts, the concurrent switch rate was 6.2% (95% CI, 6.2%-6.2%) for all, 10.4% (95% CI, 10.4%-10.4%) for dual-eligible beneficiaries and 5.1% (95% CI, 5.1%-5.1%) for non-dual-eligible enrollees. The highest switch rates to TM were among Black enrollees (32.3% [95% CI, 31.7%-32.8%]) and those with prior use of hospital (31.3% [95% CI, 30.7%-31.9%], nursing home, 41.4% [95% CI, 40.4%-42.4%], or home health care (28.3% [95% CI, 27.4%-29.2%]). Beneficiaries who stayed in MA selected higher-rated star plans (mean posttermination contract star rating of 3.8 [95% CI, 3.8-3.8] stars compared with 3.3 [95% CI, 3.3-3.3] stars in the terminated year), but did not pay more in monthly premiums with 66.5% (95% CI, 66.2%-66.8%) paying the same or lower premiums. In this cross-sectional study, 1 in 5 MA beneficiaries switched to TM after a contract termination, with Black beneficiaries and those with more intensive health needs having the highest switch rates. These findings highlight the need to examine consequences of contract terminations and subsequent insurance destinations on access to care and health outcomes, especially among those with marginalized race and ethnicity, those who are dual-eligible, and beneficiaries with higher health care needs.

Dataset Information

THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.

Publications

THE RESPONSE OF DRUG EXPENDITURE TO NON-LINEAR CONTRACT DESIGN: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PART D.

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