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Cognitive Model of Trust Dynamics Predicts Human Behavior within and between Two Games of Strategic Interaction with Computerized Confederate Agents.


ABSTRACT: When playing games of strategic interaction, such as iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and iterated Chicken Game, people exhibit specific within-game learning (e.g., learning a game's optimal outcome) as well as transfer of learning between games (e.g., a game's optimal outcome occurring at a higher proportion when played after another game). The reciprocal trust players develop during the first game is thought to mediate transfer of learning effects. Recently, a computational cognitive model using a novel trust mechanism has been shown to account for human behavior in both games, including the transfer between games. We present the results of a study in which we evaluate the model's a priori predictions of human learning and transfer in 16 different conditions. The model's predictive validity is compared against five model variants that lacked a trust mechanism. The results suggest that a trust mechanism is necessary to explain human behavior across multiple conditions, even when a human plays against a non-human agent. The addition of a trust mechanism to the other learning mechanisms within the cognitive architecture, such as sequence learning, instance-based learning, and utility learning, leads to better prediction of the empirical data. It is argued that computational cognitive modeling is a useful tool for studying trust development, calibration, and repair.

SUBMITTER: Collins MG 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4751270 | biostudies-literature | 2016

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Cognitive Model of Trust Dynamics Predicts Human Behavior within and between Two Games of Strategic Interaction with Computerized Confederate Agents.

Collins Michael G MG   Juvina Ion I   Gluck Kevin A KA  

Frontiers in psychology 20160212


When playing games of strategic interaction, such as iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and iterated Chicken Game, people exhibit specific within-game learning (e.g., learning a game's optimal outcome) as well as transfer of learning between games (e.g., a game's optimal outcome occurring at a higher proportion when played after another game). The reciprocal trust players develop during the first game is thought to mediate transfer of learning effects. Recently, a computational cognitive model using a  ...[more]

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