Dataset Information

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition.

ABSTRACT: Social animals vary in their ability to compete with group members over shared resources and also vary in their cooperative efforts to produce these resources. Competition among groups can promote within-group cooperation, but many existing models of intergroup cooperation do not explicitly account for observations that group members invest differentially in cooperation and that there are often within-group competitive or power asymmetries. We present a game theoretic model of intergroup competition that investigates how such asymmetries affect within-group cooperation. In this model, group members adopt one of two roles, with relative competitive efficiency and the number of individuals varying between roles. Players in each role make simultaneous, coevolving decisions. The model predicts that although intergroup competition increases cooperative contributions to group resources by both roles, contributions are predominantly from individuals in the less competitively efficient role, whereas individuals in the more competitively efficient role generally gain the larger share of these resources. When asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency is greater, a group's per capita cooperation (averaged across both roles) is higher, due to increased cooperation from the competitively inferior individuals. For extreme asymmetry in relative competitive efficiency, per capita cooperation is highest in groups with a single competitively superior individual and many competitively inferior individuals, because the latter acquiesce and invest in cooperation rather than within-group competition. These predictions are consistent with observed features of many societies, such as monogynous Hymenoptera with many workers and caste dimorphism.

SUBMITTER: Barker JL

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4784174 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Mar

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition.

Barker J L JL Loope K J KJ Reeve H K HK

Journal of evolutionary biology 20151229 3

Social animals vary in their ability to compete with group members over shared resources and also vary in their cooperative efforts to produce these resources. Competition among groups can promote within-group cooperation, but many existing models of intergroup cooperation do not explicitly account for observations that group members invest differentially in cooperation and that there are often within-group competitive or power asymmetries. We present a game theoretic model of intergroup competi ...[more]

PMID: 26663312

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Project description:Labour market regulation constrains small and medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs) ability to minimize redundant labour. However, it is often neglected that many SMEs might circumvent these constraints by accessing a business group’s internal labour market (ILM). In this study, we analyse whether SMEs with ILM access—i.e., with an increasing number of sister group companies in the same subnational region-industry—enjoy a labour productivity premium and whether this potential productivity premium depends on the bargaining power of labour. Because intra-group reallocation of redundant personnel often involves substantial changes in employment conditions, we argue that the value of ILM access might be reduced when the bargaining power of workers is high as they can oppose the reallocation or demand significant compensation. Using a panel of 119,801 European SMEs during 2011–2019 (639,675 firm-year observations), we find that SMEs with ILM access show relatively higher labour productivity. Further, our findings suggest that this productivity premium is higher in those contexts associated with lower labour bargaining power. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11187-023-00780-4. Intra-group reallocation of unused labour can enhance SME labour productivity, but its feasibility and value-adding potential depend on labour bargaining power. This article explores differences in SME labour productivity attributed to internal labour market access, that is, the flexibility to reallocate unproductive labour to other sister companies in the group network. We also analyse if any potential productivity premium associated with internal labour market access depends on the bargaining power of labour. Our statistical analysis shows a labour productivity premium associated with internal labour market access. Furthermore, it is especially significant in contexts associated with low employee bargaining power. For instance, when collective bargaining coverage is low (very low) we predict a labour productivity premium of 3.3% (4.5%) for all SMEs embedded in a network of 10 companies in the same region-industry. Thus, our study contributes to sharpening our understanding of SME productivity and the value they receive from group affiliation. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11187-023-00780-4.

Dataset Information

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition.

Publications

Asymmetry within social groups: division of labour and intergroup competition.

Similar Datasets

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