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Adding A Spending Metric To Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Program Rewarded Low-Quality Hospitals.

ABSTRACT: In fiscal year 2015 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services expanded its Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program by rewarding or penalizing hospitals for their performance on both spending and quality. This represented a sharp departure from the program's original efforts to incentivize hospitals for quality alone. How this change redistributed hospital bonuses and penalties was unknown. Using data from 2,679 US hospitals that participated in the program in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, we found that the new emphasis on spending rewarded not only low-spending hospitals but some low-quality hospitals as well. Thirty-eight percent of low-spending hospitals received bonuses in fiscal year 2014, compared to 100 percent in fiscal year 2015. However, low-quality hospitals also began to receive bonuses (0 percent in fiscal year 2014 compared to 17 percent in 2015). All high-quality hospitals received bonuses in both years. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services should consider incorporating a minimum quality threshold into the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program to avoid rewarding low-quality, low-spending hospitals.

SUBMITTER: Das A

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4910877 | biostudies-literature | 2016 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Adding A Spending Metric To Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Program Rewarded Low-Quality Hospitals.

Das Anup A Norton Edward C EC Miller David C DC Ryan Andrew M AM Birkmeyer John D JD Chen Lena M LM

Health affairs (Project Hope) 20160501 5

In fiscal year 2015 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services expanded its Hospital Value-Based Purchasing program by rewarding or penalizing hospitals for their performance on both spending and quality. This represented a sharp departure from the program's original efforts to incentivize hospitals for quality alone. How this change redistributed hospital bonuses and penalties was unknown. Using data from 2,679 US hospitals that participated in the program in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, we ...[more]

PMID: 27140997

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Project description:ObjectiveTo determine the impact of the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program-the US pay for performance program introduced by Medicare to incentivize higher quality care-on 30 day mortality for three incentivized conditions: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia.DesignObservational study.Setting4267 acute care hospitals in the United States: 2919 participated in the HVBP program and 1348 were ineligible and used as controls (44 in general hospitals in Maryland and 1304 critical access hospitals across the United States).Participants2 430 618 patients admitted to US hospitals from 2008 through 2013.Main outcome measures30 day risk adjusted mortality for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia using a patient level linear spline analysis to examine the association between the introduction of the HVBP program and 30 day mortality. Non-incentivized, medical conditions were the comparators. A secondary outcome measure was to determine whether the introduction of the HVBP program was particularly beneficial for a subgroup of hospital-poor performers at baseline-that may benefit the most.ResultsMortality rates of incentivized conditions in hospitals participating in the HVBP program declined at -0.13% for each quarter during the preintervention period and -0.03% point difference for each quarter during the post-intervention period. For non-HVBP hospitals, mortality rates declined at -0.14% point difference for each quarter during the preintervention period and -0.01% point difference for each quarter during the post-intervention period. The difference in the mortality trends between the two groups was small and non-significant (difference in difference in trends -0.03% point difference for each quarter, 95% confidence interval -0.08% to 0.13% point difference, P=0.35). In no subgroups of hospitals was HVBP associated with better outcomes, including poor performers at baseline.ConclusionsEvidence that HVBP has led to lower mortality rates is lacking. Nations considering similar pay for performance programs may want to consider alternative models to achieve improved patient outcomes.

Project description:BackgroundThe Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), established by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in March 2010, introduced payment-reduction penalties on acute care hospitals with higher-than-expected readmission rates for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia. There is concern that hospitals serving large numbers of low-income and uninsured patients (safety-net hospitals) are at greater risk of higher readmissions and penalties, often due to factors that are likely outside the hospital's control. Using publicly reported data, we compared the readmissions performance and penalty experience among safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals.MethodsWe used nationwide hospital level data for 2009-2016 from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Hospital Compare program, CMS Final Impact Rule, and the American Hospital Association Annual Survey. We identified as safety-net hospitals the top quartile of hospitals in terms of the proportion of patients receiving income-based public benefits. Using a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences approach based on the comparison of pre- vs. post-HRRP changes in (risk-adjusted) 30-day readmission rate in safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals, we estimated the change in readmissions rate associated with HRRP. We also compared the penalty frequency among safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals.ResultsOur study cohort included 1915 hospitals, of which 479 were safety-net hospitals. At baseline (2009), safety-net hospitals had a slightly higher readmission rate compared to non-safety net hospitals for all three conditions: AMI, 20.3% vs. 19.8% (p value< 0.001); heart failure, 25.2% vs. 24.2% (p-value< 0.001); pneumonia, 18.7% vs. 18.1% (p-value< 0.001). Beginning in 2012, readmission rates declined similarly in both hospital groups for all three cohorts. Based on difference-in-differences analysis, HRRP was associated with similar change in the readmissions rate in safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals for AMI and heart failure. For the pneumonia cohort, we found a larger reduction (0.23%; p < 0.001) in safety-net hospitals. The frequency of readmissions penalty was higher among safety-net hospitals. The proportion of hospitals penalized during all four post-HRRP years was 72% among safety-net and 59% among non-safety-net hospitals.ConclusionsOur results lend support to the concerns of disproportionately higher risk of performance-based penalty on safety-net hospitals.

Project description:BACKGROUND:Starting in fiscal year 2013, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (HVBP) program introduced quality performance-based adjustments of up to 1% to Medicare reimbursements for acute care hospitals. METHODS:We evaluated whether quality improved more in acute care hospitals that were exposed to HVBP than in control hospitals (Critical Access Hospitals, which were not exposed to HVBP). The measures of quality were composite measures of clinical process and patient experience (measured in units of standard deviations, with a value of 1 indicating performance that was 1 standard deviation [SD] above the hospital mean) and 30-day risk-standardized mortality among patients who were admitted to the hospital for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, or pneumonia. The changes in quality measures after the introduction of HVBP were assessed for matched samples of acute care hospitals (the number of hospitals included in the analyses ranged from 1364 for mortality among patients admitted for acute myocardial infarction to 2615 for mortality among patients admitted for pneumonia) and control hospitals (number of hospitals ranged from 31 to 617). Matching was based on preintervention performance with regard to the quality measures. We evaluated performance over the first 4 years of HVBP. RESULTS:Improvements in clinical-process and patient-experience measures were not significantly greater among hospitals exposed to HVBP than among control hospitals, with difference-in-differences estimates of 0.079 SD (95% confidence interval [CI], -0.140 to 0.299) for clinical process and -0.092 SD (95% CI, -0.307 to 0.122) for patient experience. HVBP was not associated with significant reductions in mortality among patients who were admitted for acute myocardial infarction (difference-in-differences estimate, -0.282 percentage points [95% CI, -1.715 to 1.152]) or heart failure (-0.212 percentage points [95% CI, -0.532 to 0.108]), but it was associated with a significant reduction in mortality among patients who were admitted for pneumonia (-0.431 percentage points [95% CI, -0.714 to -0.148]). CONCLUSIONS:In our study, HVBP was not associated with improvements in measures of clinical process or patient experience and was not associated with significant reductions in two of three mortality measures. (Funded by the National Institute on Aging.).

Project description:ObjectiveTo evaluate whether longer term participation in the bundled payments for care initiative (BPCI) for medical conditions in the United States, which held hospitals financially accountable for all spending during an episode of care from hospital admission to 90 days after discharge, was associated with changes in spending, mortality, or health service use.DesignQuasi-experimental difference-in-differences analysis.SettingUS hospitals participating in bundled payments for acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), or pneumonia, and propensity score matched to non-participating hospitals.Participants238 hospitals participating in the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative (BPCI) and 1415 non-BPCI hospitals. 226 BPCI hospitals were matched to 700 non-BPCI hospitals.Main outcome measuresPrimary outcomes were total spending on episodes and death 90 days after discharge. Secondary outcomes included spending and use by type of post-acute care. BPCI and non-BPCI hospitals were compared by patient, hospital, and hospital market characteristics. Market characteristics included population size, competitiveness, and post-acute bed supply.ResultsIn the 226 BPCI hospitals, episodes of care totaled 261 163 in the baseline period and 93 562 in the treatment period compared with 211 208 and 78 643 in the 700 matched non-BPCI hospitals, respectively, with small differences in hospital and market characteristics after matching. Differing trends were seen for some patient characteristics (eg, mean age change -0.3 years at BPCI hospitals v non- BPCI hospitals, P<0.001). In the adjusted analysis, participation in BPCI was associated with a decrease in total episode spending (-1.2%, 95% confidence interval -2.3% to -0.2%). Spending on care at skilled nursing facilities decreased (-6.3%, -10.0% to -2.5%) owing to a reduced number of facility days (-6.2%, -9.8% to -2.6%), and home health spending increased (4.4%, 1.4% to 7.5%). Mortality at 90 days did not change (-0.1 percentage points, 95% confidence interval -0.5 to 0.2 percentage points).ConclusionsIn this longer term evaluation of a large national programme on medical bundled payments in the US, participation in bundles for four common medical conditions was associated with savings at three years. The savings were generated by practice changes that decreased use of high intensity care after hospital discharge without affecting quality, which also suggests that bundles for medical conditions could require multiple years before changes in savings and practice emerge.

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Adding A Spending Metric To Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Program Rewarded Low-Quality Hospitals.

Publications

Adding A Spending Metric To Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing Program Rewarded Low-Quality Hospitals.

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