Dataset Information

Traditional Medicare Versus Private Insurance: How Spending, Volume, And Price Change At Age Sixty-Five.

ABSTRACT: To slow the growth of Medicare spending, some policy makers have advocated raising the Medicare eligibility age from the current sixty-five years to sixty-seven years. For the majority of affected adults, this would delay entry into Medicare and increase the time they are covered by private insurance. Despite its policy importance, little is known about how such a change would affect national health care spending, which is the sum of health care spending for all consumers and payers-including governments. We examined how spending differed between Medicare and private insurance using longitudinal data on imaging and procedures for a national cohort of individuals who switched from private insurance to Medicare at age sixty-five. Using a regression discontinuity design, we found that spending fell by $38.56 per beneficiary per quarter-or 32.4 percent-upon entry into Medicare at age sixty-five. In contrast, we found no changes in the volume of services at age sixty-five. For the previously insured, entry into Medicare led to a large drop in spending driven by lower provider prices, which may reflect Medicare's purchasing power as a large insurer. These findings imply that increasing the Medicare eligibility age may raise national health care spending by replacing Medicare coverage with private insurance, which pays higher provider prices than Medicare does.

SUBMITTER: Wallace J

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4943661 | biostudies-literature | 2016 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Traditional Medicare Versus Private Insurance: How Spending, Volume, And Price Change At Age Sixty-Five.

Wallace Jacob J Song Zirui Z

Health affairs (Project Hope) 20160501 5

To slow the growth of Medicare spending, some policy makers have advocated raising the Medicare eligibility age from the current sixty-five years to sixty-seven years. For the majority of affected adults, this would delay entry into Medicare and increase the time they are covered by private insurance. Despite its policy importance, little is known about how such a change would affect national health care spending, which is the sum of health care spending for all consumers and payers-including go ...[more]

PMID: 27140993

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Project description:ImportanceNearly one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan, yet little is known about the prices that MA plans pay for physician services. Medicare Advantage insurers typically also sell commercial plans, and the extent to which MA physician reimbursement reflects traditional Medicare (TM) rates vs negotiated commercial prices is unclear.ObjectiveTo compare prices paid for physician and other health care services in MA, traditional Medicare, and commercial plans.Design, setting, and participantsRetrospective analysis of claims data evaluating MA prices paid to physicians and for laboratory services and durable medical equipment between 2007 and 2012 in 348 US core-based statistical areas. The study population included all MA and commercial enrollees with a large national health insurer operating in both markets, as well as a 20% sample of TM beneficiaries.ExposuresEnrollment in an MA plan.Main outcomes and measuresMean reimbursement paid to physicians, laboratories, and durable medical equipment suppliers for MA and commercial enrollees relative to TM rates for 11 Healthcare Common Procedure Coding Systems (HCPCS) codes spanning 7 sites of care.ResultsThe sample consisted of 144 million claims. Physician reimbursement in MA was more strongly tied to TM rates than commercial prices, although MA plans tended to pay physicians less than TM. For a mid-level office visit with an established patient (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] code 99213), the mean MA price was 96.9% (95% CI, 96.7%-97.2%) of TM. Across the common physician services we evaluated, mean MA reimbursement ranged from 91.3% of TM for cataract removal in an ambulatory surgery center (CPT 66984; 95% CI, 90.7%-91.9%) to 102.3% of TM for complex evaluation and management of a patient in the emergency department (CPT 99285; 95% CI, 102.1%-102.6%). However, for laboratory services and durable medical equipment, where commercial prices are lower than TM rates, MA plans take advantage of these lower commercial prices, ranging from 67.4% for a walker (HCPCS code E0143; 95% CI, 66.3%-68.5%) to 75.8% for a complete blood cell count (CPT 85025; 95% CI, 75.0%-76.6%).Conclusions and relevanceTraditional Medicare's administratively set rates act as a strong anchor for physician reimbursement in the MA market, although MA plans succeed in negotiating lower prices for other health care services for which TM overpays. Reforms that transition the Medicare program toward some premium support models could substantially affect how physicians and other clinicians are paid.

Project description:ObjectivesTo investigate the consequences of endogeneity bias on the estimated effect of having health insurance on health at age 63 or 64, just before most people qualify for Medicare, and to simulate the implications for total and public insurance (Medicare and Medicaid) spending on newly enrolled beneficiaries in their first years of Medicare coverage.DataThe longitudinal Health and Retirement Survey of people who were 55-61 years old in 1992, followed through biannual surveys to age 63-64 or until 2000 (whichever came first), and those who were 66-70 years olds from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Surveys, 1992-1998.Study designInstrumental variable (IV) estimation of a simultaneous equation model of insurance choice and health at age 63-64 as a function of baseline health and sociodemographic characteristics in 1992 and endogenous insurance coverage over the observation period.FindingsContinuous insurance coverage is associated with significantly fewer deaths prior to age 65 and, among those who survive, a significant upward shift in the distribution of health states from fair and poor health with disabilities to good to excellent health. Treating insurance coverage as endogenous increases the magnitude of the estimated effect of having insurance on improved health prior to age 65. The medical spending simulations suggest that if the near-elderly had continuous insurance coverage, average annual medical spending per capita for new Medicare beneficiaries in their first few years of coverage would be slightly lower because of the improvement in health status. In addition, total Medicare and Medicaid spending for new beneficiaries over their first few years of coverage would be about the same or slightly lower, even though more people survive to age 65.ConclusionsExtending insurance coverage to all Americans between the ages of 55 and 64 would improve health (increase survival and shift people from good-fair-poor health to excellent-very good health) at age 65, and possibly reduce total short-term spending by Medicare and Medicaid for newly eligible Medicare beneficiaries, even though more people would enter the program because of increased survival.

Dataset Information

Traditional Medicare Versus Private Insurance: How Spending, Volume, And Price Change At Age Sixty-Five.

Publications

Traditional Medicare Versus Private Insurance: How Spending, Volume, And Price Change At Age Sixty-Five.

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