Detecting the Collapse of Cooperation in Evolving Networks.

ABSTRACT: The sustainability of biological, social, economic and ecological communities is often determined by the outcome of social conflicts between cooperative and selfish individuals (cheaters). Cheaters avoid the cost of contributing to the community and can occasionally spread in the population leading to the complete collapse of cooperation. Although such collapse often unfolds unexpectedly, it is unclear whether one can detect the risk of cheater's invasions and loss of cooperation in an evolving community. Here, we combine dynamical networks and evolutionary game theory to study the abrupt loss of cooperation with tools for studying critical transitions. We estimate the risk of cooperation collapse following the introduction of a single cheater under gradually changing conditions. We observ

SUBMITTER: Cavaliere M 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4974622 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Aug

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature