Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness.
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ABSTRACT: Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject's choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Fur
SUBMITTER: Jordan JJ
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4978259 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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