Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Grimalda G
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4980489 | biostudies-literature | 2016 Aug
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment.
Grimalda Gianluca G Pondorfer Andreas A Tracer David P DP
Nature communications 20160809
Human cooperation is enigmatic, as organisms are expected, by evolutionary and economic theory, to act principally in their own interests. However, cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice resources for each other's benefit. We conducted a series of novel experiments in a foraging society where social institutions make the study of social image and punishment particularly salient. Participants played simple cooperation games where they could punish non-cooperators, promote a positive social ...[more]
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