Project description:Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived environmental uncertainty. Recent behavioral experimental research indicates variation in the degree to which a group of users can identify a sustainable exploitation level. In this paper, we identify social-ecological micro-foundations that facilitate cooperative sustainable common-pool resource use. We do so by using an agent-based model (ABM) that is informed by behavioral common-pool resource experiments. In these experiments, groups that cooperate do not necessarily manage the resource sustainably, but also over- or underexploit. By reproducing the patterns of the behavioral experiments in a qualitative way, the ABM represents a social-ecological explanation for the experimental observations. We find that the ecological knowledge of each group member cannot sufficiently explain the relationship between cooperation and sustainable resource use. Instead, the development of a sustainable exploitation level depends on the distribution of ecological knowledge among the group members, their influence on each other's knowledge, and the environmental uncertainty the individuals perceive. The study provides insights about critical social-ecological micro-foundations underpinning collective action and sustainable resource management. These insights may inform policy-making, but also point to future research needs regarding the mechanisms of social learning, the development of shared management strategies and the interplay of social and ecological uncertainty.
Project description:In social-ecological systems (SESs), social and biophysical dynamics interact within and between the levels of organization at multiple spatial and temporal scales. Cross-scale interactions (CSIs) are interdependences between processes at different scales, generating behaviour unpredictable at single scales. Understanding CSIs is important for improving SES governance, but they remain understudied. Theoretical models are needed that capture essential features while being simple enough to yield insights into mechanisms. In a stylized model, we study CSIs in a two-level system of weakly interacting communities harvesting a common-pool resource. Community members adaptively conform to, or defect from, a norm of socially optimal harvesting, enforced through social sanctioning both within and between communities. We find that each subsystem's dynamics depend sensitively on the other despite interactions being much weaker between subsystems than within them. When interaction is purely biophysical, stably high cooperation in one community can cause cooperation in the other to collapse. However, even weak social interaction can prevent the collapse of cooperation and instead cause collapse of defection. We identify conditions under which subsystem-level cooperation produces desirable system-level outcomes. Our findings expand evidence that collaboration is important for sustainably managing shared resources, showing its importance even when resource sharing and social relationships are weak.
Project description:Most experimental studies on common pool resource usage focus on situations in which actors are in symmetric positions when they use the resource. Many real-world cases do not fit this scenario because users are in asymmetric positions regarding their ability to benefit from the resource. Examples range from irrigation systems to climate change mitigation. Moreover, while there is large evidence on the effects of communication on social dilemmas, few studies focus on different modes of communication. We compare the effects of unstructured and structured communication on the provision of an infrastructure for a common pool resource and appropriation of the provided resource. Structured communication applied rules that are based on the ideals of democratic deliberation. Participants made contribution and appropriation decisions in an incentivized experiment. In the experiment, both communication and deliberation increased contributions in comparison to a baseline. Interestingly, deliberation attenuated the effect of the player position more than communication. Our results suggest that deliberation may be useful for overcoming asymmetric commons dilemmas in the field.
Project description:Within the university-industry ecosystem, improvement and innovation of technology transfer involve implementing appropriate dynamic capabilities. To answer the question-What are the micro-foundations of dynamic capabilities in university technology transfer?-this study investigates in-depth organizational-level dynamic capabilities in transferring university-based knowledge to business and society. Two qualitative case studies were deployed at organizational entities at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam: the Industry Alliance Office, and the Demonstrator Lab. These two organizations stimulate science- and business-oriented university technology transfer. In this context, the micro-foundations of the dynamic capabilities "sensing", "seizing" and "reconfiguring" are identified and discussed. For "sensing", which is the university's ability to explore the opportunities in the ecosystem, the micro-foundations are "selecting internal competency" and "sensing external partners". For "seizing", which supports universities in managing complementarity with industry and society, micro-foundations include "resource co-allocation" and "collaborative business model". The micro-foundations of "reconfiguring", through which universities maintain evolutionary fitness in the innovation ecosystem, are "strategic renewal", "establishing a university technology transfer-friendly environment", and "asset orchestration". This study provides researchers with a better understanding of how dynamic capabilities facilitate university technology transfer. Industrial practitioners and policymakers can consider the suggestions of the present study when pursuing collaboration with universities.
Project description:Although social structure is known to promote cooperation, by locally exposing selfish agents to their own deeds, studies to date assumed that all agents have access to the same level of resources. This is clearly unrealistic. Here we find that cooperation can be maintained when some agents have access to more resources than others. Cooperation can then emerge even in populations in which the temptation to defect is so strong that players would act fully selfishly if their resources were distributed uniformly. Resource heterogeneity can thus be crucial for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We also show that resource heterogeneity can hinder cooperation once the temptation to defect is significantly lowered. In all cases, the level of cooperation can be maximized by managing resource heterogeneity.
Project description:OBJECTIVE:Cash transfers are a common intervention to incentivize salutary behavior in resource-constrained settings. Many cash transfer studies do not, however, account for the effect of the size of the cash transfer in design or analysis. A randomized, controlled trial of a cash-transfer intervention is planned to incentivize appropriate surgical utilization in Guinea. The aim of the current study is to determine the size of that cash transfer so as to maximize compliance while minimizing cost. METHODS:Data were collected from nine coastal Guinean hospitals on their surgical capabilities and the cost of receiving surgery. These data were combined with publicly available data about the general Guinean population to create an agent-based model predicting surgical utilization. The model was validated to the available literature on surgical utilization. Cash transfer sizes from 0 to 1,000,000 Guinean francs were evaluated, with surgical compliance as the primary outcome. RESULTS:Compliance with scheduled surgery increases as the size of a cash transfer increases. This increase is asymptotic, with a leveling in utilization occurring when the cash transfer pays for all the costs associated with surgical care. Below that cash transfer size, no other optima are found. Once a cash transfer completely covers the costs of surgery, other barriers to care such as distance and hospital quality dominate. CONCLUSION:Cash transfers to incentivize health-promoting behavior appear to be dose-dependent. Maximal impact is likely only to occur when full patient costs are eliminated. These findings should be incorporated in the design of future cash transfer studies.
Project description:The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners' cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants' positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect-that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners-depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load.
Project description:A debt-based economy requires the accumulation of more and more debt to finance economic growth, while future economic growth is needed to repay the debt, and so the cycle continues. Despite global debt reaching unprecedented levels, little research has been done to understand the impacts of debt dynamics on environmental sustainability. Here, we explore the environmental impacts of the debt-growth cycle in Indonesia, the world's largest debt-based producer of palm oil. Our empirical Agent-Based Model analyses the future effects (2018-2050) of power (im)balance scenarios between debt-driven economic forces (i.e. banks, firms), and conservation forces, on two ecosystem services (food production, climate regulation) and biodiversity. The model shows the trade-offs and synergies among these indicators for Business As Usual as compared to alternative scenarios. Results show that debt-driven economic forces can partially support environmental conservation, provided the state's role in protecting the environment is reinforced. Our analysis provides a lesson for developing countries that are highly dependent on debt-based production systems: sustainable development pathways can be achievable in the short and medium terms; however, reaching long-term sustainability requires reduced dependency on external financial powers, as well as further government intervention to protect the environment from the rough edges of the market economy.
Project description:Overexploitation of common-pool resources, resulting from uncooperative harvest behavior, is a major problem in many social-ecological systems. Feedbacks between user behavior and resource productivity induce non-linear dynamics in the harvest and the resource stock that complicate the understanding and the prediction of the co-evolutionary system. With an adaptive model constrained by data from a behavioral economic experiment, we show that users' expectations of future pay-offs vary as a result of the previous harvest experience, the time-horizon, and the ability to communicate. In our model, harvest behavior is a trait that adjusts to continuously changing potential returns according to a trade-off between the users' current harvest and the discounted future productivity of the resource. Given a maximum discount factor, which quantifies the users' perception of future pay-offs, the temporal dynamics of harvest behavior and ecological resource can be predicted. Our results reveal a non-linear relation between the previous harvest and current discount rates, which is most sensitive around a reference harvest level. While higher than expected returns resulting from cooperative harvesting in the past increase the importance of future resource productivity and foster sustainability, harvests below the reference level lead to a downward spiral of increasing overexploitation and disappointing returns.
Project description:Collective action of resource users is essential for sustainability. Yet, often user groups are socioculturally heterogeneous, which requires cooperation to be established across salient group boundaries. We explore the effect of this type of heterogeneity on resource extraction in lab-in-the-field Common Pool Resource (CPR) experiments in Zanzibar, Tanzania. We create heterogeneous groups by mixing fishers from two neighbouring fishing villages which have distinct social identities, a history of conflict and diverging resource use practices and institutions. Additionally, we analyse between-village differences in extraction behaviour in the heterogeneous setting to assess if out-group cooperation in a CPR dilemma is associated with a community's institutional scope in the economic realm (e.g., degree of market integration). We find no aggregate effect of heterogeneity on extraction. However, this is because fishers from the two villages behave differently in the heterogeneity treatment. We find support for the hypothesis that cooperation under sociocultural heterogeneity is higher for fishers from the village with larger institutional scope. In line with this explanation, cooperation under heterogeneity also correlates with a survey measure of individual fishers' radius of trust. We discuss implications for resource governance and collective action research.