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Effects of accountable care and payment reform on substance use disorder treatment: evidence from the initial 3 years of the alternative quality contract.

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND AND AIMS:Global payment and accountable care reform efforts in the United States may connect more individuals with substance use disorders (SUD) to treatment. We tested whether such changes instituted under an Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) model within the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts' (BCBSMA) insurer increased care for individuals with SUD. DESIGN:Difference-in-differences design comparing enrollees in AQC organizations with a comparison group of enrollees in organizations not participating in the AQC. SETTING:Massachusetts, USA. PARTICIPANTS:BCBSMA enrollees aged 13-64 years from 2006 to 2011 (3 years prior to and after implementation) representing 1 333?534 enrollees and 42?801 SUD service users. MEASUREMENTS:Outcomes were SUD service use and spending and SUD performance metrics. Primary exposures were enrollment into an AQC provider organization and whether the AQC organization did or did not face risk for behavioral health costs. FINDINGS:Enrollees in AQC organizations facing behavioral health risk experienced no change in the probability of using SUD services (1.64 versus 1.66%; P = 0.63), SUD spending ($2807 versus $2700; P = 0.34) or total spending ($12?631 versus $12?849; P = 0.53), or SUD performance metrics (identification: 1.73 versus 1.76%, P = 0.57; initiation: 27.86 versus 27.02%, P = 0.50; engagement: 11.19 versus 10.97%, P = 0.79). Enrollees in AQC organizations not at risk for behavioral health spending experienced a small increase in the probability of using SUD services (1.83 versus 1.66%; P = 0.003) and the identification performance metric (1.92 versus 1.76%; P = 0.007) and a reduction in SUD medication use (11.84 versus 14.03%; P = 0.03) and the initiation performance metric (23.76 versus 27.02%; P = 0.005). CONCLUSIONS:A global payment and accountable care model introduced in Massachusetts, USA (in which a health insurer provided care providers with fixed prepayments to cover most or all of their patients' care during a specified time-period, incentivizing providers to keep their patients healthy and reduce costs) did not lead to sizable changes in substance use disorder service use during the first 3 years following its implementation.

SUBMITTER: Stuart EA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5148657 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Effects of accountable care and payment reform on substance use disorder treatment: evidence from the initial 3 years of the alternative quality contract.

Stuart Elizabeth A EA Barry Colleen L CL Donohue Julie M JM Greenfield Shelly F SF Duckworth Kenneth K Song Zirui Z Mechanic Robert R Kouri Elena M EM Ebnesajjad Cyrus C Chernew Michael E ME Huskamp Haiden A HA

Addiction (Abingdon, England) 20160924 1

<h4>Background and aims</h4>Global payment and accountable care reform efforts in the United States may connect more individuals with substance use disorders (SUD) to treatment. We tested whether such changes instituted under an Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) model within the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts' (BCBSMA) insurer increased care for individuals with SUD.<h4>Design</h4>Difference-in-differences design comparing enrollees in AQC organizations with a comparison group of enrol ...[more]

PMID: 27517740

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Project description:BackgroundIn 2009, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS) implemented a global payment system called the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC). Provider groups in the AQC system assume accountability for spending, similar to accountable care organizations that bear financial risk. Moreover, groups are eligible to receive bonuses for quality.MethodsSeven provider organizations began 5-year contracts as part of the AQC system in 2009. We analyzed 2006-2009 claims for 380,142 enrollees whose primary care physicians (PCPs) were in the AQC system (intervention group) and for 1,351,446 enrollees whose PCPs were not in the system (control group). We used a propensity-weighted difference-in-differences approach, adjusting for age, sex, health status, and secular trends to isolate the treatment effect of the AQC in comparisons of spending and quality between the intervention group and the control group.ResultsAverage spending increased for enrollees in both the intervention and control groups in 2009, but the increase was smaller for enrollees in the intervention group--$15.51 (1.9%) less per quarter (P=0.007). Savings derived largely from shifts in outpatient care toward facilities with lower fees; from lower expenditures for procedures, imaging, and testing; and from a reduction in spending for enrollees with the highest expected spending. The AQC system was associated with an improvement in performance on measures of the quality of the management of chronic conditions in adults (P<0.001) and of pediatric care (P=0.001), but not of adult preventive care. All AQC groups met 2009 budget targets and earned surpluses. Total BCBS payments to AQC groups, including bonuses for quality, are likely to have exceeded the estimated savings in year 1.ConclusionsThe AQC system was associated with a modest slowing of spending growth and improved quality of care in 2009. Savings were achieved through changes in referral patterns rather than through changes in utilization. The long-term effect of the AQC system on spending growth depends on future budget targets and providers' ability to further improve efficiencies in practice. (Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and others.).

Project description:BackgroundIn 2004, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services changed reimbursement for physicians and advanced practitioners caring for patients receiving hemodialysis from a capitated to a tiered fee-for-service system, encouraging increased face-to-face visits. This early version of a pay-for-performance initiative targeted a care process: more frequent provider visits in hemodialysis. Although more frequent provider visits in hemodialysis are associated with fewer hospitalizations and rehospitalizations, it is unknown whether encouraging more frequent visits through reimbursement policy also yielded these benefits.Study designWe used a retrospective cohort interrupted time-series study design to examine whether the 2004 nephrologist reimbursement reform led to reduced hospitalizations and rehospitalizations. We also used published data to estimate a range of annual economic costs associated with more frequent visits.Setting & participantsMedicare beneficiaries in the United States receiving hemodialysis in the 2 years prior to and following reimbursement reform.PredictorThe 2 years following nephrologist reimbursement reform.OutcomesOdds of hospitalization and 30-day hospital readmission for all causes and fluid overload; US dollars.ResultsWe found no significant change in all-cause hospitalization or rehospitalization and slight reductions in fluid overload hospitalization and rehospitalization following reimbursement reform; the estimated economic cost associated with additional visits ranged from $13 to $87 million per year, depending on who (physicians or advanced practitioners) spent additional time visiting patients and how much additional effort was involved.LimitationsDue to limited information about how much additional time providers spent seeing patients after reimbursement reform, we could only examine a range of potential economic costs associated with the reform.ConclusionsA Medicare reimbursement policy designed to encourage more frequent visits during outpatient hemodialysis may have been costly. The policy was associated with fewer hospitalizations and rehospitalizations for fluid overload, but had no effect on all-cause hospitalizations or rehospitalizations.

Project description:BackgroundPopulation-based global payment gives health care providers a spending target for the care of a defined group of patients. We examined changes in spending, utilization, and quality through 8 years of the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) of Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts, a population-based payment model that includes financial rewards and penalties (two-sided risk).MethodsUsing a difference-in-differences method to analyze data from 2006 through 2016, we compared spending among enrollees whose physician organizations entered the AQC starting in 2009 with spending among privately insured enrollees in control states. We examined quantities of sentinel services using an analogous approach. We then compared process and outcome quality measures with averages in New England and the United States.ResultsDuring the 8-year post-intervention period from 2009 to 2016, the increase in the average annual medical spending on claims for the enrollees in organizations that entered the AQC in 2009 was $461 lower per enrollee than spending in the control states (P<0.001), an 11.7% relative savings on claims. Savings on claims were driven in the early years by lower prices and in the later years by lower utilization of services, including use of laboratory testing, certain imaging tests, and emergency department visits. Most quality measures of processes and outcomes improved more in the AQC cohorts than they did in New England and the nation in unadjusted analyses. Savings were generally larger among subpopulations that were enrolled longer. Enrollees of organizations that entered the AQC in 2010, 2011, and 2012 had medical claims savings of 11.9%, 6.9%, and 2.3%, respectively, by 2016. The savings for the 2012 cohort were statistically less precise than those for the other cohorts. In the later years of the initial AQC cohorts and across the years of the later-entry cohorts, the savings on claims exceeded incentive payments, which included quality bonuses and providers' share of the savings below spending targets.ConclusionsDuring the first 8 years after its introduction, the BCBS population-based payment model was associated with slower growth in medical spending on claims, resulting in savings that over time began to exceed incentive payments. Unadjusted measures of quality under this model were higher than or similar to average regional and national quality measures. (Funded by the National Institutes of Health.).

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Effects of accountable care and payment reform on substance use disorder treatment: evidence from the initial 3 years of the alternative quality contract.

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Effects of accountable care and payment reform on substance use disorder treatment: evidence from the initial 3 years of the alternative quality contract.

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