Fragility of the provision of local public goods to private and collective risks.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Cardenas JC
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5293090 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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