Direct replication of Gervais & Norenzayan (2012): No evidence that analytic thinking decreases religious belief.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Sanchez C
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5325262 | biostudies-literature | 2017
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Direct replication of Gervais & Norenzayan (2012): No evidence that analytic thinking decreases religious belief.
Sanchez Clinton C Sundermeier Brian B Gray Kenneth K Calin-Jageman Robert J RJ
PloS one 20170224 2
Gervais & Norenzayan (2012) reported in Science a series of 4 experiments in which manipulations intended to foster analytic thinking decreased religious belief. We conducted a precise, large, multi-site pre-registered replication of one of these experiments. We observed little to no effect of the experimental manipulation on religious belief (d = 0.07 in the wrong direction, 95% CI[-0.12, 0.25], N = 941). The original finding does not seem to provide reliable or valid evidence that analytic thi ...[more]
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