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Epistemic beliefs' role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation.

ABSTRACT: Widespread misperceptions undermine citizens' decision-making ability. Conclusions based on falsehoods and conspiracy theories are by definition flawed. This article demonstrates that individuals' epistemic beliefs-beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how one comes to know-have important implications for perception accuracy. The present study uses a series of large, nationally representative surveys of the U.S. population to produce valid and reliable measures of three aspects of epistemic beliefs: reliance on intuition for factual beliefs (Faith in Intuition for facts), importance of consistency between empirical evidence and beliefs (Need for evidence), and conviction that "facts" are politically constructed (Truth is political). Analyses confirm that these factors complement established predictors of misperception, substantively increasing our ability to explain both individuals' propensity to engage in conspiracist ideation, and their willingness to embrace falsehoods about high-profile scientific and political issues. Individuals who view reality as a political construct are significantly more likely to embrace falsehoods, whereas those who believe that their conclusions must hew to available evidence tend to hold more accurate beliefs. Confidence in the ability to intuitively recognize truth is a uniquely important predictor of conspiracist ideation. Results suggest that efforts to counter misperceptions may be helped by promoting epistemic beliefs emphasizing the importance of evidence, cautious use of feelings, and trust that rigorous assessment by knowledgeable specialists is an effective guard against political manipulation.

SUBMITTER: Garrett RK

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5603156 | biostudies-literature | 2017

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Epistemic beliefs' role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation.

Garrett R Kelly RK Weeks Brian E BE

PloS one 20170918 9

Widespread misperceptions undermine citizens' decision-making ability. Conclusions based on falsehoods and conspiracy theories are by definition flawed. This article demonstrates that individuals' epistemic beliefs-beliefs about the nature of knowledge and how one comes to know-have important implications for perception accuracy. The present study uses a series of large, nationally representative surveys of the U.S. population to produce valid and reliable measures of three aspects of epistemic ...[more]

PMID: 28922387

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Project description:Pre-service teachers tend to devalue general pedagogical knowledge (GPK) as a valid source for deriving successful teaching practices. The present study investigated beliefs about knowledge sources and epistemic beliefs as predictors for students' perceived value of GPK. Three pre-registered hypotheses were tested. We expected beliefs that GPK originates from scientific sources to entail a devaluation of GPK (Hypothesis 1). Concerning epistemic beliefs, we expected absolute beliefs to positively, and multiplistic beliefs to negatively predict pre-service teachers' perceived practical value of GPK (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we expected relationships between epistemic beliefs and pre-service teachers' perceived practical value of GPK to be confounded by epistemic trustworthiness, perceived topic-specific consistency and topic-specific familiarity (Hypothesis 3). In a study using a split plot design, 365 pre-service teachers were presented with four texts on different educational research topics. For each topic, three text versions were constructed. Even though they were invariant in content, these versions varied in a way that the results were allegedly generated by a practitioner, an expert or by means of a scientific study. Unexpectedly, results showed that research findings allegedly generated by means of a scientific study were associated with a higher perceived value of (topic-specific) GPK for practice (Hypothesis 1). As expected, the perceived value of GPK for practice was predicted by topic-specific multiplism and domain-specific absolutism (Hypothesis 2). These predictive effects were confounded by expertise evaluations of the source and the consistency of prior beliefs with the presented research results (Hypothesis 3). In summary, our results suggest that source beliefs might not be responsible for the devaluation of GPK, but that beliefs on the nature and structure of GPK (i.e., epistemic beliefs) might play an even more important role in this respect. Implications for research and practice are discussed.

Project description:BackgroundOverdose education and naloxone distribution (OEND) to laypersons are key approaches to reduce the incidence of opioid-involved overdoses. While some research has examined attitudes toward OEND, especially among pharmacists and first responders, our understanding of what laypersons believe about overdose and naloxone is surprisingly limited. Further, some scholars have expressed concerns about the prevalence of non-evidence-based beliefs about overdose and naloxone. We designed this study to analyze the prevalence, nature, and context of beliefs about naloxone and overdose among U.S. laypersons.MethodsWe conducted a cross-sectional study (n = 702) using Prolific.co (representative of the U.S. population by age, gender, and race). Primary outcomes were the believability of six statements about overdose/naloxone on a seven-point Likert-type scale. Five statements were unsupported, and one was supported, by current scientific evidence. We used latent profile analysis to classify participants into belief groups, then used regression to study correlates of profile classification.ResultsBelievability of the statements (7: extremely believable) ranged from m = 5.57 (SD = 1.38) for a scientifically supported idea (trained bystanders can reverse overdose with naloxone), to m = 3.33 (SD = 1.83) for a statement claiming opioid users can get high on naloxone. Participants were classified into three latent belief profiles: Profile 1 (most aligned with current evidence; n = 246), Profile 2 (moderately aligned; n = 351), and Profile 3 (least aligned, n = 105). Compared to Profile 1, several covariates were associated with categorization into Profiles 2 and 3, including lower trust in science (RRR = 0.36, 95%CI = 0.24-0.54; RRR = 0.21, 95%CI = 0.12-0.36, respectively), conservative political orientation (RRR = 1.41, 95%CI = 1.23-1.63; 3:RRR = 1.62, 95%CI = 1.35-1.95, respectively), and never being trained about naloxone (Profile 3: RRR = 3.37, 95%CI = 1.16-9.77).ConclusionsPreliminary evidence suggests some U.S. laypersons simultaneously believe that bystander overdose prevention with naloxone can prevent overdose and one or more scientifically unsupported claims about naloxone/overdose. Categorization into clusters displaying such belief patterns was associated with low trust in science, conservative political orientation, and not having been trained about naloxone.PreregistrationThis cross-sectional study was preregistered prior to any data collection using the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/c6ufv.

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Epistemic beliefs' role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation.

Publications

Epistemic beliefs' role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation.

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