False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Bernstein DM
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5619768 | biostudies-literature | 2017
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age.
Bernstein Daniel M DM Coolin Alisha A Fischer Ashley L AL Thornton Wendy Loken WL Sommerville Jessica A JA
PloS one 20170928 9
False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person's beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed simil ...[more]
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