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Developing Digital Privacy: Children's Moral Judgments Concerning Mobile GPS Devices.

ABSTRACT: New technology poses new moral problems for children to consider. We examined whether children deem object tracking with a mobile GPS device to be a property right. In three experiments, 329 children (4-10 years) and adults were asked whether it is acceptable to track the location of either one's own or another person's possessions using a mobile GPS device. Young children, like adults, viewed object tracking as relatively more acceptable for owners than nonowners. However, whereas adults expressed negative evaluations of someone tracking another person's possessions, young children expressed positive evaluations of this behavior. These divergent moral judgments of digital tracking at different ages have profound implications for how concepts of digital privacy develop and for the digital security of children.

SUBMITTER: Gelman SA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5675834 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Jan

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Developing Digital Privacy: Children's Moral Judgments Concerning Mobile GPS Devices.

Gelman Susan A SA Martinez Megan M Davidson Natalie S NS Noles Nicholaus S NS

Child development 20170507 1

New technology poses new moral problems for children to consider. We examined whether children deem object tracking with a mobile GPS device to be a property right. In three experiments, 329 children (4-10 years) and adults were asked whether it is acceptable to track the location of either one's own or another person's possessions using a mobile GPS device. Young children, like adults, viewed object tracking as relatively more acceptable for owners than nonowners. However, whereas adults expres ...[more]

PMID: 28478655

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