Implicit Theory of Mind - An overview of current replications and non-replications.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Kulke L
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5694957 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Similar Datasets
Project description:In this work, we present a collection of data from three replication studies of anticipatory looking false belief tasks measuring implicit Theory of Mind. Two paradigms, by Southgate & Senju and Surian & Geraci were replicated in two independent labs. Eye-tracking data was collected and processed in line with the original procedures to allow for an investigation of effects of false belief processing on looking times and first saccades.
| S-EPMC5671519 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Recently, there has been a debate whether implicit Theory of Mind can be reliably measured using anticipatory looking tasks. Previous anticipatory looking paradigms used video stimuli to measure implicit Theory of Mind; however, numerous replications of these paradigms were unsuccessful. This lack of replications may be due to video stimuli not being sufficiently engaging. As Theory of Mind is an inherently social phenomenon, robust evidence might only be observed in a real social situation. Therefore, the current preregistered study aimed to test anticipatory looking with real-life social stimuli. A mobile eye-tracker was used to measure gaze patterns indicative of Theory of Mind while participants observed a real-life interaction of an experimenter and a confederate. The realistic scenario did not provide clear evidence for implicit Theory of Mind. Furthermore, anticipatory looking behavior did not reliably occur during familiarization trials, in line with previous research. However, looking patterns were slightly more in line with belief tracking than in some more controlled studies using video stimuli. In general, implicit Theory of Mind was not reliably reflected in anticipatory looking patterns even if they were measured in realistic social situations. This questions the suitability of anticipatory looking measures for implicit Theory of Mind.
| S-EPMC7806733 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Research on Theory-of-Mind (ToM) has mainly focused on ages of core ToM development. This article follows a quantitative approach focusing on the level of ToM understanding on a measurement scale, the ToM Storybooks, in 324 typically developing children between 3 and 11 years of age. It deals with the eventual occurrence of developmental non-linearities in ToM functioning, using smoothing techniques, dynamic growth model building and additional indicators, namely moving skewness, moving growth rate changes and moving variability. The ToM sum-scores showed an overall developmental trend that leveled off toward the age of 10 years. Within this overall trend two non-linearities in the group-based change pattern were found: a plateau at the age of around 56 months and a dip at the age of 72-78 months. These temporary regressions in ToM sum-score were accompanied by a decrease in growth rate and variability, and a change in skewness of the ToM data, all suggesting a developmental shift in ToM understanding. The temporary decreases also occurred in the different ToM sub-scores and most clearly so in the core ToM component of beliefs. It was also found that girls had an earlier growth spurt than boys and that the underlying developmental path was more salient in girls than in boys. The consequences of these findings are discussed from various theoretical points of view, with an emphasis on a dynamic systems interpretation of the underlying developmental paths.
| S-EPMC5209372 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.
| S-EPMC4178016 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Recently, Theory of Mind (ToM) research has been revolutionized by new methods. Eye-tracking studies measuring subjects' looking times or anticipatory looking have suggested that implicit and automatic forms of ToM develop much earlier in ontogeny than traditionally assumed and continue to operate outside of subjects' awareness throughout the lifespan. However, the reliability of these implicit methods has recently been put into question by an increasing number of non-replications. What remains unclear from these accumulating non-replication findings, though, is whether they present true negatives (there is no robust phenomenon of automatic ToM) or false ones (automatic ToM is real but difficult to tap). In order to address these questions, the current study implemented conceptual replications of influential anticipatory looking ToM tasks with a new variation in the stimuli. In two separate preregistered studies, we used increasingly realistic stimuli and controlled for potential confounds. Even with these more realistic stimuli, previous results could not be replicated. Rather, the anticipatory looking pattern found here remained largely compatible with more parsimonious explanations. In conclusion, the reality and robustness of automatic ToM remains controversial.
| S-EPMC6689622 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This paper introduces a model of 'theory of mind', namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a 'game theory of mind'. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a 'stag-hunt'. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution.
| S-EPMC2596313 | biostudies-literature
Project description:In the last 15 years, Theory of Mind research has been revolutionized by the development of new implicit tasks. Such tasks aim at tapping children's and adults' uninstructed, largely automatic mental state ascription, indicated in spontaneous looking behavior when observing agents who act on the basis of false beliefs. Studies with anticipatory looking, in particular, have suggested that basic ToM capacities operate from very early in life and remain in unconscious operation throughout the lifespan. Recently, however, systematic replication attempts of anticipatory looking measures have yielded a complex and puzzling mixture of successful, partial and non-replications. The present study aimed at shedding light on the question whether there is a system to this pattern. More specifically, in a set of three preregistered experiments, it was tested whether those conditions that could previously be replicated and those that could not differ in crucial conceptual respects such that the former do not strictly require ToM whereas the latter do. This was tested by the implementation of novel control conditions. The results were complex. There was generally no unambiguous evidence for reliable spontaneous ToM and no effect of the number of passed familiarization trials. Neither was there any unambiguous evidence that the previous mixed patterns of (non-)replications could be explained (away) by the sub-mentalizing account tested in the new control conditions. The empirical situation remains puzzling, and the question whether there is some such thing as implicit and spontaneous ToM remains to be clarified.
| S-EPMC6433471 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundTheory of mind (ToM) has been shown to be impaired in Clinical High Risk (CHR) for psychosis populations and is linked to functional outcomes and symptom severity. Implicit versus explicit ToM has seldom been differentiated in this group, and underlying neural networks have also gone unexplored.Methods24 CHR and 26 healthy volunteers (HV) completed a behavioral ToM measure called the Short Story Task (SST), as well as a resting state functional MRI scan. SST performance was correlated to attenuated psychosis symptoms. Interactions between group and ToM variables (implicit, explicit, and comprehension) on global efficiency in the Mentalizing (MENT) and Mirror Neuron System (MNS) were also examined.ResultsCHR individuals made significantly fewer spontaneous mental state inferences. There were trend-level associations between ToM variables and symptoms, such that greater ToM performance predicted less severe symptoms. There was an interaction of group by spontaneous mental state inference within MENT bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), such that CHR individuals that made spontaneous mental state inferences showed greater global efficiency within the MENT network's bilateral dmPFC.DiscussionFindings suggest implicit ToM deficits are observable prior to psychotic disorder onset, and that these deficits implicate MENT network dmPFC efficiency. Explicit ToM performance was unaltered in the CHR group, and there were no interactions observed within MNS, suggesting specificity of implicit ToM associations with MENT network dmPFC global efficiency. Results identify potential treatment targets for the neural underpinnings of ToM, thus informing prevention and intervention efforts.
| S-EPMC6544479 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Adults with schizophrenia usually have impairments in theory of mind (ToM), which subsequently cause them problems in social interaction. Therefore, it is important for healthcare providers to assess their ToM using adequate measures. This systematic review evaluated current ToM measures (or ToM tasks) for adults with schizophrenia and summarized their specific characteristics, including the concept and construct, administration, and psychometric properties. From a review of 117 articles, 13 types of ToM tasks were identified, and the findings from these articles were qualitatively synthesized. The results showed that ToM tasks are diverse in their presentation modalities, answer modes, strategies of controlling cognitive confounders, and scoring. Most tasks employ cognitive and affective dimensions and target a specific, single ToM concept. The present systematic review found that psychometric evidence supporting the ToM tasks, such as internal consistency, test-retest reliability, unidimensionality, and convergent, criterion, and ecological validities, is insufficient. Based on the results, we propose several principles for selecting appropriate ToM tasks in practice, e.g., selecting a task with multiple ToM concepts, or an exclusive ToM construct containing the cognitive and affective dimensions. Moreover, future studies are needed to provide more psychometric evidence on each type of ToM task applied in people with schizophrenia.
| S-EPMC8297277 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Human strategic interaction requires reasoning about other people's behavior and mental states, combined with an understanding of their incentives. However, the ontogenic development of strategic reasoning is not well understood: At what age do we show a capacity for sophisticated play in social interactions? Several lines of inquiry suggest an important role for recursive thinking (RT) and theory of mind (ToM), but these capacities leave out the strategic element. We posit a strategic theory of mind (SToM) integrating ToM and RT with reasoning about incentives of all players. We investigated SToM in 3- to 9-y-old children and adults in two games that represent prevalent aspects of social interaction. Children anticipate deceptive and competitive moves from the other player and play both games in a strategically sophisticated manner by 7 y of age. One game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium: In this game, children achieve equilibrium play by the age of 7 y on the first move. In the other game, with a single mixed-strategy equilibrium, children's behavior moved toward the equilibrium with experience. These two results also correspond to two ways in which children's behavior resembles adult behavior in the same games. In both games, children's behavior becomes more strategically sophisticated with age on the first move. Beyond the age of 7 y, children begin to think about strategic interaction not myopically, but in a farsighted way, possibly with a view to cooperating and capitalizing on mutual gains in long-run relationships.
| S-EPMC4169981 | biostudies-literature