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Heterogeneous network promotes species coexistence: metapopulation model for rock-paper-scissors game.

ABSTRACT: Understanding mechanisms of biodiversity has been a central question in ecology. The coexistence of three species in rock-paper-scissors (RPS) systems are discussed by many authors; however, the relation between coexistence and network structure is rarely discussed. Here we present a metapopulation model for RPS game. The total population is assumed to consist of three subpopulations (nodes). Each individual migrates by random walk; the destination of migration is randomly determined. From reaction-migration equations, we obtain the population dynamics. It is found that the dynamic highly depends on network structures. When a network is homogeneous, the dynamics are neutrally stable: each node has a periodic solution, and the oscillations synchronize in all nodes. However, when a network is heterogeneous, the dynamics approach stable focus and all nodes reach equilibriums with different densities. Hence, the heterogeneity of the network promotes biodiversity.

SUBMITTER: Nagatani T

PROVIDER: S-EPMC5935761 | biostudies-literature | 2018 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Heterogeneous network promotes species coexistence: metapopulation model for rock-paper-scissors game.

Nagatani Takashi T Ichinose Genki G Tainaka Kei-Ichi KI

Scientific reports 20180504 1

Understanding mechanisms of biodiversity has been a central question in ecology. The coexistence of three species in rock-paper-scissors (RPS) systems are discussed by many authors; however, the relation between coexistence and network structure is rarely discussed. Here we present a metapopulation model for RPS game. The total population is assumed to consist of three subpopulations (nodes). Each individual migrates by random walk; the destination of migration is randomly determined. From react ...[more]

PMID: 29728573

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