Impact of the 340B Drug Pricing Program on Cancer Care Site and Spending in Medicare.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Jung J
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6153182 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Oct
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Impact of the 340B Drug Pricing Program on Cancer Care Site and Spending in Medicare.
Jung Jeah J Xu Wendy Y WY Kalidindi Yamini Y
Health services research 20180122 5
<h4>Objective</h4>To examine the impact of the 340B drug discount program on the site of cancer drug administration and cancer care spending in Medicare.<h4>Data sources/study setting</h4>2010-2013 Medicare claims data for a random sample of Medicare Fee-for-Service beneficiaries with cancer.<h4>Study design</h4>We identified the 340B effect using variation in the availability of 340B hospitals across markets. We considered beneficiaries from markets that newly gained a 340B hospital during the ...[more]
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Project description:BackgroundThe 340B Drug Pricing Program entitles qualifying hospitals to discounts on outpatient drugs, increasing the profitability of drug administration. By tying the program eligibility of hospitals to their Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) adjustment percentage, which reflects the proportion of hospitalized patients who are low-income, the program is intended to expand resources for underserved populations but provides no direct incentives for hospitals to use financial gains to enhance care for low-income patients.MethodsWe used Medicare claims and a regression-discontinuity design, taking advantage of the threshold for program eligibility among general acute care hospitals (DSH percentage, >11.75%), to isolate the effects of the program on hospital-physician consolidation (i.e., acquisition of physician practices or employment of physicians by hospitals) and on the outpatient administration of parenteral drugs by hospital-owned facilities in three specialties in which parenteral drugs are frequently used. For low-income patients, we also assessed the effects of the program on the provision of care by hospitals and on mortality.ResultsHospital eligibility for the 340B Program was associated with 2.3 more hematologist-oncologists practicing in facilities owned by the hospital, or 230% more hematologist-oncologists than expected in the absence of the program (P=0.02), and with 0.9 (or 900%) more ophthalmologists per hospital (P=0.08) and 0.1 (or 33%) more rheumatologists per hospital (P=0.84). Program eligibility was associated with significantly higher numbers of parenteral drug claims billed by hospitals for Medicare patients in hematology-oncology (90% higher, P=0.001) and ophthalmology (177% higher, P=0.03) but not rheumatology (77% higher, P=0.12). Program eligibility was associated with lower proportions of low-income patients in hematology-oncology and ophthalmology and with no significant differences in hospital provision of safety-net or inpatient care for low-income groups or in mortality among low-income residents of the hospitals' local service areas.ConclusionsThe 340B Program has been associated with hospital-physician consolidation in hematology-oncology and with more hospital-based administration of parenteral drugs in hematology-oncology and ophthalmology. Financial gains for hospitals have not been associated with clear evidence of expanded care or lower mortality among low-income patients. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and others.).
| S-EPMC6073067 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceCritics of the federal 340B Drug Pricing Program raised concerns that the program might provide financial incentives for participating hospitals to prescribe more and/or more expensive drugs because the revenue generated from Medicare reimbursement exceeds the purchase price by a substantial margin. Studies showing higher Medicare Part B drug spending at hospitals that are 340B hospitals, which can purchase outpatient drugs from manufacturers at discounted prices, compared with non-340B hospitals were used by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to justify their 340B payment policy that reduced Medicare payments for drugs in the 340B program in 2018 and thereafter. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services attributed higher spending to the 340B benefit and believed that payment cuts would reduce the financial incentives associated with higher spending. However, the lack of sufficient risk adjustments is a significant concern of study validity.ObjectiveTo examine whether per-beneficiary Medicare Part B drug spending is significantly different between 340B and non-340B hospitals while adequately controlling for patient-level and hospital-level risk factors.Design, setting, and participantsA cross-sectional study was conducted from October 1, 2020, to May 30, 2021, using 2017 administrative claims data from a random 5% sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. Included beneficiaries had at least 1 separately payable non-pass-through drug claim in 2017, were fully enrolled in Part A and Part B through 2017, and did not die in 2017.Main outcomes and measuresThe outcome was separately payable Part B drug spending.ResultsThe sample included 35 364 beneficiaries (21 825 women [61.7%]; 29 996 White patients [84.8%]; mean [SD] age, 70.6 [12.0] years) and 2446 hospitals. A total of 918 hospitals (37.5%) were in the 340B program and 938 hospitals (38.3%) were teaching hospitals. There was a higher percentage of teaching hospitals among 340B hospitals (517 of 918 [56.3%]) than non-340B hospitals (421 of 1528 [27.6%]), and beneficiaries who went to 340B hospitals were more likely to be non-White than those who went to non-340B hospitals (3360 of 19 139 [17.6%] vs 1583 of 13 710 [11.5%]). The Part B drug spending difference between 340B and non-340B hospitals was not statistically significant after controlling for beneficiary-level risk factors and hospital-level characteristics ($568; 95% CI, -$283 to $1419; P = .19).Conclusions and relevanceThe results show that the differences in patient population and hospital-level characteristics may explain drug spending differences between 340B and non-340B hospitals, which raises doubt about the financial incentive theory of the 340B program drug discount and the justification for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services's 340B payment policy.
| S-EPMC8857681 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGROUND:Accountable care organizations (ACOs) have been shown to reduce prostate cancer treatment among men unlikely to benefit because of competing risks (ie, potential overtreatment). This study assessed whether the level of engagement in ACOs by urologists affected rates of treatment, overtreatment, and spending. METHODS:A 20% sample of national Medicare data was used to identify men diagnosed with prostate cancer between 2012 and 2014. The extent of urologist engagement in an ACO, as measured by the proportion of patients in an ACO managed by an ACO-participating urologist, served as the exposure. The use of treatment, potential overtreatment (ie, treatment in men with a ?75% risk of 10-year noncancer mortality), and average payments in the year after diagnosis for each ACO were modeled. RESULTS:Among 2822 men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer, the median rates of treatment and potential overtreatment by an ACO were 71.3% (range, 23.6%-79.5%) and 53.6% (range, 12.4%-76.9%), respectively. Average Medicare payments among ACOs in the year after diagnosis ranged from $16,523.52 to $34,766.33. Stronger urologist-ACO engagement was not associated with treatment (odds ratio, 0.87; 95% confidence interval, 0.6-1.2; P?=?.4) or spending (9.7% decrease in spending; P?=?.08). However, urologist engagement was associated with a lower likelihood of potential overtreatment (odds ratio, 0.29; 95% confidence interval, 0.1-0.86; P?=?.03). CONCLUSIONS:ACOs vary widely in treatment, potential overtreatment, and spending for prostate cancer. ACOs with stronger urologist engagement are less likely to treat men with a high risk of noncancer mortality, and this suggests that organizations that better engage specialists may be able to improve the value of specialty care. Cancer 2018. © 2018 American Cancer Society.
| S-EPMC6108926 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceThe federal 340B program lowers the acquisition cost of prescription drugs and places no limits on what hospitals charge payers. Congress established the program to allow 340B profits (the difference between payments and acquisition costs) to subsidize other safety-net services. Little is known about the magnitude of revenues and profits from the 340B program among participating hospitals.ObjectiveTo report revenues and estimated profits from the 340B program that hospitals collect from Medicare and Medicare beneficiaries for outpatient clinic administration of prescription drugs covered under Medicare Part B.Design, setting, and participantsThis cross-sectional descriptive study used 100% Medicare outpatient Part B claims from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2016, from fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries administered separately payable drugs at general acute care nonprofit or public hospitals without special payment designations. Claims data (N?=?11?298?860) were aggregated to the hospital-year level (N?=?6000) and linked to hospital finances and 340B participation from Medicare cost reports and the 340B covered entity list.Main outcomes and measuresOutcomes studied were revenue and estimated profits, assuming a 50% discount from 340B-discounted drug administrations to Medicare patients, as well as Medicare 340B profits relative to hospital net operating revenue, uncompensated care, and disproportionate share hospital payments.ResultsDuring the study period, hospitals received approximately $2.1 billion in 340B revenue from Medicare in 2013, increasing to $3.7 billion in 2016. Estimated 340B profits from Medicare in 2016 totaled $1.9 billion, and per-hospital estimated 340B profits were $2.5 million but exhibited variability (median, $0.8 million; interquartile range, $0.1 million-$2.8 million). In 2016, median estimated 340B profits from Medicare were 0.3% (interquartile range, 0.1%-0.7%; mean, 0.4%) of hospital operating budgets and 9.4% (interquartile range, 1.8%-26.5%; mean, 16.6%) of hospital uncompensated care costs.Conclusions and relevanceEstimated profits that hospitals derived from administering 340B-discounted drugs to Medicare patients are small compared with operating budgets yet substantial compared with uncompensated care costs for many hospitals. Revenue and profit estimates from 340B-discounted drugs represent a lower bound because data on revenue from the sale of outpatient retail dispensed drugs by hospital contract pharmacies and commercial insurer claims are not available.
| S-EPMC6824218 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Background In the United States, prices for therapeutically similar drugs vary widely, which has prompted efforts by public and private insurers to steer patients toward the lower-priced options. Under reference pricing, the insurer or employer establishes a maximum contribution it will make toward the price of a drug or procedure, and the patient pays the remainder. Methods We used difference-in-differences multivariable regression methods to analyze changes in prescriptions and pricing for 1302 drugs in 78 therapeutic classes in the United States, before and after implementation of reference pricing by an alliance of private employers. We assessed trends for the study group relative to those for an employee group that was not subject to reference pricing. The study included 1,122,741 prescriptions that were reimbursed during the period from 2010 through 2014. Results Implementation of reference pricing was associated with a higher percentage of prescriptions that were filled for the lowest-priced reference drug within its therapeutic class (difference in probability, 7.0 percentage points; 95% confidence interval [CI], 4.0 to 9.9), a lower average price paid per prescription (-13.9%; 95% CI, -23.8 to -2.7), and a higher rate of copayment by patients (5.2%; 95% CI, 0.2 to 10.4) than in the comparison group. During the first 18 months after implementation, spending for employers was $1.34 million lower and the amount of copayments for employees was $0.12 million higher than in the comparison group. Conclusions Implementation of reference pricing was associated with significant changes in drug selection and spending for a population of patients covered by employment-based insurance in the United States. (Funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the Genentech Foundation.).
| S-EPMC5580998 | biostudies-literature
Project description:OBJECTIVES:To compare Medicare spending on provider-administered chemotherapy in hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) and physician offices after controlling for cancer type. STUDY DESIGN:Secondary data analysis. METHODS:We used 2010-2013 claims data for a random sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries who had cancer and received chemotherapy services either in physician offices or in HOPDs. We constructed 2 spending measures: (1) spending on chemotherapy drugs and (2) spending on chemotherapy administration. Each spending measure was the allowed payment, which includes both Medicare reimbursement and patient out-of-pocket spending. We compared the spending measures in the 2 care settings using regression analysis to control for certain patient risk factors, including cancer type. We also compared the number of chemotherapy and administration claims per beneficiary and spending per claim by cancer type to understand differences in utilization patterns in the 2 care settings. RESULTS:Risk-adjusted chemotherapy drug spending per beneficiary was $2451 lower in HOPDs compared with physician offices. Risk-adjusted chemotherapy administration spending was $322 higher in HOPDs than in physician offices. Patients in physician offices received chemotherapy drugs more frequently than those in HOPDs. However, the chemotherapy spending per claim line was higher in HOPDs than physician offices. CONCLUSIONS:Chemotherapy drug spending per Medicare beneficiary was lower in HOPDs than in physician offices, driven by less frequent use of chemotherapy in HOPDs. As the site of provider-administered chemotherapy shifts from physician offices to HOPDs, continuing assessment of cancer care spending by site of care is necessary.
| S-EPMC6346993 | biostudies-other
Project description:BackgroundHealth care providers who participate as an accountable care organization (ACO) in the voluntary Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) have incentives to lower spending for Medicare patients while achieving high performance on a set of quality measures. Little is known about the extent to which early savings achieved by ACOs in the program have grown and been replicated by ACOs that entered the program in later years. ACOs that are physician groups have stronger incentives to lower spending than hospital-integrated ACOs.MethodsUsing fee-for-service Medicare claims from 2009 through 2015, we performed difference-in-differences analyses to compare changes in Medicare spending for patients in ACOs before and after entry into the MSSP with concurrent changes in spending for local patients served by providers not participating in the MSSP (control group). We estimated differential changes (i.e., the between-group difference in the change from the pre-entry period) separately for hospital-integrated ACOs and physician-group ACOs that entered the MSSP in 2012, 2013, or 2014.ResultsMSSP participation was associated with differential spending reductions in physician-group ACOs. These reductions grew with longer participation in the program and were significantly greater than the reductions in hospital-integrated ACOs. By 2015, the mean differential change in per-patient Medicare spending was -$474 (-4.9% of the pre-entry mean, P<0.001) for physician-group ACOs that entered in 2012, -$342 (-3.5% of the pre-entry mean, P<0.001) for those that entered in 2013, and -$156 (-1.6% of the pre-entry mean, P=0.009) for those that entered in 2014. The corresponding differential changes for hospital-integrated ACOs were -$169 (P=0.005), -$18 (P=0.78), and $88 (P=0.14), which were significantly lower than for physician-group ACOs (P<0.001). Spending reductions in physician-group ACOs constituted a net savings to Medicare of $256.4 million in 2015, whereas spending reductions in hospital-integrated ACOs were offset by bonus payments.ConclusionsAfter 3 years of the MSSP, participation in shared-savings contracts by physician groups was associated with savings for Medicare that grew over the study period, whereas hospital-integrated ACOs did not produce savings (on average) during the same period. (Funded by the National Institute on Aging.).
| S-EPMC6269647 | biostudies-literature
Project description: Not available
| S-EPMC7080379 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundSurgical care among older adults is costly. While Medicare accountable care organizations (ACOs) are designed around primary care, there are reasons to believe that participation may also affect spending on surgery. This study examines the impact that Medicare ACO alignment has on spending for inpatient and outpatient surgical care.Study designWe conducted a retrospective cohort study using national Medicare claims (2008 through 2015). Among a 20% random sample of beneficiaries, we identified adults 65 years of age and older enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare, distinguishing between those aligned and unaligned with a Medicare ACO. We then measured payments for surgical services made on their behalf. Finally, we fit multivariable regression models to evaluate the association between ACO alignment and spending for inpatient and outpatient surgical care.ResultsWe identified 37,249,845 beneficiary-year observations, of which 2,950,188 (7.9%) were aligned with a Medicare ACO. After adjustment for patient factors, ACO alignment was associated with $181 [95% confidence interval (CI), -$243 to -$118; P <0.001] lower spending per beneficiary-year. ACO alignment was associated with 2.9% fewer inpatient surgical episodes per year [incidence rate ratio (IRR), 0.97; 95% CI, 0.96 to 0.98; P <0.001] but 2.3% more outpatient episodes per year (IRR, 1.02; 95% CI, 1.02 to 1.03; P <0.001). Among inpatient surgical episodes, average payments were $956 lower for ACO aligned beneficiaries (95%CI -$1218 to -$694, P <0.001).Conclusions and relevanceACO alignment was associated with savings on surgical care. These savings resulted from increased outpatient surgery and reduced use of inpatient surgery as well as reduced spending per inpatient surgical episode. Greater focus on surgical care may improve the ability of ACOs to control healthcare spending.
| S-EPMC7561039 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceCareFirst, the largest commercial insurer in the mid-Atlantic Region of the United States, runs a medical home program focusing on financial incentives for primary care practices and care coordination for high-risk patients. From 2013 to 2015, CareFirst extended the program to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries in participating practices. If the model extension improved quality while reducing spending, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services could expand the program to Medicare beneficiaries broadly.ObjectiveTo test whether extending CareFirst's program to Medicare FFS patients improves care processes and reduces hospitalizations, emergency department visits, and spending.Design, setting, and participantsThis difference-in-differences analysis compared outcomes for roughly 35 000 Medicare FFS patients attributed to 52 intervention practices (grouped by CareFirst into 14 "medical panels") to outcomes for 69 000 Medicare patients attributed to 42 matched comparison panels during a 1-year baseline period and 2.5-year intervention at Maryland primary care practices.Main outcomes and measuresHospitalizations (all-cause and ambulatory-care sensitive), emergency department visits, Medicare Part A and B spending, and 3 quality-of-care process measures: ambulatory care within 14 days of a hospital stay, cholesterol testing for those with ischemic vascular disease, and a composite measure for those with diabetes.InterventionsCareFirst hired nurses who worked with patients' usual primary care practitioners to coordinate care for 3656 high-risk Medicare patients. CareFirst paid panels rewards for meeting cost and quality targets for their Medicare patients and advised panels on how to meet these targets based on analyses of claims data.ResultsOn average, each of the 14 intervention panels had 9.3 primary care practitioners and was attributed 2202 Medicare FFS patients in the baseline period. The panels' attributed Medicare patients were, on average, 73.8 years old, 59.2% female, and 85.1% white. The extension of CareFirst's program to Medicare patients was not statistically associated with improvements in any outcomes, either for the full Medicare population or for a high-risk subgroup in which impacts were expected to be largest. For the full population, the difference-in-differences estimates were 1.4 hospitalizations per 1000 patients per quarter (P = .54; 90% CI, -2.1 to 5.0), -2.5 outpatient ED visits per 1000 patients per quarter (P = .26; 90% CI, -6.2 to 1.1), and -$1 per patient per month in Medicare Part A and B spending (P = .98; 90% CI, -$40 to $39). For hospitalizations and Medicare spending, the 90% CIs did not span CareFirst's expected impacts. Hospitalizations for the intervention group declined by 10% from baseline year to the final 18 months of the intervention, but this was matched by similar declines in the comparison group.Conclusion and relevanceThe extension of CareFirst's program to Medicare did not measurably improve quality-of-care processes or reduce service use or spending for Medicare patients. Further program refinement and testing would be needed to support scaling the program more broadly to Medicare patients.
| S-EPMC5710572 | biostudies-literature