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Coevolution of public goods game and networks based on survival of the fittest.

ABSTRACT: We introduce a random strategy update rule for the evolutionary public goods game on networks based on survival of the fittest. A survival cost parameter is introduced to public goods game. Players whose payoffs are below the survival cost will be deleted from the network. The same number of new nodes are randomly connected to the network and randomly designated cooperation or defection. Numerical results show that cooperation can flourish if the multiplication factor of the public goods game is greater than the network degree. We present a simple analytical method to explain this result. The fraction of cooperators reaches the maximum for a suitable survival cost. Furthermore, the initial random network has evolved into a heterogeneous network which facilitates the emergence of the cooperation. Our work could be helpful to understand how natural selection favors cooperation. It suggests a new method to investigate the impact of the survival cost on the evolution of cooperation.

SUBMITTER: Ren G

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6155537 | biostudies-literature | 2018

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Coevolution of public goods game and networks based on survival of the fittest.

Ren Guangming G Liu Lan L Feng Mingku M He Yingji Y

PloS one 20180925 9

We introduce a random strategy update rule for the evolutionary public goods game on networks based on survival of the fittest. A survival cost parameter is introduced to public goods game. Players whose payoffs are below the survival cost will be deleted from the network. The same number of new nodes are randomly connected to the network and randomly designated cooperation or defection. Numerical results show that cooperation can flourish if the multiplication factor of the public goods game is ...[more]

PMID: 30252900

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